



TURKEY AND EUROPE

CHALLENGING PARTNERS

RUSSIA, TURKEY, AND THE EU: AN UNEASY TRIANGLE

EVREN BALTA
CONSTANTINOS FILIS
MUSTAFA AYDIN

OCTOBER 2021

This publication was produced as part of the CATS Network Project, titled "Turkey as a partner and challenge for European Security". The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of CATS Network, an international network of think tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.

The project is being conducted by a consortium of the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT), the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University, and the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at Panteion University.

RUSSIA, TURKEY, AND THE EU: AN UNEASY TRIANGLE

Evren Balta*, Constantinos Filis**, Mustafa Aydın***

Historically, Russia and Turkey have both been outsiders and challengers to Europe, though it would be impossible to understand European history without considering their impact and their attempts at times to become “European”. During most of the 20th century, too, they remained on Europe’s periphery, Turkey aligning with the West (including Western Europe) and Russia aligning with and dominating Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War, however, saw Europe’s unification at long last, with most of the Central and Eastern Countries joining the European Union (EU) and NATO. Yet Turkey and Russia remained outside this process, though with Turkey’s continued membership of NATO and up to now unsuccessful bid to become a full EU member. While both tried to varying degrees to work (integrate) with Europe during the 1990s, once again with a varying degree of success, they grew apart from Europe during the 2000s for different reasons. Nevertheless, they still impact European developments, both positively and negatively, while their own political and international developments are also influenced by what happens in Europe. In short, their future developments remain entangled in an uneasy triangle.

Looking over the experience of EU enlargement after the end of the Cold War, it is clear that after an initial inclusive attitude toward both countries during the 1990s, the EU - the main engine of European integration - has since then redefined its relationship with them. While Turkey is still an EU candidate country, its foreign and domestic policies have become less European-oriented and more self-assertive, and accession negotiations have been all but officially suspended. Meanwhile, EU-Russian relations have become strained over various issues since the early 2000s, but especially following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The lingering Syrian Civil War and related refugee crisis and other regional conflicts have also widened the regional geopolitical agenda and reshaped the (in)security framework that all sides have to operate within. Nevertheless, it is clear that the earlier European enthusiasm to finally bring peace to the “whole of Europe” through Europeanization has by now stopped at the thresholds of Russia (even Ukraine) and Turkey, which has, and no doubt will have further repercussions for the future of Europe as well as for these countries and even global politics.

In these contexts, this paper examines the

* Prof. Dr., Chair, Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University, evren.balta@ozyegin.edu.tr

** Executive Director, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, cfilis@gmail.com

*** Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Kadir Has University, maydin@khas.edu.tr

evolving parameters of the Turkish-Russian-European triangle and their evolving relations with each other, with a specific attention to European security. By focusing on how the EU affects and is affected by the growing bilateral ties between Turkey and Russia, and by looking via different angles at their individual relationships with the EU, it will bring out both challenging and endorsing aspects of the trio. It will also consider Russia and Turkey as normative challengers to Europe, before discussing their positioning in various security-related regional developments, which simultaneously provides security to Europe while also challenging the transatlantic alliance, amidst growing regional tensions. Finally, it will evaluate how energy has become a major factor shaping alliance patterns between Russia, Turkey, and the EU.

Russia and Turkey as Normative Challengers

In July 1996, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Albert Chernyshev, visited Turkey to ask Turkish officials to cut support for the Chechens, famously remarking in Turkish that “people living in glass houses should not throw stones at each other” (Olson, 1996: 113). Throughout the 1990s, while the Turkish government sympathized with the Chechen cause, Russian politicians openly declared their support for the Kurdish cause (Traynor, 2001), and went as far as hosting an international conference in 1994 to discuss the problems of the Kurds living in the Russian Federation, despite Turkish government protests. In 1995, while two former Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament were visiting Russia to discuss the possibility of establishing a Kurdish parliament in exile in Moscow, the Russian

government allowed a “Kurdish House” to open in Moscow (Olson, 1989). While the tug-of-war between Turkey and Russia came to the surface with the Chechen and Kurdish conflicts at the time, the underlying struggle for dominance over Eurasia was ever present in the background, and ethnic challenges were part of this wider geopolitical tussle (Blandy, 1998: 4; Aydın, 2000). Bilateral relations only started to improve after they signed a Joint Declaration on Anti-Terrorism on 5 November 1999 (Olson, 1996), that prohibited the operation of terrorist organizations in one country that could threaten the other, which was only possible once it became clear that both countries received their coveted energy through pipelines from the Caspian Basin -- Tenghiz-Novorossisk for Russia and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan for Turkey (Aydın, 2010: 783).

For both states, the underlying geopolitical struggle and the ethnic conflicts they faced in their territories, invoked the earlier memories of an infiltrating foreign enemy attempting to weaken the neighboring nation by using internal divisions, which dated back to their shared experience at the beginning of the 20th century of imperial collapse and subsequent state formation (Barkey and Von Hagen, 1997). The trauma inflicted by the collapse of multinational empires, mostly through nationalist mobilization, set in motion a dynamic of suspicion and a veritable obsession with treason and traitors that focused on ethnic others (Von Hagen, 1998).

In Turkey, this is closely related to what Turkish scholars dub the “Sèvres syndrome” (Aydın, 2003), whereby “individuals, groups and institutions... interpret all public interactions...through a framework of fear and anxiety over the

possible annihilation, abandonment, and betrayal of the Turkish state” (Göçek, 2011: 99). As such, contemporary Turkish political culture is shaped by an overwhelming existential trauma that posits a choice between survival or annihilation, and independence or slavery (Öktem, 2011: 59). The perpetual fear of conspiratorial external actors bent on destroying Turkey’s national integrity, with the collaboration of supposed internal enemies, has strongly influenced both Turkey’s political culture and general public perception, as reflected in consecutive public surveys (Aydın et al., 2021). More specifically, the Kurdish question has occupied central stage in recent decades in the security culture of the country (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000; Aydın, 2003) and even become one of the defining elements of Turkey’s external relations.

Analogous to Turkey’s Sèvres syndrome, Russia’s political elites have long been overly concerned by fears of disintegration orchestrated by external actors and carried out by the state’s domestic enemies. Remembering the cooperation of the White Army with the Western powers during the Russian Civil War after the 1917 Revolution, the alleged collaboration of non-Russian ethnic groups with the Germans during the Second World War became the rationale to deport several national groups, including the Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and others from their homelands (Bugai 1996). Throughout the Cold War, the internal agents of enemy governments were thought to have penetrated the country’s internal defenses to attack it from within and bring about military defeat.

After the end of the Cold War, conspiracy theorists blamed the USSR’s disintegration on an elaborate plot by supposed external forces, that aimed at and ultimately succeeded in weakening and dismembering Russia. Such explanations gained remarkable traction within Russian society and its elite, especially among the security and foreign policy establishment (Yablokv, 2018). Very similar to Turkey, the conspiratorial thinking focusing on how the state is being weakened from within has always been evident in the Russian political elite’s threat perceptions.[1]

Thus, the two countries’ foreign policy and security cultures share many similar aspects, reflecting their attachment to the emerging European security architecture in the 19th century. Throughout the 19th century, both countries tried to become part of Europe and fully-fledged members of the “concert of Europe”, though both remained, at best, on the fringes of the European system (Rachman, 2019; Center of Global Interests, 2016). This in-between-ness forced both the Russian and the Turkish state and elites to maintain a dual identity as both European and something else (Giles, 2019: 3-12), which was exacerbated by numerous historical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural differences from Europe proper (Friedman, 2014; Koldunova, 2015), and eventually resulted in periodic swings between Westernization and anti-Western positions in their foreign policy cultures (Usackas, 2017; Bugayova, 2019).

The pattern of attachment of both states to the European security architecture began to differ in the 20th century, and especially during the Cold War when Turkey moved significantly away from the Soviet Union and toward integration into

[1] A perfect example of this can be found in a speech delivered by President Putin in 2004: “We showed weakness, and the weak are trampled on. Some want to cut off a juicy morsel from us while others are helping them...And terrorism is, of course, only a tool for achieving these goals. There are certain people who want us to be focused on internal problems and they pull strings here so that we don’t raise our heads internationally.” Address by President Vladimir Putin (2004), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22494> (Accessed 20 May 2021).

the Western system (Zarakol, 2017). After the Second World War and during the Cold War, Turkey's security architecture was closely integrated into the western security architecture, after it joined NATO in 1952 and transformed its security culture in alliance with the Western bloc. As part of the Euro-Atlantic security umbrella, and engaged in EU accession negotiations for almost 70 years, Turkey has been regarded by its Western allies as a flank - during the Cold War - or even a frontline country since the end of the Cold War. Russia, on the other hand, has not only remained outside the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, but has been a major challenger. Its security architecture, institutions, and culture have therefore been designed to balance the power of the Euro-Atlantic security system, which has until recently created significant tension for Turkish-Russian relations.

Despite these differences and different modes of integration into the Western security architecture in the 20th century, their attitudes towards the West have become more aligned since the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communist ideology provided a unique opportunity for the West in general, and Europeans in particular, to incorporate Russia into a new liberal democratic world order. During the first term of Boris Yeltsin's Presidency, Russia attempted to join the western system in order to share power (Zarakol, 2017), while it moved to a position after 1994 to reclaim its place as a great power on the world stage and a dominant player in its near abroad, which clashed with similar Turkish ambitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus during the rest of the 1990s (Aydın, 2020).

Russia's weak economy and domestic instability significantly hindered efforts to

regain great power status during most of the 1990s. Thus, strengthening Russia from the inside out became the first task of Vladimir Putin after he took power in December 1999. The first Russian Foreign Policy Concept, approved by Putin on 28 June 2000, recognized Russia's limited capabilities and the need to make political concessions (Cummings, 2001), and adopted a pragmatic approach of trying to increase Russia's power and capabilities, end its isolation, and improve its international image (Sakwa, 2014).

Putin did not initially display a strong anti-US/EU attitude, and the West and Russia increased their security cooperation in the early 2000s, against what both saw as the rising global security threat: radical Islamic terrorism. While dealing with its Chechen uprising, which was thought to fuel radical Islamism inside Russia, Moscow whole-heartedly supported the US anti-terror efforts after the 9/11 attacks. This honeymoon period however soon ended, when Russia became more self-confident with its growing economy and realized that the US and its allies were not so eager to facilitate Russia's interests and security concerns in its near abroad. Specifically, the eastward expansions of NATO (in 1999 and 2004) and the EU (in 2004), the announcement of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in 2009, and NATO's declaration in the same year that Georgia and Ukraine could become new members became major concerns for Russian policy makers, who considered these as acts of aggression by the West, aiming to weaken and encircle Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014). Furthermore, Russia, by this time, began to feel threatened by what it considered western-supported regime changes in its sphere of influence - the so-called "color revolutions", as well

as US/EU support for opposition groups inside Russia (Dannreuther, 2015). These moves within the post-Soviet geography further boosted conspiratorial elements in its foreign policy culture. When protests hit the Russian capital in 2012, Russian leaders were already highly suspicious about the possible ambition of the country's encirclement by Western powers.

Given these developments, the Russian leadership concluded that its national interests and security concerns would not be respected by the West and they became more confrontational toward NATO and the EU. This became evident when Russia reacted with force when challenged in Georgia in 2008 and later when it annexed Crimea in 2014, by supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine after President Viktor Yanukovich was ousted by pro-Western protesters. Following the deterioration in EU-Russia relations after these developments, Russia also increased its efforts in the Baltics and expanded the use of its economic, political, and informational tools against several EU member states, targeting them with disinformation operations, cyberattacks, and other attempts to influence their domestic political affairs (Stronski and Sokolsky, 2017: 11-12). At the same time, it started to heavily militarize the Black Sea region, having created AD/A2 (Anti Access, Area Denial) zones on its western and southern borders, including Kaliningrad and Crimea (Erdoğan, 2018).

It can be argued that, among the multifaceted issues affecting EU-Russian relations, the main parameter is a normative disagreement over the rules that govern the existing international system (Liik, 2018: 2). In particular, Russia and the EU have dramatically divergent views on the desirable and legitimate

conduct of states, domestically and internationally, EU support for the liberal international order, and Russian application of *realpolitik* (Liik, 2018: 3). Russia's creation of concepts such as "managed democracy" or "sovereign democracy" (Petrov, 2005; Mandel, 2005), characterized by a single, central, top-down government that is immune to either internal or external influences, clashes directly in several respects with European standards of democracy, its view of the European order, shared sovereignty, cooperation, human rights, and freedom of choice (Liik, 2018: 3).

Similar to Russia's travails, Turkey's economic, political and bureaucratic elite thought at the beginning of the 2000s that it could become an integral part of Europe. However, as enlargement fatigue set in in Europe after its big-bang enlargement in 2004, political forces (and leaders) with populist agendas gained popularity in many European countries, opposing Turkey's EU membership among others, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU as a full member after the failure of the Annan Plan, despite Turkey's objections, and its leaders started to realize that Turkey's EU membership dreams would have to be shelved, at least for the time being. At the same time, relations with Europe in general soured further after the Gezi Park protests in 2013, which the government claimed were masterminded by its Western allies. This aspect of Turkey's conspiratorial foreign policy culture was strengthened again after the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, when Western capitals were not only seen as lacking in their support for Turkey's legitimate government but were even accused of complicity in the coup attempt. Thus, soon after the attempt failed, Ankara shifted explicitly to a strategy of omnibalancing between its Western allies

and regional partners - a strategy whereby Turkish leaders dynamically decide between shifting alignments, according to whichever outside power appeared most likely to help the government to advance Turkey's contemporary policies, and also sometimes to retain power domestically (Balta and Çelikpala 2020). In the meantime, the strategic culture and governmental rhetoric have increasingly become anti-American, while calls to reduce dependency on NATO and develop independent foreign and security policies, supported by an indigenous defense industry have garnered strong domestic support (Aydın et al., 2021).

To sum up, three factors have been important in shaping Russian-Turkish alliance patterns. First, their security cultures have been shaped by a perception of living in country with glass walls. Faced with domestic challenges, both states have allied with various actors to secure their territorial integrity and regime survival. They have formed alliances to seek assistance from other states, either to defeat domestic belligerents or counter-balance the external actors that they believe are fueling domestic instability (Quirk, 2014). In other words, their ontological security concerns, which are shaped by their social identities, have played a crucial role in the formation of external alliances (David, 1991). Second, both states believe that they are special powers with reference to their imperial histories. Therefore, as realist theories predict, when opportunities arise, they try to enhance their capabilities or strengthen their influence in the international system. Third, the West's role and patterns of interaction are crucial factors explaining the two states' behavior. For both states, Europe was unable to implement a greater continental unification strategy (Warhola and Mitchell

, 2006). This failure to create a framework for normative and geopolitical inclusion left Turkey and Russia feeling more excluded and isolated, which in turn drew them toward each other (Sakwa, 2010), creating an "axis of the excluded" (Hill and Taşpınar, 2006). The Russian-Turkish alignment as security providers in their shared neighborhood and beyond emerged in this context.

Russia and Turkey as Security Providers

The last decade has witnessed the emergence of a new balance of power in the wider Middle East, which can only be understood through the links between domestic conflicts, transnational affinities, and regional state ambitions. (Sub)National actors looked for regional allies who somehow shared their political and ideological positions to consolidate their existence (Gause, 2014), while Turkey and Russia have emerged as important alternative powers to the already existing US presence. Their specific domestic situations, transnational affinities, and ambitions have affected their actions in the region, while both have looked for external allies to consolidate their positions as the competition escalated.

This major regional transformation has directly or indirectly encouraged political, economic, and social challenges to the EU and its member states. Events such as the crises in Libya and Syria played a major role in the European migrant crisis, when millions of refugees from war-torn African and Middle Eastern countries attempted to flee to Europe (UNHCR, 2020), although the EU's involvement was limited due to its inability or unwillingness. In contrast, Russia and Turkey have become major stakeholders in both crises.

While their involvements are dictated by national interests and regional geopolitical objectives, this differed markedly from the EU and its member states, which clearly preferred not to get involved at all if possible.

The perceived retreat of the US - or at least its aloofness as the developments unfolded across the Middle East - has created a vacuum that both Turkey and Russia attempted to fill so as to reclaim their regional power status (Stronski and Sokols, 2017). Both countries thus found an opportunity to increase their influence while the US and EU were distracted by their own problems. Along the way, Russia has been able to erode the norms and rules of the liberal international order and exploit the emerging divisions among the members of the Western institutions (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2014: 40-48). While Putin started to express his desire more openly to restore Russia's major power status by challenging the western international order and creating buffer zones around Russia, Turkey's political elites also began to talk about gaining influence both regionally and globally. As the transnational networks and spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War heightened both countries' security concerns, they united through sharing fears and ambitions. Given their divergent goals as well as normative and geopolitical rivalry with the EU, it made little sense for both states to harmonize their interests and objectives with the latter (Marocchi, 2017).

The conflict in Syria has a specific importance in this context. Throughout the conflict, Russia has had a clear, unified strategy: to support Assad's forces and reunite Syria. The Assad government was not only a client state of Russia in the region, but was also considered as a crucial actor to counter-balance

American/Israeli power in the region.

In contrast, Turkish policy in Syria has been rife with conflict and indeterminate alliance patterns from the beginning of the conflict. Initially, Turkey's strategy was to bolster the Sunni-dominated anti-Assad opposition. When the government considered supporting the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime in 2012, other regional players were already inside Syria supporting their own camps. The considerable diplomatic, financial, and military backing given to the opposition by different actors meant that post-Assad Syria might fall out of Turkey's sphere of influence. Thus, the AKP government, to ensure its continued influence in Syria and regionally through Syria, began to arm the opposition in close alliance with Qatar. This policy caused tensions with Russia that brought them to the brink of a war when Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet in November 2015.

However, the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the emergence of the Kurds as strong regional actors backed by the West, specifically the US, dramatically altered the strategic picture for Turkey. The large-scale ISIS atrocities against the local populations in Iraq and Syria forced a compromise between rival Kurdish parties, pushing them to increase cooperation while creating solidarity among ordinary Kurds and intensifying Kurdish transnationalism (Stansfield, 2013). The Obama administration's support for the PYD (Democratic Union Party, Syria) and the Trump administration's decision to arm its military wing (YPG - People's Protection Units), both of which are considered by Turkey to have a direct connection with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), incidentally recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU and the US, not only exacerbated bilateral tensions between Turkey and the US,

but also directly activated Turkey's security fears. As Turkey's priorities moved from overthrowing the Assad regime to focusing more on its survival, it engaged more with Russia. Furthermore, following Russia's direct military intervention in Syria, the Turkish government realized that it could only become an actor in Syria, and it could only counter-balance the US-supported Kurdish groups by reconciling with Russia (Özcan, Balta, Beşgöl, 2017).

The relationship was further strengthened after the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, which heightened Turkey's security concerns and increased its suspicions of its Western allies. As Turkey's political and security calculations shifted to regime security, Russian support became more crucial to Ankara. Shortly after the coup attempt, in January 2017, Russia initiated the Astana Process for Syria with Iran and Turkey, to coordinate and formalize their military and diplomatic efforts. While Turkey's various military interventions in Syria since then were made possible only with Russian consent due to its air control, Russia has also profited from working with Turkey in pacifying the opposition groups, brokering the handover of the majority of opposition-controlled territories to Assad, and furthering divisions between Turkey and its Transatlantic allies. Meanwhile, both countries have emerged as order-builders in the region, which has significantly strengthened their legitimacy.

The Turkish-Russian cooperation developed during a period of multiple crises for the EU, leading some of its members to openly challenge some of its stated values and principles (Zielonka, 2006; Krastev, 2019). Brexit has become the definitive signal of the deep structural crisis the EU has been going through.

Two main actors within the EU, i.e., Germany and France, have been locked in an intense disagreement over the nature and the future of the EU. In other member states, such as Hungary and Poland, populist movements are challenging the liberal normative principles of the European and global order. Yet, in others, such as Greece and Italy, there rose a strong opposition to what they perceive as Germany's hold over their economies. The upsurge in international migration in the last 10 years has further paralyzed the EU and transformed its norm-setting role into a more defensive posture vis-à-vis countries like Turkey (Balta and Özel, 2019).

The weakening of the appeal and influence of European institutions, policies, norms and values then led to a growing skepticism within Turkish society toward the European agenda, strategic orientation, and European values (Aydın-Düzgüt and Kaliber, 2016). As a result, relations between Turkey and the EU have shifted to a transactional mode, favoring bilateral to multilateral relations, rejecting value-based policymaking and focusing on short-term gains. The 2016 migration deal is one of the more recent examples of the transactional relationship between Turkey and the EU. Turkey promised to accept the return of all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece, and to take the necessary measures to prevent new migrants from crossing the EU border, in return for an EU pledge to allocate 6 billion Euros for the refugees in Turkey, to accelerate visa liberalization, and to upgrade the Customs Union (European Parliament, 2020). The deal was highly criticized both in Turkey and in Europe, as it was a short-term transactional solution to a normative and humanitarian problem. In any case, it failed to resolve the underlying tensions regarding the refugee

flow between Turkey and the EU (Bashirov and Yilmaz, 2020).

While Turkey's Western allies were becoming increasingly suspicious of the developing Turkish-Russian cooperation, the major blow came when Turkey decided to purchase the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, leading to one of the most significant crises between the US and Turkey (Egeli, 2019). The US administration responded by excluding Turkey from its F-35 program, while the US Congress mandated the President to apply sanctions in compliance with the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which became operational on December 14, 2020 (US Department of State, 2020).

As stated earlier, the most important initial factor bringing Russia and Turkey together was their suspicions about US intentions (in Eurasia for Russia, in the Middle East for Turkey) and a shared desire to solve the Syria crisis without a major disruption from the US (Thépaut, 2020). As a result of the reduced US presence in the Middle East, the EU's disappearance as a normative actor, and the inability of the US/NATO to allay Turkey's security fears about the Middle East, Russia and Turkey have moved to becoming major players in the region (Gören, 2018). The relationship, however, has been arduous and perilous, given the differences between Russia and Turkey (Aydın, 2020). In fact, problems between them in Syria emerged after the Trump Administration ordered American troops to withdraw from northeastern Syria on 6 October 2019. Three days later, a Turkish military operation in northern Syria began with tacit US consent, to push back the PYD/YPG forces from the border region

and create a 30 km-deep safe zone, where Turkey could resettle Syrian refugees. This had been one of the major policy demands of Turkey since the beginning of the Syrian war, but had received no support from its Western allies. This time, however, Turkey, with the consent of President Trump, was able to force the PYD/YPG fighters to withdraw and create a new safe-zone agreement with both Russia and the US (McKernan and Borger, 2019).

But Turkey's rapprochement and increasing cooperation with the US annoyed Russia. As a result, tensions between Turkey and Russia increased over the status of the Idlib region and the future of Syria's Sunni opposition, pushing them to the brink of war in early 2020. After particularly heavy clashes with the regime forces, in March 2020, Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire deal that legitimized (at least in bilateral terms) and solidified the Turkish military presence in Idlib, while preventing further attacks on Turkish military personnel, which were threatening to unravel Russian-Turkish relations (Dalay, 2020). However, the deal only froze the situation without resolving the mutually exclusive interests of both parties, as Turkey's continued military presence in Syria conflicts with Russia's objective of a unified Syria. Turkey and Russia were also at odds in Libya, as both countries tried to cement their military presence. As in Syria, Russia and Turkey have emerged as the most consequential players, backing opposing sides. Turkey's rather late intervention from January 2020 onwards to prop up the Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli, was instrumental in thwarting the advance of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar, who was strongly supported by mercenaries belonging to the Russian Wagner Group,

in addition to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on the ground and a host of other nations, including the EU member France, in a wider context. What followed was a stalemate, after the GNA forces reclaimed northwestern Libya up to the Sirte-Al Jufra line, which later allowed for a resumption of diplomatic efforts to move forward. While Turkey and Russia briefly explored the possibility of a bilateral deal, replicating their accommodation in Idlib-Syria, Libya proved to be a different case, with the involvement of various European and other regional countries, and thus both countries eventually chose to support the Geneva Process under the auspices of the UN.

As the danger of Turkey and Russia facing each other through proxy forces over Libya was averted and the two countries strengthened both their military footprint and political standing in Libya vis-à-vis the European actors, another theater, this time in the Caucasus, erupted with a potential to pit the two countries against each other, and this had implications for Europe as well. Although many assumed that the reignition of fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), a breakaway region of Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority, and the Armenian occupied territories beyond it, risked a wider war that might draw in Russia, Turkey, and even Iran, in reality what happened was a deft coordination between Russia and Turkey, which excluded other external actors, including the US and Europe, from the region. Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan and provided military training, support, and weapons, while Russia avoided active involvement on behalf of Armenia as many expected, though it continued to supply weapons and ammunition. As in the previous round of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which

ended in a cease fire in 1994, the most recent flare-up also concluded with a ceasefire agreement on November 10, 2020, with Russian mediation. The details of the eventual ceasefire arrangement, which allowed for a Russian-Turkish joint monitoring mission in the territory of Azerbaijan, throughout NK proper, reflected a behind the scenes diplomatic agreement between the two countries. While Russia maintained its primary position in the region, Turkey was able to send its military forces (beyond the advisors that it already had in Azerbaijan and Georgia), albeit in a peace-monitoring function and in coordination with Russia, to the region for the first time since the end of the First World War.

While Russia and Turkey were able to develop a modus operandi and created a joint monitoring operation, similar to the ones they already had in Syria - around Idlib and in the Operation Peace Spring area - the EU and European countries, especially the Minsk Group co-chair France, were left out of the loop. It seemed that after Syria and Libya, Turkey and Russia had once again “helped one another to become...influential external powers” in a third country, keeping other actors out (Yıldız, 2021). While the US and France lost most of their influence, Russia consolidated its hold over Armenia and send its security forces back to Azerbaijan after 28 years, albeit as peacekeepers, and Turkey strengthened its presence in the region with Russian acquiescence (Isachenko, 2021). Russia seemed to clearly prefer Turkey to its other possible rivals in the region, as a result of it having more leverage against Turkey in terms of their recently enhanced cooperation, and also because it has been able to develop a compartmentalized relationship with the country (Aydın, 2020), in contrast to the US and the EU, which chose to sanction

Russia when their interests clashed over Ukraine and Crimea.

Tensions between Russia and Turkey have also been seen in recent years in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. After invading Crimea, Russia alarmed NATO by substantially increasing its naval presence in the Black Sea and resuming naval activity in the Mediterranean (Delanoë, 2014). While the EU responded to the Russian annexation of Crimea with sanctions, Turkey chose accommodation over confrontation, and distanced itself from the EU sanctions (Bechev, 2017). As Russia rebuilt its naval superiority in the Black Sea after its confrontation with Georgia in 2008, and surpassed the Turkish navy in the number and strength of its forces by the late 2010s (Tass, 2016; Petersen, 2019), some experts claimed that Turkey's role as the gatekeeper for the Black Sea for naval forces of the non-Black Sea, through a strict application of the Montreux Convention, unintentionally helped Russia strengthen its military buildup in the region, which was then used to logistically support its presence in the Mediterranean (Güvenç & Egeli, 2016; Tol, 2019).

Despite this lack of a shared vision for the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus, the striking feature of the Turkish-Russian bilateral relationship has been its resilience in the face of repeated and at times existential crises. To achieve this, both countries have successfully compartmentalized their relations (Aydın, 2020), going to great lengths to accommodate each other's needs, with flexible policy moves and by postponing issues that they clearly see they cannot reach an agreement on. For Turkey, the Russian presence in all these regions presents both a balancing act against the US/West and a constraining factor toward

its own ambitions. Turkey has overcome this dilemma by acting as a NATO member in certain cases, while in other cases, sometimes simultaneously, behaving as if it is an autonomous actor. This flexibility in its foreign policy has underlined the West's need for Turkey to counter-balance Russia and reclaim its centuries-old regional balancing role as a western ally against the over-expansionism of Russian power.

This balancing act, seen in the Turkey-Russia-West triangle, has in fact become the major feature of Turkish foreign policy behavior in recent years. Ankara has used its relations with Russia to counter-balance the Western powers in its neighborhood, while never shying away from using its NATO membership to counter-balance Russian expansionism. In this way, i.e., by holding both a Russian and a Western card, Turkey has expanded its regional influence while responding to its own perceived existential security threats. For Russia, its cooperation with Turkey has not only been important for the stabilization of a turbulent region, but also through this relationship Russia has been able to exploit the cracks and divisions among the members of the Western alliance (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2014). Indeed, following the deterioration of EU-Russia relations after 2014, Russia has been able to increase its efforts in the Baltics, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Eastern Ukraine, and has expanded the use of its economic, political, and informational tools to block or neutralize EU influence in these regions. Turkey clearly has not raised any objection to these moves.

To conclude, the relationship between Turkey, Russia and the EU has largely been characterized by transactionalism. The EU as the normative actor has lost its appeal

to both Turkey and Russia and proved dysfunctional in the realm of *realpolitik*. With the EU becoming absent as a security-setting actor in the Middle East, the West's overall leverage and soft power influence both on Turkey and on Russia has significantly diminished. Russia and Turkey, on the other hand, are both seemingly happy to keep the Western actors away from the regions they view as their primary regions of influence. While the emergence of Russia and Turkey as order setting agents has increased both countries' regional legitimacies and influences, their economies have continued to be highly dependent on Europe, which at times has affected their abilities as order setters in their shared neighborhood.

Russia and Turkey as Energy Providers

The EU-27's energy import dependency increased from 56.3% in 2000 to 58.2% in 2018, with hard coal imports increasing from 43.2% to 68.3%, crude oil and LNG from 92.5% to 95.7% and natural gas from 65.7% to 83.2% (European Commission Directorate-General for Energy, 2020: 24). Moreover, crude oil was 58.4% of the EU-27's net fuel imports in 2018, with natural gas being at 30.5% and solid fossil fuels at 10.4% (Ibid.: 42). Russia has become the EU's main energy supplier over the past two decades, providing 42.3% of the EU-27's imports of solid fossil fuel, 29.8% of crude oil, and 40.1% of natural gas in 2018. In 2000 and 2010, the EU-27 only depended on Russia for 11.1% and 25.5% of its solid fossil fuel, 21.8% and 34.9% of crude oil, and 48.1% and 35.7% of natural gas, respectively (Ibid.: 67-70). In 2019, Russia's share of EU natural gas imports remained at 39% (Yermakov, 2020), while its share of EU-27 LNG imports rose to

20% from 3.6% in 2018 (European Commission Directorate-General for Energy, 2020: 70). This change underlines Moscow's efforts to become an LNG supplier and retain its share of the EU's energy market, by taking advantage of falling LNG prices in 2019 and increased EU demand for LNG imports (Market Observatory for Energy, 2019). Despite previous energy crises between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU, Moscow remains the EU's most reliable and credible energy supplier.

While the EU's energy demands will remain roughly the same during the next decade (Morningstar et. al., 2020), its energy production – especially in the natural gas sector – is expected to continue to shrink gradually, further augmenting its dependence on Russian energy exports. However, Russia's increased normative and geopolitical differences with the EU highlight the necessity to diversify its energy imports. Indeed, over the past decade, the European Union has undertaken significant efforts to do so by diversifying its energy imports (Ibid.). Currently, several energy suppliers can mitigate EU dependency on Russia for energy, such as Azerbaijan, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the US, along with domestic production. However, each alternate supplier, possibly except for the US, lacks the production capacity necessary to replace Russia as the EU's main energy supplier. Moreover, none are risk- or problem-free alternatives.

Azerbaijan evidently cannot meet Europe's energy demands alone (State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2020), while its close cooperation with Turkey and recent actions in its immediate neighborhood could pose significant challenges for the EU.

Likewise, Middle Eastern oil and gas producer states face significant domestic and regional challenges that hinder their ability to evolve into credible and reliable energy suppliers of the European energy market. For instance, even if US-imposed isolation and sanctions are overcome, Iran will need to modernize its production capabilities significantly to supply the EU, which means Tehran is unlikely to supply Europe with energy resources before 2028 at the earliest.

New discoveries of hydrocarbon deposits have been made recently in the Eastern Mediterranean, and more are expected. However, their exploitation faces numerous challenges – political, diplomatic, environmental, and technical – which cast doubt on their feasibility. EU domestic energy production has declined over the past decade, mainly because old deposits are exhausted, and the exploitation of new ones is unfeasible. Meanwhile, although renewable energy production has increased by 49.2%, this cannot offset the significant reductions in natural gas (-46.4%), crude oil (-35.3%), solid fossil fuels (-27.9%), and nuclear energy (-14.4%) (Eurostat, 2020). Brexit is expected to further reinforce this trend, since the UK will become an external energy supplier to EU.

In short, despite the EU's efforts, Moscow is and will most likely remain the EU's main energy supplier for the foreseeable future. The EU's alternatives to Moscow are not large enough to threaten Russia's share of the European energy market due to numerous issues that limit their credibility and supply capabilities. The only alternative that could threaten Russian energy exports to Europe is green energy, but this is unlikely to occur in the near future. Similarly, Turkey and Russia are major economic partners, with Turkey

reliant on Russian energy.

By 2015, Russia had become Turkey's third largest source of imports after China and Germany (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2017), and their eleventh largest export market (the first two being Germany and the UK). Russia has also become a major investment site for Turkish construction companies during successive AKP governments, as the Turkish economic growth model has increasingly focused on expanding the construction sector (Balta and Çelikpala, 2020). However, there is a huge trade imbalance in favor of Russia, making Turkey's economy asymmetrically dependent on Russia. According to the World Bank, for every dollar's worth of Russian imports that Turkey purchased in 2018, it exported just 15 cents of its own goods to Russia (World Integrated Trade Solution, 2018a and 2018b). The trade deficit results from bilateral trade relations, in which Turkey's gas and oil imports constitute a major portion of the overall volume. In 2018, Russia was Turkey's top supplier of natural gas, with 47% of Turkish natural gas imports (Petform cited in Özel and Uçar, 2019), and 36% of Turkey's coal imports (Wilde and Lalor, 2019). This over-reliance on a single exporter has long been regarded as both an important energy security issue and an essential matter for Turkey's overall national security. AKP governments therefore proposed developing nuclear energy to diversify Turkey's energy resources. However, the contract for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, one of the first in Turkey, was also given to a Russian company, Rosatom, which increased worries about granting Russia control over a significant part of the country's electricity production and generation (Balta and Çelikpala, 2020).

Similar to the European states, however, Turkey has also been trying to diversify its

energy sources, while becoming Europe's second LNG importer in 2017, with Algeria, Nigeria, and Qatar as its main suppliers (Anadolu Agency, 2018). The share of US shale gas has also risen in Turkey's energy mix in recent years, from 16% in 2017 to 23% in 2019, when the US became the second biggest LNG supplier of Turkey after Qatar. This significantly reduced Russia's share of Turkey's natural gas imports from 52% in 2017 to 33% in 2019 (Temizer, 2020), as Turkey's LNG imports exceeded its pipeline gas imports for the first time in March 2020 (Anadolu Agency, 2020). Nevertheless, Moscow remains one of Turkey's overall main energy suppliers, as is the case with the EU.

Another vital issue in this uneasy triangle is the transportation of energy resources, especially natural gas, which is not only about economic relations but also significantly alters power projections and geopolitical interests. During the 1990s, Turkey largely positioned itself against Russia, especially over the development and transportation of Caspian Basin and Central Asian oil and gas reserves. It played an active role in projects aiming to bypass Russian-controlled transportation lines. However, Turkey's attitude toward transport routes has since become more inclusive of Russian interests, which also contributed to evolving political relations (Kardaş, 2012). In 2003, the Blue Stream pipeline carrying natural gas from Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea became fully functional. In October 2016, Turkey and Russia signed a deal on TurkStream, which began gas deliveries to Bulgaria on 1 January 2020, and will make Turkey a hub for the European gas market. This pipeline allowed Russia to reduce dependence on Ukraine and Eastern Europe while helping to further seal its dominance over European gas markets.

On the other hand, however, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its extension, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, transport natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe, moving Turkey closer to becoming a regional hub. Along with these projects, in addition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines from Azerbaijan, and natural gas pipelines from Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government region of Iraq, Turkey at the same time has become host to alternative energy routes to Europe, bypassing Russia. Turkey's concomitant roles, both in linking Russia to Europe and bypassing Russia for Caspian as well as some Middle Eastern resources toward Europe, highlight the complexity of Turkey's position between Russia and Europe.

All these also complicate the EU's approach to both countries. The simultaneous dependency of many European countries on Russian natural gas - 100% for Finland, 93% for Latvia, 79% for Bulgaria and Estonia, 71% for Czechia, 64% Austria, 61% Hungary, 49% Germany etc. - (Elagina, 2021), and its strong emphasis on diversification as well as concurrent opposition to Russian attempts to bypass Ukraine in its connection to Europe, and the building of the Nord Stream Pipeline, all point to the EU's ambivalent position regarding Russia and its natural gas. As a result, while the EU has imposed sanctions on Russia following the latter's annexation of Crimea, led by Germany, it also resisted US pressures fervently to abandon the joint pipeline project with Russia (Nord Stream II). This is a repeated theme with regard to the EU's attitude toward Moscow, mainly deriving from two divergent tendencies among its member states. Member states geographically located in the eastern parts of the EU and

in close proximity to Russia, perceive Moscow as a much greater threat based on historical and contemporary security issues, while countries in western and central Europe do not consider Russia as such and favor developing closer energy-based and economic relations with Moscow. Germany, in particular, finds itself in an odd position, as it unequivocally supports and defends the Nord Stream pipeline projects and other economic partnerships with Moscow, receiving fierce criticism from Washington and eastern European member states, such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, while spearheading the EU's response to the Ukrainian crisis and the imposition of sanctions against Russia, in a bid to alleviate its allies' security concerns and to curtail Russia's influence in the region.

Similarly, the Union supports various projects planned to pass through Turkey, in an attempt to diversify its energy sources and intensify its cooperation with Turkey, while at the same time opposing the start of negotiations on the Energy Chapter in Turkey's full membership bid for political reasons, which indicates a similar delicate balancing act. It is clear that both Turkey and Russia have very important roles to play in European energy security and policies, though they also constitute challenging factors in European energy calculations.

Conclusion

Turkey and Russia have been unable to develop their partnership of convenience into a more integrated comprehensive one. Instead, the relationship remains transactional because they do not have a mutually shared comprehensive approach for their joint future. Despite the lack of a

shared vision for the Middle East and North Africa, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus, the striking feature of the bilateral relationship has been its resilience, despite repeated crises. Turkey's security institutions are still deeply attached to the West's security architecture, and despite occasional fiery rhetoric, the transatlantic alliance still provides Turkey with irreplaceable regional and global deterrence.

Russia, on the other hand, currently defines its existence and role in world politics in terms of its opposition to the global future imagined by the West, and feels itself to be in a struggle for its sovereignty against western encroachments on its borders.

It has developed an alternative vision to the West's rule-based international system, which often includes calls to return to the 1945 situation. The latter is of course something that Turkey vehemently opposes, by claiming that the "world is bigger than 5" in the words of its most prominent decision-maker. It is not clear how these two diametrically opposed world views can converge, except that both countries are annoyed with the current meddling US policies, especially in their neighborhoods.

Europe on the other hand remains a challenge to both, but at the same time a potential partner. Historically, both had complicated relations with the European powers, and the concept of Europe as a whole. Both emulated European modernization at one point in their history, and both have long-standing grievances and a history of conflicts with one or more European countries. Each experienced occupation attempts by the European powers and interference in their internal affairs, the Europeans at times reaching out for support to minorities

and/or the losing sides in their civil wars.

Nevertheless, Europe has been a model of development and inspiration for both since the late 17th century, creating deep inroads in their cultural, political, and social developments. Both at one time or another declared and/or defined their country as “European” and at other times struggled to be seen as a European state. Moreover, European history cannot be complete if one does not take into account either Turkey or Russia. During both the First and the Second world wars, Russia/Soviet Union allied itself with the winning sides in Europe, but inevitably grew as a threat to them immediately afterwards. Turkey, on the other hand, was on the losing side in the first and remained out of the second, but chose decisively European/Western paths after both wars.

As far as the more recent Cold War is concerned, Russia was on the losing side, and has maintained its challenging posture, after an initial zigzagging, toward the West/Europe. Turkey, on the other hand, while on the winning side of the Cold War and in the immediate aftermath, has seen its position grow more anomalous in recent years. In this sense, Turkey is more of a challenge to Europe than Russia, as its global positioning is not yet very clear, though one can easily peg the latter into its former role of an antagonist. As such, developing a clear policy for Russia would be easier for the EU than for Turkey, which needs to be kept attached to it, while at the same time the challenges it poses need to be managed with the use of carrots and sticks.

The two countries have also been important partners of Europe and the EU, as shown above, in terms of trade, energy,

security, the environment, international politics, etc. As such, the EU cannot ignore either Russia or Turkey. We therefore recommend that,

- As Russia and Turkey have become the main players in Syria, the EU should promote effective burden sharing and provide more support for humanitarian objectives in Syria. More specifically, the EU and NATO should assist Turkey and Russia in responding to the Idlib crisis. In order to achieve an effective and long-term solution to the refugee flows from Syria, the EU should also assist in resolving the crisis and participate in the future reconstruction of Syria.
- The Transatlantic Alliance should develop a coherent approach to the role of Russia in the European security architecture. Western efforts to limit the Russian role in Europe have often been inconsistent so far, which has become counter-productive and provoked Russian-Turkish rapprochement.
- The EU should have a coherent continental unification strategy which is based on a framework for the normative and geopolitical inclusion of Turkey and Russia.
- The Transatlantic Alliance should not evaluate Turkey’s relations with Russia as zero-sum and mutually exclusive and should acknowledge that some level of cooperation with Russia is beneficial not just for Turkey but also for European security.
- It was quite a well-known fact that Turkey’s inclusion in the European integration process was bound to be a challenge both to Turkey and the EU. Yet the EU member states decided to embark on the process, in full knowledge of the benefits it would bring to the Union. Not much has

changed in that sense, though the two sides have grown apart in recent years. Apart from the overall relationship, it is clear that both sides would benefit from cooperation in the economic and geopolitical realms. Therefore, it is to the EU's advantage to keep Turkey aligned with it, which would also reward Turkey in its international relations.

Bibliography

Anadolu Agency (2020). "US share of Turkish LNG imports rises with cheap prices". 18 July, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/international-relations/us-share-of-turkish-lng-imports-rises-with-cheap-prices/29936> (Accessed 12 May 2021).

Anadolu Agency (2018). "Turkey Becomes Second LNG Importer in Europe", <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/lng-lpg/turkey-becomes-second-lng-importer-in-europe/20936> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

Aydın, Mustafa (2020). "The Long View on Turkish-Russian Rivalry and Cooperation". *GMF On Turkey Series*, 8 June, <https://www.gmfus.org/publications/long-view-turkish-russian-rivalry-and-cooperation>.

Aydın, Mustafa (2010). "Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia". In: Baskın Oran (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006; Facts and Analyses with Documents*. Salt Lake City: Utah University Press: 750-789.

Aydın, Mustafa (2003). "Securitization of History and Geography; Understanding of Security in Turkey". *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3 (2): 163-184.

Aydın, Mustafa (2000). *New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and Predicament*. Ankara: Center for Strategic Research.

Aydın, Mustafa, Mitat Çelikpala, Erinç Yeldan, Murat Güvenç, Osman Z. Zaim, Banu B. Hawks, Ebru C. Sokullu, Özgehan Şenyuva, Onurcan Yılmaz, Deniz S. Tıǧlı (2021). *Quantitative Research Report: Turkey Trends 2020*, İstanbul, Kadir Has University Turkey Studies Group, Akademetre and Global Academy, 7 January, <http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15993.08803>

Aydın-Düzgüt, Senem and Alper Kaliber (2016). "Encounters with Europe in an era of domestic and international turmoil: is Turkey a de-Europeanising candidate country?". *South European Society and Politics*, 21(1), 1-14, Doi: 10.1080/13608746.2016.1155282.

Balta, Evren and Mitat Çelikpala (2020). "Turkey and Russia: Historical Patterns and Contemporary Trends in Bilateral Relations." In: Güneş Murat Tezcür (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Balta, Evren and Mitat Çelikpala (2020). "Turkey and Russia: Historical Patterns and Contemporary Trends in Bilateral Relations." In: Güneş Murat Tezcür (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Barkey, Karen and Mark Von Hagen (Eds.), (1997). *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Colorado: Westview Press.

Bechev, Dimitar (2017). *Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Blandy, Charles W. (1998). *The Caucasus Region and Caspian Basin: Change, Complication and Challenge*. Surrey: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Bugaï, Nikolai (1996). *The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union*. Nova Publishers.

Bugayova, Nataliya (2019). *How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin's Worldview*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War.

Center of Global Interests (2016). "Does Russia Belong to Europe?" <https://globalinterests.org/2016/04/29/does-russia-belong-to-europe/> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Friedman, George (2014). "Viewing Russia From the Inside". Center of Global Interests, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/viewing-russia-inside> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Dalay, Galip (2020). "How Long Will the Turkish-Russian Deal on Idlib Last?". *Aljazeera Online*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/3/16/how-long-will-the-turkish-russian-deal-on-idlib-last/?gb=true> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

Dannreuther, Ronald (2015). "Why the Arab Spring Set Russia on the Road to Confrontation with the West", <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/01/16/why-the-arab-spring-set-russia-on-the-road-to-confrontation-with-the-west/> (Accessed 28 August 2020).

David, Steven R (1991). "Explaining Third World Alignment". *World Politics*, 43(2): 233-256.

Delanoe, Igor (2014). "After the Crimean Crisis: Towards a Greater Russian Maritime Power in the Black Sea". *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 14(3): 367-382.

De Wilde, Piers and Dan Lalor (2019). "Turkey's 2018 Thermal Coal Imports down 4.5% to 31.5 Mil Mt." *S&P Global Platts*, <https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/coal/020419-turkeys-2018-thermal-coal-imports-down-45-to-315-mil-m> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

Egeli, Sitki (2019). "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-round". *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace*, 8(1), Doi: 10.20991/allazimuth.470640.

Elagina, Diana (2021). "Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe in 2019, by selected country". *Statista*, 15 February, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201743/russian-gas-dependence-in-europe-by-country/> (Accessed 12 May 2021).

Erdoğan, Aziz (2018). "Russian A2/AD Strategy and Its Implications for NATO". *Beyond the Horizon*, <https://behorizon.org/russian-a2ad-strategy-and-its-implications-for-nato/> (Accessed 08 May 2021).

European Commission Directorate-General for Energy (2020). *EU Energy in Figures*:

Statistical Pocketbook 2020. Luxembourg: Publications Officer of the European Union.

Eurostat (2020). *Energy Production and Imports*.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Gause III, F. Gregory (2014). "Beyond sectarianism: The New Middle East cold war". *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, No 11.

Giles, Keir (2019). *Moscow Rules*. Washington D.C., Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House.

Göçek, Fatma Müge (2011). *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris.

Gören, Nilsu (2018). *The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead*. Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland Working Paper. <https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/20649/Goren-%20NatoUSRussiaTurkeyStrategic011518.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

Güvenç, Serhat and Sıtkı Egeli (2016). "Changing Naval Balances in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Turkey". *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 15(1): 94-105.

Hill, Fiona and Ömer Taşpınar (2006). "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?". *Survival*, 48 (1): 81-92.

Isachenko, Daria (2020). "Turkey–Russia Partnership in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh; Militarised Peacebuilding with Implications for Conflict Transformation". *SWP Comment*, 2020/C 53, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/> (Accessed 12 May 2021).

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali (2000). "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey". *Journal of International Affairs*, 54 (1).

Kardaş, Şaban (2012). "Turkey–Russia Energy Relations: The Limits of Forging Cooperation Through Economic Interdependence". *International Journal*, 67 (1): 81-100.

Koldunova, Ekaterina (2015). "Russia as a Euro–Pacific Power: Dilemmas of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making". *International Relations*, 29 (3): 378-395.

Liik, Kadri (2018). *Winning the Normative War with Russia: An EU–Russia Power Audit*. Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations.

Mandel, David (2005). " 'Managed Democracy': Capital and State in Russia". *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 13(2): 117-136.

Marocchi, Tania (2017). *EU–Russia Relations: Towards an Increasingly Geopolitical Paradigm*. <https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/07/03/eu-russia-relations-towards-increasingly-geopolitical-paradigm> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

McKernan, Bethan, and Julian Borger (2019). "Turkey and Russia Agree on Deal Over Buffer Zone in Northern Syria". *The Guardian*, 22 October 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/turkey-and-russia-agree-deal-over-buffer-zone-in-northern-syria> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

Morningstar, Richard L., Andras Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Irina Markina (2020). *European Energy Diversification: How Alternative Sources, Routes, and Clean Technologies Can Bolster Energy Security and Decarbonization*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/european-energy-diversification-how-alternative-sources-and-routes-can-bolster-energy-security-and-decarbonization/> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Öktem, Kerem (2011). *Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989*. London and New York: Zed Books.

Olson, Robert (1989). *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Olson, Robert (1996). "The Kurdish question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian foreign policies since the Gulf War". *Middle East Policy*, 4(3): 106-119

Özcan, Gencer, Evren Balta, and Burç Beşgül (2017). "Giriş". In: Gencer Özcan, Evren Balta, and Burç Beşgül (eds.). *Kuşku ile Komşuluk: Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerinde Değişen Dinamikler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Özel, Soli and Gökçe Uçar (2019). "The Economics of Turkey-Russia Relations". *EDAM Foreign Policy & Security*, https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Economics-of-Turkey-Russia-Relations_compressed.pdf. (Accessed 10 March 2020).

Petersen, Michael (2019). "The Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea". *War on the Rocks*, 9 January, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-sea/> (Accessed 11 May 2021).

Petform. *Natural Gas Market in Turkey*. <https://www.petform.org.tr/en/dogal-gaz-piyasasi/turkiye-dogal-gaz-piyasasi/> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

Petrov, Nikolai (2005). "From Managed Democracy to Sovereign Democracy: Putin's Regime Evolution in 2005". PONARS Policy Memo No: 396, 1 December.

Quirk, Patrick W. (2014). *Internal Threat Alliances: Great Powers, Fragmented Allies, and Alliance-Making in the Post-Cold War Era*. PhD Thesis: Johns Hopkins University.

Rachman, Gideon (2019). "Britain and Russia are Europe's Odd Couple". *Financial Times*, 28 October 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/2057070e-f961-11e9-98fd-4d6c20050229> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Sakwa, Richard (2010). "Russia and Turkey: Rethinking Europe to Contest Outsider Status". *Russie. Nei. Visions* 51.

Sakwa, Richard (2014). "Politics in Russia." In: Stephen White, Richard Sakwa, and Henry E. Hale (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics*. London, Palgrave.

Schmidt-Felzmann, Anke (2014). "Is the EU's Failed Relationship with Russia the Member States' Fault?", *L'Europe en Formation*, 4 (374): 40-60.

Stansfield, Gareth (2013). "The Unravelling of the Post-First World War State System? The Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Transformation of the Middle East". *International Affairs*, 89(2): 259-282.

Stronski, Paul and Richard Sokolsky (2017). *The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12995.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A389d1243b302ea7ee0794fa1c457537d> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Tass (2016), "General Staff: Russia-Turkey balance of force in Black Sea has changed over years". 14 September, <https://tass.com/defense/899730>.

Temizer, Murat (2020). "Russian Share of Turkish Gas Imports Falls as LNG Rises". *Anadolu Agency*, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-share-of-turkish-gas-imports-falls-as-lng-rises/1866403> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2020). *Energy*, https://www.stat.gov.az/source/balance_fuel/?lang=en (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Thépaut, Charles (2020). "The Astana Process: A Flexible but Fragile Showcase for Russia". *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/astana-process-flexible-fragile-showcase-russia> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

Tol, Gönül (2019). "Balance in the Black Sea: The complex dynamic between Turkey, Russia, and NATO". *Middle East Institute*, 18 November, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/balance-black-sea-complex-dynamic-between-turkey-russia-and-nato> (Accessed 11 May 2021).

Traynor, Ian (2001). "Chechnya fuels Russian-Turkish tension." *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/26/chechnya.worlddispatch> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/26/chechnya.worlddispatch> (Accessed 21 April 2018).

Turkish Statistical Institute (2017). *Database*, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr> (Accessed 20 June 2017).

US Department of State (2020). *The United States Sanctions Turkey Under CAATSA 231*. Press Statement. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/> (Accessed 1 October 2020).

UNHCR (2020). *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019*. <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html?query=global%20trends> (Accessed 29 September 2020).

Usackas, Vygaudas (2017). *Russia and the West: Handling the Clash of Worldviews*. Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations.

Von Hagen, Mark (1998). "The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire." In B. R. Rubin and J. Snyder (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*. London: Routledge.

Yıldız, Güney (2021). "Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh". *SWP Comment*, 2021/C 22, Doi:10.18449/2021C22, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C22/> (Accessed 12 May 2021).

Warhola, James W. and William A. Mitchell (2006). "The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications". *Demokratizatsiya*, 14(1): 127-143.

World Integrated Trade Solution (2018a). *Russian Federation: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance* 2018. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/RUS/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXIMP/Partner/by-countr> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

World Integrated Trade Solution (2018b). *Turkey: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance* 2018.

<https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXIMP/Partner/by-countr> (Accessed 10 March 2020).

Zarakol, Ayşe (2017). "Türkiye ve Rusya: Tarihsel Benzerlikler." In: Gencer Özcan, Evren Balta, Burç Beşgül (eds.). *Kuşku ile Komşuluk: Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerinde Değişen Dinamikler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.



TURKEY AND EUROPE

CHALLENGING PARTNERS

TURKEY AS A PARTNER

AND CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

This publication was produced as part of the CATS Network Project, titled "Turkey as a partner and challenge for European Security". The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of CATS Network, an international network of think tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.

The project is being conducted by a consortium of the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT), the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University, and the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at Panteion University.