

DIALOGUE DIALOGUE

Bridging the Gaps

An Almanac for
Greek-Turkish Cooperation

Edited by

Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou



BRIDGING THE GAPS: AN ALMANAC FOR GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION

Edited by
Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Yayın No.: 875
ISBN: 978-625-433-135-0
E-ISBN: 978-625-433-136-7
Basım Sayısı: 1. Basım, Aralık 2021

© Copyright 2021, Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

NOBEL BİLİMSEL ESERLER SERTİFİKA NO.: 20779

All rights for this edition (December 2021) are reserved for Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık Eğitim Danışmanlık Tic. Ltd. Şti. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage retrieval system, without permission from Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık Eğitim Danışmanlık Tic. Ltd. Şti.

'NOBEL BİLİMSEL ESERLER' is a brand of Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.

Executive Editor: Nevzat Argun -nargun@nobelyayin.com-
Publishing Coordinator: Gülfem Dursun -gulfem@nobelyayin.com-

Interior Designer: Tarkan Kara -erdal@nobelyayin.com-
Cover Designer: Sezai Özden -sezai@nobelyayin.com-

Library Information Card

Meinardus, Ronald., Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios.

Bridging The Gaps: An Almanac For Greek-Turkish Cooperation / Ronald Meinardus, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
1st Edition. VI + 188 p., 16x23,5 cm. Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN: 978-625-433-135-0

E-ISBN: 978-625-433-136-7

1. Trust-building 2. Greek-Turkish relations 3. Dialogue

General Delivery

ATLAS AKADEMİK BASIM YAYIN DAĞITIM TİC. LTD. ŞTİ.

Address: Bahçekapı Mh. 2465 Sk. Oto Sanayi Sitesi No:7 Bodrum Kat, Şaşmaz/ANKARA


Phone: +90 312 278 50 77 - **Faks:** 0 312 278 21 65 - **Order:** siparis@nobelyayin.com-

E-Selling: www.nobelkitap.com - esatis@nobelkitap.com / www.atlaskitap.com - info@atlaskitap.com

Points of Delivery and Sales: Alfa Basım Dağıtım, Arasta, Arkadaş Kitabevi, D&R Mağazaları, Dost Dağıtım, İnkılâp Kitabevleri, Kitapsan, Nezih Kitabevleri, Pandora, Prefix, Remzi Kitabevleri

Printer and Binder

Sarıyıldız Ofset Amb. Kağ. Paz. San. ve Tic. Ltd Sertifika No.: 23593
İvedik Ağaç İşleri San. Sit. 1354. Cad. 1358. Sok. No.: 31 Ostim / ANKARA



Dedicated to Despoina-Ino Afentouli
For her unrelenting commitment
to trust-building between Greece and Turkey

Table of Contents

- 1. Introduction: Bridging the Gaps and Enhancing Synergies across Borders** 1
Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
- 2. Avoiding Disaster in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Latent Tension Index for Greek-Turkish Relations** 9
Ioannis Choulis, Selin Siviş, and Marius Mehrl
- 3. The New Governance System for Asylum and Migration in the European Union: An Avenue for Cooperation between Turkey and Greece?** 23
Bezen Balamir Coskun and Effie Charalampaki
- 4. The Migration Crisis at the Evros/Meriç border: An Analysis on the Coverage of Greek and Turkish News Portals** 51
Ioanna M. Kostopoulou and Alaaddin F. Paksoy
- 5. The Missing 50%: Women in Trust-Building, Crisis Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Greece-Turkey Relations**..... 77
Yvonne Efstathiou and Polen Türkmen
- 6. Claiming the Glory of the covid-19 Vaccine: Lessons for Better Societies via a Success Story Nearly Lost in Translation**..... 93
Mary Drosopulos and Jegar Delal Tayip
- 7. Breaking Down Barriers: Trust-Building through the Mobility of Academic Elite between Greece and Turkey** 109
Nur Sinem Kourou, Müge Dalkıran, Antonios Alexandridis
- 8. Audi Alteram Partem: Enhancing Trust-Building in Greek-Turkish Relations through Youth Empowerment** 125
Abdullah Arslan, Erman Ermihan, and Kleopatra Moditsi
- 9. Pairs Through Borders: Aegean** 141
Deniz Halman Tomaka and Eirini Aikaterini Barianaki

**10. The Power of Our Story is to Create Memories:
From Being Roommates in Kavala to Promising Project Partnership.... 155**
Chrysanthi Athanasiadou and Hazel Çağan Elbir

About The Authors 177

About the Partners..... 186

Introduction: Bridging the Gaps and Enhancing Synergies across Borders

Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

In an international order dominated by hostility, distrust and negative stereotypes, dialogues across borders are a positive response. The conflict between Greece and Turkey is considered one of the most complex and also dangerous conflicts in Europe – and possibly beyond. For decades and longer the bilateral strife has repeatedly led insecurity as well as periodic violence and war. Also, in this part of the world, the past weighs heavily on the present. What happened long ago determines what happens today and may stand in the way of a peaceful future, or even in imagining one.

Conflicts bedevil the bilateral relationship on multiple fronts. As in other cross-border rivalries, also here we witness a dynamic development. What used to be on the top the agenda has fallen back (without going away completely). Meanwhile new contentious issues have emerged.

The most recent example is the rift in and around the Eastern Mediterranean Sea that led the two neighbors to the brink of war in 2020. Once again it has become evident that the Greek-Turkish strife goes beyond being a bilateral feud between Athens and Ankara. Throughout, third-party involvement has been a dominant feature of this conflict. where one is member state since 1981 while the other is negotiating its accession since 2004. Of a more recent nature is the European involvement. The European Union has become a key

player in the region, where one is member state since 1981 while the other is negotiating its accession since 2004, joining other global actors who claim a role as mediators and wrestle for influence in a strategically neuralgic zone.

Historically, phases of tension and enmity have alternated with periods of détente and rudiments of peaceful coexistence. In the collective memories of the peoples on both sides of the Aegean, the positive phases, unfortunately, play a lesser role than the episodes of hostility. On both sides of the divide, political forces benefit from an atmosphere of tension. Therefore, they are hardly inclined to become champions of amicable solutions. Opposing these forces have stood and continue to stand part of the civil societies both in Greece and in Turkey. They may be termed the core of an amorphous peace movement that has seen ups and downs in line with the political and diplomatic process. Over the years, these groups and individuals have organized myriad activities and campaigns. While not in the limelight, and against all the odds, they continue to strive for sustainable rapprochement - and very basically Greek-Turkish friendship. This brings us to the authors (as well as the editors) of this book. In the broader sense of the term, they belong to the latter category.

The Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University in Istanbul and the Turkey Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) look back at many years of successful projects aimed at bringing Greeks and Turks together. Over the years, the two partner institutions have provided spaces for participants from both countries to talk and design solutions for a more peaceful future. In their eyes, every one of these activities may be termed a confidence building measure. Over the years, the two institutions and the individuals that lead them have co-organized myriad such dialogues in both countries which have contributed to the participants acquiring a better understanding of the “other” and the challenges ahead.

Naturally, since only about 10 workshops and seminars with over 200 participants have been held, they could be deemed to have only a limited impact. Nevertheless, we believe in the multiplying impact of our work as we have helped establish a network of like-minded individuals many of whom

have moved up in their professional careers and are bound to become influencers in their respective societies – or have already attained this position of privilege.

People to people meetings rely to a great extent on direct interaction, a face-to-face encounter at a physical venue. Or so we thought, until our experiences in times of the COVID 19 pandemic inspired us to adapt to Zoom sessions. This experience taught us that we can also achieve great results working together from a distance using the Internet. From this vantage point, the awful pandemic has also been a time of creativity, innovation, and high productivity. Not at least in our efforts to bring young Turks and Greeks together and to bridge gaps that exist. In fact, the Zoom sessions allowed for the participation of several young Greeks and Turks living, studying, and working outside their respective countries that would not have attended the in-person sessions.

So how did this happen? Just one example that brings us straight back to the origin of this book. In one of our virtual workshops, we asked mixed working groups, in an exercise titled “focus group workshop” designed and led by an expert facilitator, to design proposals for joint Greek-Turkish projects. In lengthy sessions, participants would grapple with the details and, ultimately, come up with quite remarkable blueprints. For all of us, these sessions have been special moments and experiences of understanding and learning.

It is in the nature of this framework that the results of the intellectual efforts would remain within a small circle of participants only and hardly, if at all, reach a wider audience outside apart from the project’s institutional stakeholders (partner and funding organizations). Against this background, we came up with the idea to do this book. First, we formulated a call for proposals. Very much like the earlier exercise in the closed virtual spaces, we now invited young Turkish and Greek scholars, analysts, journalists, and others to develop and write a research or policy paper. This would have to deal with an area of common ground and cooperation between the two countries. Apart from the quality, the originality, the relevance, and policy recommendations as selection criteria, it was clear from the outset that successful proposals would be submitted jointly by individuals from both countries.

The call for proposals was meant to jumpstart a series of Greek-Turkish cooperative efforts in our network and beyond producing a big number of fascinating proposals – and thus exactly what we had hoped for. It has been a challenge to select from the entries the best paper proposals that would be granted a small fellowship and, in the end, be featured in this edited volume. The jury (composed of representatives of Kadir Has University, the Panteion University of Athens, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom) was also guided by a desire to feature as broad a thematic spectrum as possible covering politics, the economy, the role of the media and culture and, of course, the contributions of civil society.

For the editors, it has been a fascinating journey to read the papers. We hope you may be equally attracted by the contributions of our young writers. The literature on Greek-Turkish topics is vast. A preference for works covering the hostile dimensions of this relationship is obvious. Texts focusing on cooperation and the less combative aspects of the relationship are not as numerous. Our book belongs to the latter category.

As is standard practice with research or policy papers, we asked the authors to conclude their chapters with policy recommendations. As a result, you will find in the following pages some highly creative and innovative, albeit diverse, suggestions. We believe these should be of interest for everyone involved in Greek-Turkish affairs.

A quick overview of the nine contributions demonstrates the wealth of the topics and their recommendations. The chapter by Ioannis Choulis, Selin Siviş, and Marius Mehrl on “Avoiding Disaster in The Aegean: Developing a Latent Tension Index for Greek-Turkish Relations” presents a novel framework or index which is meant to serve as a neutral early-warning system for stakeholders from both Greece and Turkey. The objective is to facilitate trust-building and to enhance cooperation between the two countries.

In their chapter on “The New Governance System for Asylum and Migration in the European Union: An Avenue for Cooperation between Turkey and Greece?”, Bezen Balamir Coşkun and Effie Charalampaki stress the need for multidimensional and multilevel governance approaches in the manage-

ment of the EU's migration and asylum complex. They present an evolutionary policy framework that allows for a "shared adaptive space" between the two countries to address these issues and minimize tensions.

In their contribution on "The Migration Crisis at the Evros/Meriç Border: An Analysis of the Coverage of Greek and Turkish News Portals", Ioanna M. Kostopoulou and Alaaddin Paksoy analyze how Greek and Turkish media portals reported on the crisis at the Greek-Turkish land border as it evolved in February and March 2020. They created a codebook to assess the media's response and derived some general conclusions about how the press in each country portrayed the crisis where "political atmosphere and the discourse used by politicians" prevailed.

For Yvoni Efstathiou and Polen Türkmen writing "The Missing 50%: Women in Trust-Building, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Greece-Turkey Relations", the focus is on imbalance of the of the gender dimension within the bilateral context. They show that the evident absence of women from both countries in official relations does not help enhance trust-building, as opposed to their active involvement in several civil society initiatives. Hence, the authors provide concrete recommendations on how to better include women in aspects of conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

In "Claiming the Glory of the Covid-19 Vaccine: Lessons for Better Societies Learnt by a Success Story Nearly Lost in Translation", Mary Drosopoulos and Jegar Telal Tayip explore how the background human story behind the BioNTech-Pfizer anti-Covid-19 vaccine Turkey and Greece worked together to develop and produce the vaccine. While the media in Greece and Turkey have only highlighted the contributions of the individuals involved from their respective countries. The authors focus on the social-cultural level to demonstrate how, under the proper conditions, scientists and individuals from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, can thrive together by serving science and humanity.

For Nur Sinem Kourou, Müge Dalkıran and Antonios Alexandridis writing in "Breaking Down Barriers: Trust-Building Through the Mobility of Ac-

ademic Elite between Greece and Turkey”, the issue of academic mobility between Greece and Turkey is explored. The authors interviewed scholars from both countries that have experienced academic mobility in different phases in their careers and derived interesting conclusions. Fundamentally, the article stresses how the mobility of academics between Greece and Turkey “enables trust-building and consolidates the relations between” the two countries, especially during times of tension and mistrust.

In their study titled “Audi Alteram Partem: Enhancing Trust-Building in Greek-Turkish Relations through Youth Empowerment”, Abdullah Arsan, Erman Ermihan and Kleopatra Moditsi surveyed the alumni of the Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS) since the project was first launched in 2015. They explored how an event such as the GTYLS could provide the framework for trust, contact intention, and empathy among the Greek and Turkish youth that participated in it, via the use of recognized academic methodologies. They concluded that the focus on youth empowerment “has long-term benefits for interstate cooperation and dialogue” and stated their intention to continue to research this topic by widening their target audiences.

Deniz Halman Tomaka and Eirini Barianaki in “Pairs Through Borders: Aegean” investigated the various economic, social, and cultural flows generated by the interface between Turkish Aegean coastal cities and nearby Greek islands. They introduced three “pairs through borders” – Symi-Datça, Rhodes-Marmaris, and Kastellorizo-Kaş – and explored their particular characteristics, connections, and potential. The authors, furthermore, presented an action plan for further cooperation and its extension to other potential “pairs”.

Finally, the contribution titled “The Power of our Story is to Create Memories: From Being Roommates in Kabala to Promising Project Partnership” by Chrysanthi Athanasiadou and Hazel Çağan Elbir is a very personal account of how their first encounter in Kavala in December 2019 during a Greek-Turkish youth symposium led them to develop a friendship and the promotion of a language-based cultural approach between the two countries. The authors argue that knowing each other’s language helps trust-building and dialogue-building since someone’s culture can only be understood by learning and speaking the language associated with it.

Hence, the outputs of this project are remarkably diverse and extremely useful in providing a framework and a direction in improving relations between the two countries. Above all, these collaborative chapters demonstrate a commitment by their youthful authors to work together and produce useful and innovative content to further enable the much-needed trust-building process between the two sides. In other words, for us the editors, we are especially content with the empowerment of the volume's contributors.

It would be great – and this is our hope - if our writers' proposals also find the interest of policymakers as well potential funders or donors who will consider implementing some of the recommendations or supporting the further research and implementation of the featured ideas. Our ultimate aim is for this volume to be an almanac of opportunities – for those fine young scholars and individuals dedicated to rapprochement, trust-building, and dialogue, as well as for those who think that Greek-Turkish rapprochement is a cause worth investing in. In fact, one of the encouraging aspects of this project is that many of the contributions have been written by individuals that have not been previously involved in our activities and were not necessarily inspired by taking part in them. This demonstrates both the potential of this initiative as well as the interest that exists among the youth in Greece and Turkey in creating synergies across borders.

This project would not have been possible without the invaluable and unrelenting inspiration, support, and guidance we have received from Despoina-Ino Afentouli, the longtime Program Officer at NATO's Public Diplomacy Division in our work. Despoina-Ino, along with her Turkish colleagues, has been the biggest supporter of the Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium project and has been instrumental in ensuring that NATO co-sponsors the project year in year out. This has allowed us to further develop it and create multiplier initiatives stemming from it such as this book. For these reasons, we dedicate this publication to her and her commitment to our work and Greek-Turkish trust-building.

We would also like to express our gratitude to Professor Mustafa Aydin of Kadir Has University and Professor Kostas Ifantis of the Panteion University of Athens who have assisted us in selecting the nine papers that comprise

the bulk of this publication. Special mention also goes to Gulcin Sinav of the Turkey Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of Liberty for her continued support and Seren Bostan of the Center for International and European Studies for designing the book's cover. Finally, above all, we would like to thank Abdullah Arslan who has been with us from the start as our assistant in this project while he was a postgraduate student at Kadir Has University and continued to do so after moving to the University of Essex to further his studies. We would not have been able to complete this book without his invaluable contribution.

Athens and Istanbul, December 2021

Avoiding Disaster in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Latent Tension Index for Greek-Turkish Relations

Ioannis Choulis, Selin Siviş, and Marius Mehrl

Abstract

The contemporary history of Greek-Turkish relations is marked by persistent tensions which, following gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, nearly escalated into a full-scale military conflict in August 2020. While outside mediation has resulted in limited rapprochement since then, both sides have also continued their hostile rhetoric and posturing, risking re-escalation. To facilitate enduring trust-building and de-escalation between the parties, it is necessary to measure and monitor the latent tension between Turkey and Greece in a real-time and transparent fashion. We present a novel tension index developed for this purpose. In order to provide a comprehensive measure of Greek-Turkish tensions, the index combines publicly available information on aerial and naval incursions, arms imports, and bilateral exploratory talks. In addition to developing the theoretical and empirical basis of the index, the project also triangulates it qualitatively against news reporting in both the Turkish and Greek media and illustrates its use by examining the quantitative relationship between Greek-Turkish tension and bilateral trade. As a transparent, real-time, and neutral measure of latent tensions between Turkey and Greece, the index will thus serve as a neutral crisis early-warning system for stakeholders in both countries, facilitating trust-building and cooperation between the two parties.

Keywords: cooperation; conflict; Greece; Turkey; tension index; Eastern Mediterranean

INTRODUCTION

The strong language exchange between Foreign Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Dendias during their official talks in April 2021 in Ankara suggests that the current state of Greek-Turkish relations is far from ideal even though the two states made significant steps towards a positive agenda and both ministers made a case against high tensions and escalatory behavior. The need for a positive agenda was stressed again by the two Foreign Ministers during their follow up meeting in Athens in May 2021 and by President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Mitsotakis after meeting in June 2021 in Brussels. The August 2020 naval standoff highlighted the escalatory potential of the Greek-Turkish dispute, yet existing measurements do not capture the increase in tension underlying the 2020 standoff. Being unable to measure rising tension in Greek-Turkish relations, stakeholders, like civil society organizations in both countries and neighboring states, were taken by surprise when the two states deployed their naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. To facilitate trust-building and de-escalation between the two parties, it is thus imperative to measure and monitor the latent tension between Turkey and Greece in a real-time and transparent fashion.

To that end, low intensity dispute events, like airspace violations, offer unique insights on the trajectory of Greek-Turkish relations (see Kollias 2004; Athanassiou et al. 2006). We thus introduce a new tension index based on publicly available, monthly data on airspace violations, naval incursions, arms imports, and exploratory talks to measure variations in latent tension between the two neighbors. As a transparent, replicable, and neutral measure of tension between Turkey and Greece, the index thus serves as an objective crisis early-warning system for relevant stakeholders in both countries, facilitating trust-building and cooperation between the two parties, and beyond. Here, we discuss the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the index and triangulate it qualitatively against news reporting in both the Turkish and Greek media. Specifically, we examine how six daily, national newspapers with anti- and pro-government views portrayed bilateral relations in the periods June-July 2020 and May-June 2016. Lastly, we illustrate its use by examining the relationship between Greek-Turkish tensions and bilateral economic activity.

The paper is structured as follows: First, we present the state of affairs in Greek-Turkish relations and highlight the need for a latent tension index. We then discuss the components and construction of the index. Following this discussion, we present the two applications. In the conclusions we consider the study's implications and provide relevant policy recommendations.

BACKGROUND

The Greek-Turkish territorial dispute is a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, and the threat of military escalation is ubiquitous in Greek-Turkish relations. Bilateral relations are beset by acute disagreements over the continental shelf and the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones, the extent of territorial waters and sovereignty over islands, naval and aerial incursions, regional cooperation, and the status of Cyprus (Choulis et al. 2021). A full-scale war was averted during the Imia/Kardak 1996 crisis owing to US intervention, but the dispute persists despite Western-led diplomatic efforts as both states have adopted an intransigent, zero-sum culture (Ifantis 2009). Gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have further aggravated the Greek-Turkish competition. In August 2020, the two navies nearly came to blows when Turkey deployed naval forces and drilling ships as a response to the newly signed Greco-Egyptian delimitation agreement. German mediation led to the termination of the military standoff after 45 days and to the resumption of exploratory talks, but tensions remain high.

While Greek-Turkish relations have not featured full-scale military action since 1974, tensions remain persistent and significant. The August 2020 naval stand-off accentuates the potentially disastrous prospects of the Greek-Turkish rivalry with German chancellor Angela Merkel commenting that “it’s hard to imagine how small the distance between military conflict and peaceful settlement can get in some cases” (Ekathimerini 2020). Yet, the August 2020 standoff caught many observers by surprise since existing measures of the interstate dispute do not capture variations in tension at a substantively or temporally fine-grained level.

Thus, the August confrontation highlights the need to incorporate variation in low levels of contention, like airspace or naval violations, in the study of interstate dispute intensity in order to provide policy makers with detailed and current information on tension levels. A tension index would provide policy makers and other stakeholders with readily available, objective information on the level of dispute intensity on a monthly basis and would serve as an early warning system for latent escalation that may lead to a full-scale military crisis, similar to the August 2020 standoff. In doing so, it will also provide civil society with another tool to meaningfully contribute to dispute resolution in the Eastern Mediterranean via the reduction of information asymmetries between the two parties (Fearon 1995; Rauchhaus 2006).

The study of low intensity disputes can provide significant insights on Greek-Turkish relations and the factors that affect the level of tension between the two states. Existing studies focusing exclusively on airspace incursions indicate that these incidents positively affect Greek military spending while themselves being driven by Turkish defense expenditures (Kollias 2004; Choulis et al. 2021), have a meaningful impact on the Greek stock market (Athanassiou et al. 2006), and also serve domestic political purposes for the government in Ankara (Mehrl and Choulis 2021). While this research focuses only on airspace incursions, hence missing other important components of the dispute such as naval incursions or arms imports, it nonetheless suggests that studying low intensity dispute events can improve our understanding of Greek-Turkish tensions. Beyond airspace violations, naval incursions have become an important feature of the dispute, as evidenced by the Imia/Kardak crisis or the recent events involving the research activities of the survey vessel *Oruç Reis* in the East Mediterranean. Similarly, the purchase of a French Rafale aircraft squadron by Greece shortly after the August standoff highlights the dispute's escalation dynamics within an arms race (Ekathimerini 2021). In contrast, the restart of the exploratory talks between the two countries in 2021 points to a mutual willingness to consider diplomatic dispute resolution. Taking these incidents seriously enables us to measure dispute intensity more accurately in Greek-Turkish relations. Measurements based on conflict onset or militarized interstate

disputes do not capture variation in underlying tension and as such miss the tension build-up that precedes a militarized crisis. The sudden escalation of the Greek-Turkish rivalry as observed in the Imia/Kardak 1995-6 crisis and the August 2020 naval standoff indicates the need of an objective tension index that will serve as an early warning system for potential escalation in the Greek-Turkish dispute.




Figure 1: Greek-Turkish tension, January 2009 – January 2021.
Black dashed line indicates mean tension level.

Extending existing work on the role of airspace incursions in the Greek-Turkish context, we thus propose a tension index that accounts for a parsimonious set of additional important measures of the two countries' bilateral relationship and dispute perception. Following the preceding discussion, it combines information on aerial and naval incursions with variables indicating the value of Greek arms imports as well as the incidence of exploratory talks. It is constructed as *aerial and naval incursions + arms imports - exploratory talks* where incursions are scaled to range between 0 and 100, the import and talk variables between 0 and 10, and the resulting index again between 0 and 100. The index is presented in Figure 1.

The index shows that Greek-Turkish relations have undergone substantial shifts throughout the period of observation. Most noticeably, tensions were very high from mid-2019 onwards, culminating in the highest observed value during the August 2020 standoff. But even before this dispute escalation, the index suggests an increase in tensions starting in Spring 2017. In contrast, the 2-year period preceding it exhibits markedly lower tensions as monthly values often remain below average. To triangulate the index, we now investigate how the tension score corresponds to media reporting on the state of the Greek-Turkish relationship.

DISCUSSION

For the index to have any value, it is critical that it corresponds to real-world events. We thus first qualitatively assess its validity by evaluating its reported tension level against Greek and Turkish media reporting. This analysis illustrates that the index corresponds to informed observers' perceptions of the dispute. In a second step, we also assess the relationship between the tension index and bilateral trade, finding that rising tensions correspond to decreased economic activity between the two countries.

For the media analysis, we examine the reporting by six national newspapers in two periods which, based on the index, can respectively be classified as low- and high-tension. We selected the newspapers to include three widely circulated publications per country exhibiting both pro- and anti-government leanings. For Turkey, we looked at *Birgün*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Sabah*. *Sabah*, with an average circulation of 195.000-200.000, is a right-wing source displaying pro-government views. In contrast, *Cumhuriyet* and *Birgün*, with average circulations of 25.000-30.000 and 50.000-55.000 respectively, both exhibit leftist positions and are more critical of the current government. For the Greek media, we selected *Efsyn* as an anti-government, left-wing source, *TaNea* as a centrist source and *Kathimerini* as a right-wing source with pro-government views. *Kathimerini* has an average daily circulation of 14.000-17.000; *TaNea* 15.000-16.000, and *Efsyn* 7.000-8.000. In searching for relevant news items, we used 'Greek-Turkish relations' as an initial keyword but further employed 'Turkey' (*Τουρκία*) in the Greek and

‘Greece’ (*Yunanistan*) in the Turkish sources to ensure sufficient coverage. Finally, we chose the months June-July 2020 as high- and May-June 2016 as low-tension periods. We study June-July 2020 to explore whether and how Greek and Turkish media reported increasing tension in bilateral relations before the August naval standoff. We examine May-June 2016 as the most recent period of low tensions and because it precedes the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.

The findings of this analysis are summarized in Table 1. Our reading of Turkish and Greek media indicates that news on bilateral relations is mostly centered around five frames: 1) socio-political tension over socio-cultural symbols, arising, for example, over the status of Hagia Sophia, burning the Turkish flag, or attacks on mosques in Greece, as well as conflict over the perceived mistreatment of the Turkish speaking minority in Greece; 2) economic and military cooperation, i.e. efforts to boost security and business ties between the two states, such as, for example, economic partnerships in the Aegean and the export of Turkish drone technology to Greece; 3) De-escalation efforts, i.e. diplomatic attempts to decrease tensions between the two states, e.g. seeking diplomacy on the Eastern Mediterranean front and German mediation; 4) territorial tension, i.e. mostly verbal threats or militarized actions challenging the status-quo regarding border delimitations, such as airspace violations, military build-ups in the Eastern Mediterranean, or gas explorations; and 5) the humanitarian crisis, i.e. political aspects of the refugee influx, such as, for example, irregular crossings in the Aegean, the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, or pushbacks of asylum seekers and refugees. Except for the final category, which is predominantly featured in Turkish news reporting, these categories structure the discourse on Greek-Turkish relations in both countries.

Overall, the reporting in all six outlets indicates growing tension in bilateral relations throughout June-July 2020 but little dispute activity in May-June 2016. Most pertinently, there were 261 articles on territorial tensions in June-July 2020 but only 16 in May-June 2016. And while the Table suggests that Greek-Turkish relations were generally a more salient issue in Summer 2020 than in the earlier period, a telling exception is the

topic of economic and military cooperation which was more reported on in May-June 2016. This suggests that our latent tension index corresponds with the state of Greek-Turkish affairs as reported by media outlets in both countries.

Table 1: Media Reports on Bilateral Relations.

Newspaper	<i>Socio-political tension over socio-cultural symbols</i>		<i>Economic and military cooperation</i>		<i>De-escalation efforts</i>		<i>Territorial tension</i>		<i>Humanitarian Crisis</i>	
	May-June 2016	June-July 2020	May-June 2016	June-July 2020	May-June 2016	June-July 2020	May-June 2016	June-July 2020	May-June 2016	June-July 2020
<i>Sabah</i>	1	37	2	1	0	7	7	43	6	29
<i>BirGün</i>	0	7	0	1	0	2	1	11	2	6
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	1	6	0	0	0	2	1	14	6	2
<i>Kathimerini</i>	2	34	1	0	0	18	1	105	0	8
<i>TaNea</i>	1	10	0	0	1	6	4	37	0	0
<i>Efsyn</i>	1	6	0	0	0	8	2	51	0	0

As Table 1 indicates, there is a striking difference in how often Turkish media reported on Greece-Turkey relations, pointing to escalating tensions particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. This shift also affects all three newspapers studied. Even though the right-wing conservative *Sabah* tends to report much more about Greek-Turkish relations than *Birgün* and *Cumhuriyet*, all three newspapers exhibit similar positions on Turkey’s foreign affairs, especially in the context of Greece-Turkey relations, regardless of their political stance. Greece, on the one hand, is positively portrayed in the Turkish media only when news cover economic and military cooperation between the two countries. On the other hand, Greece mostly has a negative disposition in the Turkish media when news articles are about gas explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the conversion of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, the alleged mistreatment of the Turkish-speaking minority in Greece, and the Greek response to irregular crossings in the Aegean and at the Greek-Turkish land border.

While the newspapers report similar content and incidents, it is crucial to note that how news headlines are formulated varies across the three newspapers, especially when it comes to the *Mavi Vatan* (Blue Homeland) doctrine, an ideological discourse in which Ankara emphasizes the use of naval supremacy to defend “Turkey’s right to maritime boundaries, its ownership of hydrocarbon resources and the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey” against challenges by Greece and Cyprus (Adar and Toygür 2020: 2). To exemplify, *Sabah* tends to glorify Turkey and its actions in the Eastern Mediterranean through more populist headlines such as ‘Continental shelf lesson for Greece’ whilst *Birgün* and *Cumhuriyet* report similar news but use more descriptive headlines without necessarily overpraising Turkey, such as ‘NAVTEX Battles between Greece and Turkey’ and ‘NAVTEX Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean’. In a slightly distinct manner, a similar pattern is also observed while reporting on irregular crossings in the Aegean. To illustrate, *Birgün*’s headlines are mostly about boat sinkings and rescuing asylum seekers while *Cumhuriyet*’s and *Sabah*’s headlines adopt a more accusive language emphasizing the ‘inhumane treatment of asylum seekers by Greece’ or that ‘Greece leaves irregular migrants dead’. Referring again to Table 1, such more negative portrayals were very prevalent in the high-tension period of June-July 2020 but more muted when tensions were lower.

Reporting in the Greek media follows a very similar pattern. There, all three newspapers portray Turkey negatively in their frequent reports on gas explorations, irregular migration or the Hagia Sophia while it receives positive reference only in the rare reports on economic or security cooperation. Here too, Greek-Turkish relations featured heavily in June-July 2020. For instance, *Efsyn* reported that military threats had become more prevalent and expressed worries that the activities of Oruç Reis may further escalate the dispute. *TaNea* identified Greek-Turkish relations as one of the four big challenges facing the Mitsotakis’ government. And *Kathimerini* published a series of articles focusing on the Turkish-Libyan memorandum on maritime zones, Turkish airspace incursions, bilateral military build-ups, and the increased

instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the Greek news media thus discussed tensions between Ankara and Athens at great length in June-July 2020, this is not the case for May-June 2016. For this period, our search resulted in few items on political or socio-cultural tensions, with news on the then-planned conversion of Hagia Sophia being the exception, while *Kathimerini* instead reported on cooperation between the two countries. Taken together, this analysis suggests that Greek-Turkish tensions were significant in June-July 2020 but much more muted in May-June 2016, as indicated both by the number and the tone of news reports collected from three Turkish and three Greek newspapers. In other words, the perceptions of dispute intensity as exhibited in these news sources align closely to the measure of tension developed here.

Finally, we use the index to examine the relationship of bilateral tensions and trade activity between the two countries. Existing studies document a significant impact of airspace incursions on Athens stock market returns (Athanassiou et al. 2006). As such, we expect increasing tensions to deter bilateral trade activity due to rising uncertainty about the future and the threat of military escalation. To examine this relationship, we compare tension scores and trade volume (UN 2021) over the period January 2010 to December 2020 in Figure 2. The Figure indicates that higher values of tension correspond to lower values of trade volume. In particular, the total value of trade increased between 2010 and 2014 when tensions were low. The gradual increase in tensions during 2015 corresponds to a substantial decrease in the trade volume in the same period. Trade volume appears to have increased between 2017 and late 2019 despite tensions remaining comparatively high, albeit not to the 2010-2014 levels. However, this positive trend in bilateral trade stops in early 2020 and the sharp drop in trade observed throughout the rest of 2020 coincides with rising tensions. Figure 2 thus offers preliminary evidence that increasing tensions in Greek-Turkish affairs may decrease bilateral trade.




Figure 2: Greek-Turkish tension and trade activity, January 2010 – December 2020.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS

The August 2020 naval standoff made clear that the potential for a large-scale military escalation in the Greek-Turkish dispute remains present. In order to help facilitate resolution, we introduced a latent tension index based on publicly available, monthly data capturing airspace violations, naval incursions, arms imports, and exploratory talks. The index serves as a neutral early-warning system for relevant stakeholders, thus facilitating trust-building and cooperation between the two sides by providing objective, up-to-date information on the state of play of bilateral relations. We illustrate that the index captures increasing tension in the Greek-Turkish dispute since 2017, culminating in the 2020 standoff, and that it corresponds to the state of Greek-Turkish affairs as presented by the media in both countries. Finally, preliminary evidence indicates that increasing tension levels between Greece and Turkish may reduce bilateral economic activity. Building on these insights, we offer three actionable policy recommendations.

- ***Continuing the latent tension index:*** Persistent tension in Greek-Turkish relations indicates the need for a real-time, objective measure of

dispute intensity to guard against re-escalation and support mediation between the two states. A coalition of Greek and Turkish civil society organizations, think tanks, and research centers is perfectly suited to publish and continuously update such a measure, building on the progress presented here.

- ***Expanding publicly available data in both countries:*** To realize the full potential of this tension measure for conflict resolution, it is imperative to expand the included data. Civil society or academics may collect data on omitted but important events such as military exercises, diplomatic protests or even disputes in the NATO forums. More pressingly, the measure lacks data capturing the Turkish perspective, pointing to the need for data documenting Greek incursions into Turkish-claimed waters and airspace.
- ***Encouraging enhanced civil society cooperation:*** The latent tension index, and the wider Dialogue framework, demonstrate how academics and civil society in Greece and Turkey can collaborate to provide much-needed, objective information on Greek-Turkish relations, thus serving an important role in dispute resolution. Future initiatives can build on and enhance this fruitful cooperation to develop more amicable relations between the two neighbors.

Adding to these policy recommendations, this study presents many avenues for future research. The latent tension index can be significantly expanded upon with the inclusion of more fine-grained data both regarding its existing components but also new ones, like diplomatic protests. Similarly, systemic shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic may be included. The index can be used in multivariate time-series models to investigate different aspects of Greek-Turkish relations, extending the application to bilateral economic activity. Finally, the collection of data on Greek activities from the Turkish point of view would significantly increase the research's potential and offer more insight on the dispute. Civil society and academia can thus play a decisive role in conflict resolution by providing fact-based, neutral information on bilateral tension to stakeholders in both countries. Ultimately, we are fully aware that the Greek-Turkish dispute can only be resolved with clear delimit-

itation and mutual compromises. As such, civil society can facilitate conflict resolution by providing stakeholders with the needed information to improve the prospects of effective mediation.

REFERENCES

- Adar, Sinem and Toygür, Ilke. 2020. 'Turkey, the EU and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis – Militarization of Foreign Policy and Power Rivalry'. SWP Comment, No.62, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2020. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2020C62_EasternMediterraneanCrisis.pdf
- Athanassiou, Emmanuel, Kollias, Christos, and Syriopoulos, Theodore. 2006. 'Dynamic volatility and external security related shocks: The case of the Athens Stock Exchange.' *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money* 16(5): 411–424.
- Choulis, Ioannis, Mehrl, Marius, and Ifantis, Kostas. 2021. 'Arms Racing, Military Build-ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020.' *Defence and Peace Economics*: 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1933312>.
- Ekathimerini. 2020. 'Merkel suggests Greece and Turkey came close to war.' Accessed April 19, 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/257545/article/ekathimerini/news/merkel-suggests-greece-and-turkey-came-close-to-war>.
- Ekathimerini. 2021. 'Parliament approves purchase of Rafale fighters from France.' Accessed June 19, 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/261239/parliament-approves-purchase-of-rafale-fighters-from-france/>.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist explanations for war.' *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
- Kollias, C. 2004. 'The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement, the Underlying Military Tension and Greek Defense Spending.' *Turkish Studies* 5(1): 99–116.
- Ifantis, Kostas. 2009. 'Historical Context, National Narrative, and Prospects of Reconciliation in the Aegean: The View for Athens.' In *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines* edited by Carter, J., Irani, G. and Volkan, V. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Mehrl, Marius, and Choulis, Ioannis. 2021. 'Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes: Evidence from Turkish Airspace Incursions.' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17(3).
- Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2005. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management.' *World Politics* 58(2): 207–241.
- UN. 2021. *Comtrade*. Accessed April 19, 2021. <https://comtrade.un.org>.

APPENDICES:

Table A1: Components and data sources of the tension index.

Variable	Description	Unit of Obs.	Data Source
Airspace Incursions	Count of aerial incursions, all types	Month	Hellenic National Defence General Staff (2021)
Naval Incursions	Count of naval incursions, all types	Month	Hellenic National Defence General Staff (2021)
Greek Arms Imports	Greek imports - Turkish imports in previous year, set to 0 if negative	Year	SIPRI (2021)
Exploratory Talks	Dummy	Month	Own coding




Figure A1: Greek-Turkish tension and its components, January 2009 – January 2021

The New Governance System for Asylum and Migration in the European Union:

An Avenue for Cooperation between Turkey and Greece?

Bezen Balamir Coskun and Effie Charalampaki

Abstract

Migration and asylum are complex issues. Their management, thus, requires multidimensional/multilevel governance approaches. So far, the lack of joint governance mechanisms within the EU has caused further complications regarding refugees' and asylum seekers' human security. In this context, the EU proposed in 2020 the "New Pact on Migration and Asylum" to improve the migration and asylum management system in Europe. With the New Pact, the EU also expects to improve cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. By emphasizing that "no single solution on migration can satisfy all sides, on all aspects," the EU underlines the need for working together to find a common solution. The proposed research picks up these two main themes of the New Pact -cooperation and governance- and inquires the prospects of cooperation between Turkey and Greece within the context of the New European Governance System for Asylum and Migration. In order to address the problems of strategic foresight, complexity, and uncertainty in cross-boundary issues, an evolutionary policy process framework will be presented. Then, the opportunities for cooperation to minimize the human cost of irregular migration between the two sides of the Aegean will be discussed, and related policy recommendations will be presented.

Keywords: New Pact on Migration and Asylum, evolutionary model, new governance system, EU-Turkey, Turkey-Greece

INTRODUCTION

The fire at the Moria refugee camp in September 2020 was an alarm call for Europe to rethink asylum and migration policies. In her State of the Union speech on 16 September 2020, European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, underlined the need for a holistic approach to the common EU migration and asylum policy. In this context, on 23 September 2020, the European Commission proposed the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum.” The Pact aims at the improved and faster asylum and migration procedures for Europe and at a balanced approach to the principles of burden-sharing and of a culture of “responsibility and solidarity” across the EU in order to rebuild trust between its member states regarding an array of governance issues.

Furthermore, the New Pact is considered an opportunity for the EU to achieve more effective migration governance in Europe. This research aims at examining the prospects of cooperation between Turkey and Greece within the context of the New Pact in order to create a policy agenda for both Turkish and Greek policymakers and civil society. The research and inquiry will be based on expert opinions, governance model building, and policy analysis. For the analysis, opinions of the EU and migration experts were collected in written form or as voice recordings.¹ The analysis of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum and of the two countries’ perspectives about the New Pact will lead us to draw a list of policy recommendations that may provide opportunities for enhanced cooperation and dialogue between the two sides of the Aegean in spite their turbulent relations.

The project aims primarily at devising a bottom-up diffusion process as a strategic governance framework that allows for the regionalization of domestic policies and enhances strategic foresight based on common state

1 This is a preliminary study developing a regional governance model that enables bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Greece on cross-boundary crises. All the experts that were consulted so far were Turkish experts who either work at Turkish universities or European think tanks. As the authors of this study, we are aware of the limitation of the study as lacking the opinion of Greek experts, which will be included in the full report.

interests. The study also proposes an evolutionary model of a dynamic network for the management of cross-boundary crises based on the facilitation of a network architecture that will maintain consistency and uniformity in both nations in order to motivate them to work together on cross-boundary issues. An evolutionary model like this seeks primarily to disengage migratory and refugee flows from the security and national interest agendas on both sides of the Aegean by creating a bilateral early-warning system that will not be able to operate without both countries agreeing and upholding certain provisions. In other words, cross-boundary issues can become a platform for cooperation and dialogue between Greece and Turkey when a policy process framework for strategic foresight to manage transnational phenomena is developed. It is vital to develop a *modus operandi* on both sides of the Aegean that disengages the management, control, harboring, and rehabilitation of economic migrants and asylum seekers as a pressure tool and a leverage mechanism from multi-level national foreign policy agendas.


A bottom-up approach can also help the EU's New Pact develop a global governance character instead of remaining an inward-looking policy tool, as it is constructed now to enhance the Union's role as a global actor. Finally, our study inquires how a bilateral strategy can be devised to bind Greece and Turkey to a common state interest platform.

THE NEW PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: A FRESH START ON MIGRATION?

“We will take a human and humane approach. Saving lives at sea is not optional. And those countries who fulfil their legal and moral duties or are more exposed than others, must be able to rely on the solidarity of our European Union... Everybody has to step up here and take responsibility.” (von der Leyen, State of the Union Address 2020)


Since 2014, more than one million people, mostly Syrians, have irregularly entered into Europe. They bore the risks of dangerous journeys to find a better life in Europe. Asylum applications to EU members states

peaked between 2014 and 2016 (See Graphic 1). By 2019, the number of registered refugees in the EU reached 2,712,477. Furthermore, the number of asylum seekers was 721,075 (europarl.eu 2019). However, the sudden influx of millions of people caused a humanitarian crisis. Between 2014 and 2021, around 21,000 migrants died attempting to reach the shores of Europe (See Graphic 2).



Graphic 1: Non-EU Asylum applications in the EU Member States between 2008 and 2020 (Eurostat 2021)

Faced with the largest movement of migrants and refugees since World War II, the EU realized its failure to manage forced migrations. The call by its member states to safeguard their external borders raised questions about the idea of European common space. To manage the influx of migrants and refugees, member states suspended free movement inside Europe, and internal border controls were reintroduced. Despite the previous efforts to develop an EU-wide migration and asylum policy, we observed a return to the state-centric governance system. Some of the EU member states appealed to distribute the burden of refugees among all member states. These appeals were not well-received by some of the member states, such as Hungary.



Graphic 2: Number of recorded deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea from 2014 to 2021 (Statista 2021)

Within the EU, border management was reduced to a technocratic task. The Union's leaders realized that its member states lack common criteria for identifying refugees. Furthermore, they attempted to manage refugee flows through agreements with third countries. It is recognized that cooperation with other international partners, particularly with transit countries outside the EU, is required. In this context, the EU-Turkey Statement concluded on 18 March 2016.

Even though close cooperation in security and defense is a must, there was no common European position on dealing with humanitarian crisis management after the so-called refugee crisis. While the EU tends to highlight the humanitarian aspect of the migration crisis, some national governments focus on national security. Cooperation in migration issues is not a process that is entirely controlled by the EU. Yet, the governance of asylum and migration requires bilateral, multilateral, and intergovernmental approaches. The so-called refugee crisis underlined the democratic deficit of the EU institutions and highlighted the need for interstate cooperation to construct common migration policies.

Several incidents, such as the incidents on the Greek-Turkish borders at the Evros river in late February/early March 2020 and the fire at Moira camp in Greece in September 2020, have paved the way for preparing a new migration pact for the EU. As pointed out by Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President in the European Commission, the fire at the Moria refugee camp was “a stark reminder that the clock has run out on how long we can live in a house half-built. The time has come to rally around a common, European migration policy” (European Commission 2020a). In this context, for a comprehensive European approach to migration, the European Commission proposed a new Pact on Migration and Asylum in September 2020. The New Pact was prepared through intensive preparatory work since December 2019. In this context, two complete rounds of consultations were held with all member states, the European Parliament, national parliaments, civil society, social partners, and businesses (European Commission 2020b).

In her introductory comments on the New Pact, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pointed out the need for rebuilding “trust between the Member States to manage migration as a Union with the right balance between solidarity and responsibility” (European Commission 2020a). The Commission proposed a fresh start on migration which is based on two pillars. The first pillar of the Commission’s approach to building confidence consists of more efficient and faster procedures. The second pillar at the core of the Pact is the fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity (European Commission 2020a). Furthermore, the proposal of the Pact consists of four principles (See Table 1).

The Pact includes a more effective legal framework, a stronger role of the European Border and Coast Guard, a newly appointed EU Return Coordinator, and a network of national representatives to ensure consistency across the Union. In 2019, the EU allocated €101.4 Million to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in a plan to deploy a 10,000 strong standing corps by 2027 to protect its external borders. (Stanimirova 2021) Furthermore, on 24 November 2020, the Commission decided to adopt a new comprehensive Action Plan on integration and inclusion for 2021-2027. This new Action Plan targets migrants and people with a migration background in four main ac-

tions: inclusive education and training, improving employment opportunities and skills recognition, promoting access to health, and ensuring access to adequate and affordable housing. (SOLIDAR 2020) Upon its introduction, the Pact was passed to the European Parliament and Council to reach a political agreement on the core principles of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation and to adopt the Regulation by the end of the year (European Commission 2020a).

Vice President Margaritis Schinas described the Pact as a building with three floors: an external dimension (“centered around strengthened partnerships with countries of origin and transit”), robust management of external borders, and firm but fair internal rules. (Kirişçi, Erdoğan and Eminoğlu 2020) However, despite the good intentions, the Pact has been criticized by several human rights groups and migration experts. First of all, it was criticized for failing to increase human rights guarantees for migrants and solidarity among member states and focusing on border externalization and securitization. Civil society networks such as SOLIDAR view the Pact as “a missed opportunity to shape a bolder vision that enables the Union to advance on the path of solidarity and to finally live by its founding values” (SOLIDAR 2020:5). Other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as Human Rights Watch, OXFAM, and Caritas Europe criticized the Pact’s focus on returns (Bloj and Buzmaniuk 2020). Another concern was the Pact’s strong emphasis on better management of external borders and returns as it is deemed to the further strengthening of the security dimension. The second issue is about the inward-oriented nature of the Pact. As Kirişçi, Erdoğan and Eminoğlu (2020) argue, the Pact fails to recognize the global level policy implications of forced migration. In this context, Kirişçi, Erdoğan, and Eminoğlu criticized the Pact for hardly making any reference to the UN’s Global Compact for Refugees, despite Vice President Schinas’ promise to contribute to global solutions and responsibility-sharing regarding global resettlement efforts. Furthermore, the Pact gives little attention to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the EU’s migration and asylum policies. (Kirişçi, Erdoğan and Eminoğlu 2020)

The aforementioned critiques imply a need to develop the New Pact with a global governance character instead of an inward-looking policy tool. Fur-

thermore, with a strong emphasis on external borders and partnerships with third countries, the EU underlines the need for working together with non-EU partners to find a common solution. By underlining the two pillars of the Pact, namely cooperation and governance, in the following sections of the study, the prospects of cooperation between Turkey and Greece will be discussed within the context of the New European Governance System for Asylum and Migration. Thus, both Greece's and Turkey's perspectives regarding the Pact will be presented. Then, policy recommendations will be presented to address the problems of strategic foresight, complexity, and uncertainty in cross-boundary crises.

Table 1: Pillars of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission 2020b)

- **Building confidence: new balance between responsibility and solidarity**
 - Stronger trust fostered by better and more effective procedures
 - Well-managed Schengen and external borders
 - Effective Solidarity
 - Acting together to deepen international partnerships
 - Flexibility and resilience
- **Clear responsibilities through better, modernised procedures**
 - New compulsory pre-entry screening: identification, health checks, security checks, fingerprinting and registration in the Eurodac database.
 - Integrated and modern migration and border management system with the improved Eurodac database with a focus on applicants rather than application to determine responsibility for asylum claims.
 - New, faster asylum border procedure to speed up decision-making and make asylum procedures more efficient
 - Legal guarantees including an independent monitoring mechanism to ensure respect of fundamental rights, and individual assessment of asylum claims and essential guarantees protecting effective access to asylum.

- **A new mechanism for constant solidarity and flexible options for Member State contribution**
 - Relocation of recently-arrived persons
 - Return sponsorship, whereby a Member State takes over responsibility for returning a person with no right to stay on behalf of another Member State
 - Immediate operational support, longer-term support to build capacity on asylum procedures, reception of newcomers or return operations, or assistance in responding to specific migratory trends affecting Member States through cooperation with non-EU countries.
- **Tailored solidarity responses for specific scenarios:**
 - Disembarkation following search and rescue operations at sea and vulnerable persons
 - Relocation of those likely in need of protection
 - Early identification of needs through a yearly foresight report
 - Solidarity pool of national contributions, based on voluntary pledges
 - Correction mechanism to guarantee effective support
 - Risk of pressure on a Member State's migration management system
 - Relocation extended to recognised refugees
 - Contributions based on Member States' fair share
 - Correction mechanism to guarantee effective support
 - Situations of crisis
 - Relocation extended to persons in the border procedure, those in an irregular situation and those in immediate need of protection
 - Faster reaction at EU level through swift decision on contribution
 - Solidarity mechanism focused only on relocation and return sponsorship

THE GREEK PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEM FOR ASYLUM AND MIGRATION

As one of the major gateways of the EU, Greece has become its asylum hotspot. Particularly after 2015, the refugee and asylum crisis in Greece was a stark reminder of the lack of European asylum solidarity and the limits of the Common European Asylum System (Karageorgiou 2020). By the end of 2019, Greece hosted over 186,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, including 5000 unaccompanied children (See Table 2). In 2021, by the end of May, there are 3,116 arrivals (1,206 from sea, 1,910 from land). (UNHCR Operational Data Portal 2021) Most refugees and asylum seekers in Greece were from Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iran (UNHCR 2021) while most entered Greece from Turkey with Evros, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Rhodes as the main entrance points.

Table 2: Arrivals in Greece between 2014 - 2020 (UNHCR Operational Data Portal 2021)

Previous Years	Sea Arrivals	Land Arrivals	Dead and Missing
2020	9,714	5,982	102
2019	59,726	14,887	71
2018	32,494	18,014	174
2017	29,718	6,592	59
2016	173,450	3,784	441
2015	856,723	4,907	799
2014	41,038	2,280	405

Greece is a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol. Based on international law, Greece has developed its national asylum system. However, the establishment of formal structures coincided with the refugee flows following the war in Syria. As an independent structure responsible for examining requests for international protection, the Asylum Service was established (See Law 3907/2011) and became operational in June 2013. In this context, the Board of Appeals and the Reception and Identification Service were launched (UNHCR Greece 2021). With the introduction of temporary border controls applied by most of the EU member states, thousands of refugees and asylum seekers were stranded in overcrowded facilities

on the Greek islands. Although a certain level of progress has been made after the establishment of the Asylum Service, European Court of Human Rights have repeatedly condemned Greece for failing to respect the fundamental rights of migrants and applicants for international protection. The critiques were mostly about inhumane detention conditions, asylum seekers' destitution, and the lack of procedural guarantees during refugee status determination and expulsion processes (Karageorgiou 2020, 1).

As one of the most affected EU member states, the Greek authorities have expressed their preference for a Union-wide asylum system that is based on solidarity and reciprocity. Thus, Greece was one of the first member states that declared their New Pact support. In this context, in December 2021, to find a solution to the situation after the fires that destroyed the Moria Camp,² the Commission agreed with the Greek authorities to establish a new reception center on the island of Lesbos by September 2021. Furthermore, both sides agreed on the transfer of an additional €121 million to Greece for the construction of 3 smaller reception centers at Samos, Kos, and Leros (European Commission 2020c).

Most recently, in May 2021, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis urged other EU member states to reach a consensus to make progress on the new Pact for Migration and Asylum. On the same occasion, Mitsotakis latently criticized Turkey by saying that migrants and refugees must not be used as “pawns in a big geopolitical game” (Ekathimerini 2021). Greek officials have acknowledged that an approach to migration and asylum with a continued focus on borders and externalization is not sustainable. Turkey's opening of the Evros border in February-March 2020 and letting migrants and refugees cross the border proves the fragility of the refugee deal with Turkey. Thus, Greece is in favor of the speedy introduction of the New Migration Pact.

Last but not least, in the context of the management of migration and asylum, Greek officials such as Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, the Alternate Foreign Minister, are optimistic about revising the EU-Turkey Joint Statement of

² The fires in the Moria camp destroyed the camp, thus its residents found themselves without shelter. 12,362 people in the Moria camp were immediately affected by the fires.

2016. Nevertheless, Varvitsiotis expressed Greece’s concerns about the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Statement. The Greek side requires full compliance on the part of Turkey. Varvitsiotis noted that “the objective is to directly link cooperation to funding, through the adoption of a mechanism that gives more when there is good cooperation and less when the Turkish authorities do not cooperate on responding to the migration issue” (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021a).

THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEM FOR ASYLUM AND MIGRATION

Turkey is hosting around 4 million Syrians under temporary protection and 600.000 asylum seekers from other non-European countries. These numbers have made Turkey the largest refugee-hosting country in the world. Besides its domestic implications, the presence of millions of refugees and asylum seekers has become a major issue between Turkey, and the EU.

To strengthen the cooperation on the migration crisis, on 18 March 2016, the European Council and Turkey reached an agreement whose main aim was to stop the irregular flows via Turkey to Europe. In this context, the European Council and Turkey concluded a Statement on 18 March 2016. According to the statement, “all-new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey” (European Parliament 2021, 1).

Despite the objections of human rights and refugee support groups, the agreement was implemented. Consequently, the number of refugees who arrived on Greek shores was considerably dropped. The outcomes of the so-called “Refugee Deal” were quite satisfactory for both sides. In five years, a total of 28,621 Syrian refugees have been relocated in the EU, while 2,140 migrants that disembarked irregularly on Greek islands have been sent back to Turkey (ANSA 2021). In return, Turkey received €3.6 billion from the EU for Syrian communities in Turkey. By not receiving the entire budget of €6 billion that was promised by the EU, Turkey gained leverage. As observed in the European Council held in March 2021, Turkey’s commitment to keeping

4 million refugees and asylum seekers within its borders has caused a drop in the EU's tone vis-a-vis Turkey (European Council 2021).

Preventing refugees from entering the EU is a critical issue, especially for EU leaders trying to calm right-wing populist groups. For this reason, the EU wants Turkey to act as a border guard by renewing the agreement with Turkey. As long as the war in Syria continues, millions of Syrians will continue to live in Turkey. Thus, EU leaders are eager to renew the agreement as this would help them to calm their far-right and anti-immigrant groups. Meanwhile, they have time to put the New Immigration Pact into action.

On the Turkish side, there is a desire to renew the agreement. This request was voiced by Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, before von Der Leyen and Michel's visit on 6 April 2021. Furthermore, Ibrahim Kalın, chief adviser to the Turkish President, wrote for the European Council on Foreign Relations to explain why a renewed immigration agreement is a chance for both sides to develop a positive agenda (Kalın 2021). During the visits of Ursula Von Der Leyen and Charles Michel in April 2021, President Erdoğan also underlined the need to renew the agreement between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey wants to renew the migration agreement because it helps keep its communication channels with the E.U. open. At the same time, such an agreement gives Turkey a normative advantage as it reinforces the Turkish argument that Ankara is fulfilling a humanitarian mission, which the EU refused to undertake. Thus, Ankara believes that the Union must cooperate with Turkey to keep the 4 million refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.

The timing of the action plan for the New Pact coincided with the expiration of the refugee deal with Turkey. The following agenda items in the New Pact require close cooperation between the EU and Turkey and between the member states sharing borders with Turkey:

The EU will strengthen cooperation with countries of origin and transit to prevent dangerous journeys and irregular crossings, including through tailor-made Counter Migrant Smuggling Partnerships with third countries (1)

- Build action against migrant smuggling into partnerships with third countries (5 - Key Actions)

- Working with our international partners (6)
- Maximising the impact of our international partnerships (6.1)
- Protecting those in need and supporting host countries (6.2) (EUR-Lex 2020).

As the developments show, Turkey and the EU are very eager to cooperate based on a positive agenda. Thus, introducing the New Migration Pact and the prospect of renewing the refugee deal with Turkey provides a window of opportunity. It is also an opportunity for Turkey and Greece to enhance cooperation and dialogue. In this regard, we believe that devising an evolutionary model of a dynamic network for the management of migratory and refugee flows will motivate both sides to work together on cross-boundary issues.

**AN EVOLUTIONARY GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF CROSS-BOUNDARY ISSUES AND CRISES
AS THE BASIS OF COOPERATION IN REGIONAL “FAULT LINES:”
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND STRATEGIC FORESIGHT**

In this era of uncertainty, one of the major challenges that the EU is facing is crisis and risk management at its borders, among other problems and issues. The multidimensional face of transnational threats and trans-boundary crises demand novel approaches in order to address the institutional shortcomings pertaining to coordination, adaptation and innovation that preclude international institutions to develop agility and resilience, such as the EU and NATO that cooperate on transnational policy agendas, bridging national interests and needs with multilevel governance policies. Agility and resilience are paramount so as to ensure the survival of international institutions as a “whole” and their evolution as complex dynamic communities of insular diversity that is enabled by sector-oriented capacities with cross-sectoral cooperation. More specifically, the EU must develop multilevel, cross-sectoral governance structures that incorporate a bottom-up approach according to which the coordination of agencies is facilitated to enable information flows regarding decision-making, data-sharing, detection, meaning-making, accountability and transnational-agency cooperation. This enables adaptation mechanisms and embedded cooperation. The EU policymakers could use

multipurpose-multi-governance models to address the problems of uncertainty, complexity, strategic decision-making, foresight, and the emergence of uncontrollable and/or random phenomena that create a sense of urgency and challenge human, regional and international security.

The greatest challenge, obviously, is the coordination of multi-actor processes and the implementation of policies that are administered, applied, executed along, what James Rosenau called, “the domestic-foreign frontier.” (Rosenau 1997) This challenge stems primarily from the need to coordinate how large, diverse groups of people interact with each other and the nature of “boundaries” of the closed or open “environment” inside which they are called to connect and interact because this is actually what gives rise to unpredictable phenomena that challenge, accelerate, inhibit or interrupt the inputs and outputs of information flows that are essential to the management of complexity. When the patterns of behavior of large and diverse groups of people are identified and their responses to disruptions and systemic shocks are codified via their interactions, strategic decision-making and foresight are enabled so as to manage trans-boundary crises that generate high levels of uncertainty and complexity that feed conflict in the periphery of regional structures, such as the EU, developing a wicked web of overlapping problems with many actors that find it difficult to collaborate and coordinate.

We are accustomed to viewing the world divided into countries with political borders, however, the world can also include regions that are terrestrial ecoregions with their own, shared or overlaying cultures and development that can support scientific research and the production of educational tools. Strategic foresight is based on the studying of the overlapping nature of transnational issues and the trends that emerge; it can assist in create the relevant policies to support regional recovery projects with self-regulatory adaptation mechanisms as part of a broader transatlantic global governance agenda that promotes a more equitable, fairer and sustainable liberal international order. The Greek-Turkish borders (land and sea) constitute an excellent candidate for creating the first European “adaptive space” under an international treaty that Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the EU (and potentially other international organizations) will agree upon. This does not mean that there is “laissez-faire”

sovereignty by the interested parties, but it does imply that a “shared” space with common and overlapping culture(s), common values and the guidance of international law is created as a conflict resolution and crisis management tool. Inside this “shared adaptive space” all interested shareholders agree on innovation cooperation grounded in operations of transparency and coordinated trans-boundary action that advance the values of democratic governance, ecological and economic sustainability, humanitarianism and human rights, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law and international treaties.

This becomes automatically a “democratic innovation” process that promotes liberal values inside the EU and to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) partners, that also puts forward the EU as a global actor. If we want a “new transatlantic agenda for global change,” the strategic autonomy of the EU must also include a dogma of “complex adaptation” and “complex coordination of state and non-state actors” that will produce “innovation cooperation” that ensures the effective coordination of transatlantic security and economic governance structures. Trans- and cross-boundary crises, such as the management of refugee and migration flows that overlap with the resolution of transnational and criminal networks and other asymmetric threats, cannot be tackled without the coordination of all security agencies and organizations of the transatlantic sphere. In an era of pervasive interdependence and interconnectedness, those “shared adaptation spaces” must also become spaces of innovation and conflict resolution that anchor the cooperation of the transatlantic partners toward a more sustainable and adaptive liberal international order.

“SHARED” ADAPTIVE SPACES AS REGIONAL LEVERAGE POINTS

By developing not only an ideational but also a functional, practical, operational realm inside which a “shared” view of the cross-boundary crisis as a “wicked problem” is accepted by all stakeholders involved, the management of the transnational issue and the crises it generates is approached ultimately as an “evolutionary model of complex dynamics” with the potential to “self-organize” according to the network properties that emerge from the


interaction dynamics. An evolutionary governance model like this will create enhanced homogenization among highly diverse social groups and cultures, amplifying the fragmentation that centralization-decentralization tendencies produce due to the frictions between national foreign policy agendas and global governance priorities and needs, establishing synergy among different actors that co-evolve to produce new dynamics for whole regional settings that eventually acquire new properties based on embedded reciprocal interdependence, complex cooperation and complex leadership. Managing complexity is key to fostering adaptation and resilience for international institutions. This allows for establishing methods for the observation and analysis of influential behaviors within the environmental setting of social complexity, which can become the basis for strategic foresight so as to establish early warning and risk management systems that enhance resilience and robustness in national and international institutions structures with a bottom-up approach that emphasizes the role of the “individuals” and non-state actors.

“Adaptive leadership [for this analysis] is defined as an interactive event in which knowledge, action preferences and behaviors change, thereby provoking an organization to become more adaptive.” (Lichtenstein et. al. 2006, 4) Adaptive leadership demands adaptive outcomes that are generated when complex interactive dynamics seize new opportunities to tackle wicked problems. (Lichtenstein et. al. 2006, 4) For this to happen, we must conceptualize a “space” where “the ongoing cycle of events replace cross-sectional frameworks” that preclude holistic systemic analysis and aid “the longitudinal analyses of interaction events” (Lichtenstein et. al. 2006, 4): an excellent framework for developing strategic foresight and early-warning systems for multi-level governance. In this regard, in this “shared adaptive space” in troubled zones where cross-boundary crises evolve, a number of very important governance initiatives can take place such as: “1) Identifying and bracketing the events, episodes and interactions of interest; 2) Capturing these events or interactions as data in a systematic way; 3) Gathering individual/agent level data that describe interaction cues received over time; 4) Modeling these data in ways that highlight their longitudinal and relational qualities; 5) Analyzing these data in terms of their relational qualities and longitudinal dynamics”. (Lichtenstein et. al. 2006, 5-6)


These adaptive leverage points on and around borders between conflicting parties have the power to act as conflict diffusion mechanisms in bilateral and multilateral relations by actually incorporating the trans- or cross-boundary crises as a “wicked problem” that fosters a “shared” reality between the parties in dispute. When it comes to the refugee and migration flows that exacerbate tensions between Greece, Turkey, and the EU (as well as NATO and other international agencies), analysts and policymakers have emphasized continuously the different narratives that shape two different “realities” on each side of the Aegean with a third “narrative-reality” coming from Brussels and other European capitals. The question, thus, is whether it is possible to create “a common agenda” and common policies in this context to really coordinate cooperation toward the effective management of crises and disputes from which all parties involved will benefit ultimately. This is a key problem in order to manage “wicked” problems, such as uncontrollable refugee and economic migrant flows with the potential national and European security challenges they inevitably produce. The creation of “shared adaptive spaces” around borders with historical conflicts automatically produces the emergence of a “new reality” for cooperation in order to find the common or middle ground to tackle crises and/or ongoing transnational phenomena that seem to transcend space and time.

To establish a bottom-up approach, it is essential to model the micro-macro dynamics that take place in social complexity settings. With the modeling of micro-macro actors in controlled environments that continue to operate, however, as open, complex systems, we can observe the strategic and/or random interactions [high randomness produces high complexity which produces chaos and uncontrollable phenomena in governance] of state-state actors; state-non-state actors; non-state-non-state actors; international institutions agencies-state actors agencies; international institutions agencies-non-state actors; and interactions between agencies of different international institutions that demand coordination for effective governance policies; and how behavior complexity affects adaptation: an excellent tool for adaptation leadership promoted by international institutions such as the EU (see Graph 1: Part 1 & Graph 2: Part 2). We present the Charalampaki “Micro-Macro

Nexus Adaptation-Cooperation” Governance Model that is a multipurpose-multi-governance tool for international institutions for enhanced adaptation and cooperation among different and conflicting stakeholders. Adaptation and embedded interdependence are key to managing effectively cross- and trans-boundary crises and structural shocks, such as Brexit, that produce uncertainty and instability. The model will be fully explained in our forthcoming journal article.



Graph 1: The “Micro-Macro Nexus Adaptation-Cooperation” Governance Model (Extracted from Charalampaki 2019)



Graph 2: Shared Adaptive Space This is part 2 of the Charalampaki governance model above, that has emerged in order to explain the concept of “adaptive space” in combination with part 1 of the model (graph 1). It will be presented in detail in forthcoming journal publication of the article on which this chapter is based. The whole Charalampaki governance model (graph 1: part 1 and graph 2: part 2), as it unfolds in these two graphs and other unpublished graphs, demands Agent Based Modeling (ABM) and computation schemes in order to be fully developed and tested and become operational for international institutions, such as the EU and NATO.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: AN AVENUE FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE?

The model above is presented as a framework for the management of cross-boundary crises as the basis of regional cooperation for Turkey and Greece in resolving the refugee and migration crisis. For the advancement of cooperation, the model proposes a “shared adaptive space” between the Turkish and Greek governments that will be established with a treaty, as well as the civil societies of both countries. Uncontrollable refugee and migrant flows constitute a trigger event. The turbulence following the trigger event has presented a window of opportunity for Turkey, Greece and the EU to rethink their refugee and migration systems. Thus, the proposed model advances a bottom-up approach where micro-macro dynamics take place in social complexity settings. We argue that such a model will be an excellent tool for adaptation leadership promoted by international institutions such as the EU.

There exist many areas of common concern that require close collaboration between the two countries. In their meeting on 31 May 2021, Nikos Den- dias and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, declared their countries’ pledge to develop bilateral relations on 25 areas, including tourism and trade. (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021b) In this context, our proposed evolutionary model will provide a blueprint for further cooperation not just in the field of migration and asylum but also in other areas that the ministers of foreign affairs identify. In this section, we will inquire about the prospects of cooperation between Turkey and Greece in the field of migration and asylum and propose a policy agenda for both Turkish and Greek policymakers and their civil societies. To develop a policy agenda, seven EU and migration experts were consulted. Their opinions are summarized below, whereafter a list of policy recommendations will be presented.

The aforementioned proposed Pact on Migration and Asylum aims to promote greater cooperation with member states to achieve the EU’s objectives and policies regarding border management, migration, and asylum. In addition, the Pact proposes new instruments for collaboration with third countries. In conjunction with the general view about the New Migration Pact, all the experts consulted for this study have skeptical or pessimistic views about

the Pact. A migration expert refers to this Pact as “anti-immigrant.” According to this view, the Pact proposes a policy of continuous externalization with the logic that no one should come to Europe (E5). Thus, this Pact is viewed as a continuation of the Fortress Europe approach to keep refugees and asylum seekers away from the EU as much as possible (E7). In this context, the only cooperation possible under this policy may be the renewal of the agreement between the March 2016 EU and Turkey, which is related to how many resources the EU can transfer towards improving the social and economic participation of refugees – Syrian and non-Syrian alike in Turkey (E1 & E5).

Since being put into practice in March 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement has been subject to harsh criticism. Two issues - the EU’s externalization of migration governance and Ankara’s politicization of refugees as a bargaining card - lie at the heart of the criticisms. Despite the reproaches, the experts consulted assume that the EU-Turkey cooperation over migration governance will continue (E1 & E6). In this context, it is argued that migration is still one of the critical topics of the positive agenda framework in terms of Turkey-EU relations. Thus, the prospect of cooperation between Turkey and Greece in this field will also help reduce the tension in EU-Turkey relations (E7). However, as refugees and asylum seekers have become a trump card in foreign policy, both Turkish and Greek decision-makers need to stop using the issue as a negotiation item. In the medium to long term, such an approach harms stability and peace in both countries (E4). Previous experience shows that making this issue a threat contradicts the essence of cooperation. In this context, Greece, which has closed its doors to refugees in the past, and Turkey, which threatens to open its border to let refugees and asylum seekers go through the EU borders, need to build a new understanding (E7).

In order to achieve sound progress, the parties need to be sincere in their pursuit of cooperation and take steps per international ethics and human rights (E7 & E4). The success of future cooperation in the migration context requires all parties to avoid the instrumentalization of refugees and the violation of international norms. Furthermore, EU institutions as well as the other member states should take the necessary actions to help Greece hasten the processing of asylum applications (E1).

As reminded by a migration expert, Turkey and Greece have already attempted to cooperate on a series of initiatives in the migration field. The EU provided transboundary cooperation funds for Turkey and Greece to clear up mines in border areas in 2009 (UNDP 2014, 5). Despite occasional disputes, the area between the borders was mostly cleared up from mines. Regarding collaboration in migration issues, a readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece was signed in 2002 (E3). However, the implementation of readmissions was agreed upon in 2010. During the implementation of the readmission agreement, cases of human rights violations, particularly several cases of pushbacks of boats by Greek border security, were reported (Yılmaz 2014). The readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece (Gökalp-Aras 2021 and Papatzani et al. 2020) constituted the basis for the 2016 EU deal with Turkey. Thus, despite the prevailing tensions between the two countries, there exists a nucleus for cooperation. Based on the findings of the Respond Project's country reports on Turkey and Greece (Gökalp-Aras 2021 and Papatzani et al. 2020), prospective cooperation between two countries will likely be realized under the EU frameworks such as the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT), and the new migration pact (E3).

The expert opinions summarized above point out to the need for cooperative engagement to manage cross-boundary crises and establish cooperative transnational mechanisms in resolving these crises. It is believed that cooperation on migration can be a starting point for resolving other disputes between the parties.

What follows is a list of policy recommendations to guide Greek and Turkish decision-makers to address the problems of migration and asylum, which we consider to be a cross-boundary issue.

1. To develop a working system for cooperation:
 - A bi-national working group should be established to evaluate the progress since March 2016. Many reports and academic articles are evaluating the outcome of the so-called refugee deal with Turkey. Most of the evaluation reports were written from the perspective of

Brussels. However, what we need is to listen to Turkish and Greek officials and civil society. Before renewing the agreement with Turkey and implementing the New Migration Pact, problematic areas, challenges, and best practices should be identified.

2. To minimize the human cost:

- Besides the agreement between the EU and Turkey, Turkey and Greece should agree to cooperate on the following issues: control of the borders (both land and sea borders); return and readmission procedures; and prevention of pushbacks.
- Turkish and Greek officials need to ensure that the right to asylum and commitment to non-refoulement is protected. Within the context of the New Migration Pact, both EU institutions and the member states should assume responsibility and help Greece to empty the refugee camps on the islands.
- The EU should continue its financial support to Turkey towards improving the lives of Syrians under temporary protection and non-Syrian irregular migrants in Turkey. For example, all the regular and irregular migrants in Turkey should get their anti-Covid-19 vaccinations with the European funds.
- Since municipalities play an essential role in the field as service providers, the EU should ensure that a certain amount of the resources will be transferred to support local governments in both Turkey and Greece.

3. Toward further cooperation:

- Both Turkey and Greece are sub-migration systems. They possess many similarities. For them working together and jointly proposing solutions at the EU level will be more effective than not doing so. The same goes for finding political solutions in the states of origin, namely Syria and Afghanistan. Turkey and Greece should develop a joint proposal for the stability of Afghanistan and Syria, which are the principal refugee sending countries. As NATO member states, Turkey and Greece can be partners in regional conflict resolution and conflict prevention efforts to prevent mass movements from war-torn states.

REFERENCES

- ANSA. 2021. “Over 28,000 relocations 5 years into EU-Turkey migrant pact, Info-Migrants, March 22”. Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/31001/over-28-000-relocations-5-years-into-eu-turkey-migrant-pact>.
- Ansell, Chris., Boin, Arjen and Keller, Ann. 2010. “Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System.” *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 18(4):195-207.
- Backman, Sarah and Rhinard, Mark. 2018. “The European Union’s Capacities for Managing Crises.” *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 26: 261-271.
- Bloj, Ramona and Buzmaniuk, Stefanie. 2020. “Understanding the new pact on migration and asylum”, *The Robert Schuman Foundation*. Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0577-understanding-the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum>.
- Charalampaki, Effie. 2019. “Conceptualizing European Security Post-Brexit: Turbulence, Complexity and Interdependence” in *Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe: Risks and Opportunities*, edited by Cornelis-Adriana Baciu & John Doyle. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.
- Charalampaki, Effie. 2021. “A First Look in Order-Disorder Transition: The Complex Adaptive System (CAS) Approach” in *World Order Transition and the Atlantic Area: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Analysis*, edited by Fulvio Attina. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.
- Conklin, Jeffrey. 2006. *Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- Crowley, Kate and Head, W. Brian. 2017. “The Enduring Challenge of ‘Wicked Problems’: Revisiting Rittel and Webber,” *Policy Sciences*, 50: 539-547.
- European Commission. 2020a. “A fresh start on migration: Building confidence and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity.” Press Release. Accessed May 29, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1706.
- European Commission. 2020b. “New Pact on Migration and Asylum.” Accessed May 29, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en.
- European Commission. 2020c. “Migration: Commission and Greece agree joint plan for a new reception centre in Lesbos.” Accessed June 5, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2287.
- European Council. 2021. “Statement by the members of the Euro Summit.” Accessed March 25, 2021. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/25/statement-of-the-members-of-the-euro-summit-25-march-2021/>

- EUR-Lex. 2020. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM/2020/609 final.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1601287338054&uri=COM%3A2020%3A609%3AFIN>.
- European Parliament. 2019. “A Welcoming Europe: Evolution of Asylum Applications.” Accessed May 31, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/infographic/welcoming-europe/index_en.html#filter=2019.
- European Parliament. 2021. “EU-Turkey Statement & Action Plan, Legislative Train.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan>.
- Eurostat. 2021. “Asylum Statistics” Accessed May 30, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics.
- Ekathimerini. 2021. “Greek PM calls for progress on new migration pact,” Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1161899/greek-pm-calls-for-progress-on-new-migration-pact/>.
- Gokalp-Aras, Ela. 2021. “The European Union’s Externalisation Policy in the Field of Migration and Asylum: Turkey as a Case Study.” *RESPOND Working Paper Series*.
- Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021a. “Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Miltiadis Varvitsiotis meets with the Italian Minister of the Interior, Luciana Lamorgese, Rome.” Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/alternate-minister-of-foreign-affairs-miltiadis-varvitsiotis-meets-with-the-italian-minister-of-the-interior-luciana-lamorgese-rome-16-april-2021.html>.
- Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021b. Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias, following his meeting with the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu May 31. URL: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/statement-by-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-nikos-dendias-following-his-meeting-with-the-foreign-minister-of-turkey-mevlut-cavusoglu-athens-3105-2021.html>. Accessed on June 9, 2021.
- Kalın, İbrahim. 2021. “An updated migration deal can revitalise Turkey-EU relations.” *The European Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed June 24, 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/article/an-updated-migration-deal-can-revitalise-turkey-eu-relations/>.
- Karageorgiou, Eleni. 2020. “The impact of the new EU Pact on Europe’s external borders: The case of Greece. ASILE Forum on the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the UN GCR.” Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.asile-project.eu/the-impact-of-the-new-eu-pact-on-europes-external-borders-the-case-of-greece/>.

- Kirişçi, Kemal., Erdoğan, Murat and Eminoğlu, Nihal. 2020. “Order From Chaos: The EU’s “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” is missing a true foundation.” *Brookings*. Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/06/the-eus-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-is-missing-a-true-foundation/>.
- Lichtenstein, Benjamin B., Uhl-Bien, Mary., Marion, Russ., Seers, Anson, Orton, James Douglas., and Schreiber, Craig. 2006. “Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective on Leading in Complex Adaptive Systems,” *E:CO*, 8(4): 2-12.
- Lummack, Robert. 2017. “Expecting Uncertainty: Approaching Security Environment Complexity with Humility and Conceptual Flexibility,” *Government of Canada*.
- Papatzani, Evangelia, Leivaditi, Nadina., Ilias, Aggelos. and Petracou, Electra. 2020. “Conflicting Conceptualisations of Europeanisation: Greece Country Report.” *RESPOND Working Paper Series*.
- Rittel, Horst W.J. and Melvin M. Webber. 1973. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” *Police Sciences*, 4: 155-169.
- Roseanu, James R. 1997. *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Statista. 2021. “Number of recorded deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea from 2014 to 2021.” Accessed May 30, 2021. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1082077/deaths-of-migrants-in-the-mediterranean-sea/>.
- SOLIDAR. 2020. “The New Pact on Migration and Asylum & the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027.” *Briefing paper*, 97. Accessed May 29, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Briefing_paper97_Migration_and_Inclusion.pdf.
- Stanimirova, Gabriela. 2021. “Irregular Migration to Europe: How a New Pact is Shifting Old Routes.” *Global Risk Insights* Accessed May 30, 2021. <https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/03/irregular-migration-to-europe-how-a-new-pact-is-shifting-old-routes/>.
- Thompson, James D. 1967. *Organizations in Action: Social Sciences Bases of Administrative Theory* London & New York: Routledge.
- UNDP. 2014. “United Nations Development Program Country: TURKEY Project Document: Technical Assistance for Socioeconomic Development through Demining and Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at the Eastern Borders of Turkey Phase-I.” Accessed June 24, 2021. <https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/TUR/Demining%20Pro%20Doc.pdf>.
- UNHCR Operational Data Portal. 2021. “Mediterranean Situation: Greece.” Accessed June 5, 2021. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179#_ga=2.252195593.1212904425.1622883720-290536606.1622883720.
- UNHCR. 2021. “Greece.” Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/greece.html>.

UNHCR Greece. 2021. “Protection of Refugees in Greece.” Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/gr/>.

Yılmaz, Buğra. 2014. “The Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey Compatible with the right to seek asylum?” Unpublished Master Thesis, Uppsala University, Sweden.

Consulted Experts (Surnames in alphabetical order)

(E1) Adar, Sinem. Researcher, Centre for Applied Turkey Studies, SWP Berlin, Germany. 6 June 2021.

(E2) Baykal, Sanem. Associate Prof., TOBB University, Turkey. 6 June 2021.

(E3) Gökalp Aras, Ela. Researcher, Swedish Research Institute, Istanbul/Turkey. 6 June 2021.

(E4) Şahin-Mencütek, Zeynep. Senior Researcher, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Germany & Research Affiliate, Ryerson University, CERC in Migration and Integration, Canada. 5 June 2021.

(E5) Senol-Sert, Deniz. Associate Prof., Özyeğin University, Turkey. 5 June 2021.

(E6) Toygur, İlke. Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute, Spain. 4 June 2021.

(E7) Ünalldılar, Sinem. Associate Prof., Ege University, Turkey. 6 June 2021.

The Migration Crisis at the Evros/Meriç border:

An Analysis on the Coverage of Greek and Turkish News Portals

Ioanna M. Kostopoulou and Alaaddin F. Paksoy

Abstract

Towards the end of February 2020, tens of thousands of people headed to the Greek-Turkish border at Evros/Meriç, after Turkish authorities announced that they would no longer be preventing refugees and migrants from crossing the border into the EU. In reaction to this situation, the Greek authorities responded by closing the borders and announcing that they would not allow people to seek asylum in Greece and would be sending them back to Turkey. Widespread disinformation and the arrival of thousands of migrants in a few days caused tensions at the border, creating a new migration crisis along the Evros/Meriç border, being the top story for more than a week on the media agenda. However, the media agenda changed when the Covid-19 pandemic became alarming for both countries. This paper seeks to unveil how the Greek and the Turkish media covered the crisis, which took place at the border zone between 28 February and 11 March 2020. For this purpose, news items from eight news portals, both pro-government and the opposition, from Greece (kathimerini.gr, eleftherostypos.gr, efsyn.gr, tanea.gr) and Turkey (sabah.com.tr, sozcu.com.tr, hurriyet.com.tr, T24.com.tr) were selected and analyzed in a codebook. The empirical work, which is based on content analysis, aims to assess the media coverage of the two countries during the crisis, by answering the research question: “How do Greek and Turkish news portals portray the migration crisis at the Evros/Meriç River?”

Keywords: Migration, Refugees, Greece, Turkey, Crisis Reporting

INTRODUCTION

On 27 February 2020, the Syrian Air Force attacked a Turkish Army brigade in Idlib. Following the air raid, the Turkish government announced that it would open its Greek border for refugees who would like to migrate to Europe. A Turkish official statement argued “the migrants were now also Europe’s and the world’s problem” and Turkey decided to relax its border controls at the Turkish-Greek land border “because it had not received enough support in hosting about 3.7 million Syrian refugees”. (BBC News 2020) Thousands of asylum-seekers, migrants and refugees headed to the border city of Edirne and started waiting at the border by the Evros/Meriç River. The move stimulated Greece to increase the security standards at its borders as the Greek government announced that it would not allow anyone to illegally enter the country. The tension at the border was exacerbated by statements by politicians from the EU, Greece, and Turkey that blamed each other for the crisis. (Enria and Gerwens 2020).

At the time, the media’s role in providing information about the crisis was central. However, Europe’s “refugee or migration crisis” was not a new phenomenon. It was first recorded in 2015, when the media, national and international, reported on the biggest movement of people across borders. (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017, 4) Covering crises is one of the most difficult tasks for today’s media. When crises occur, the news media plays an important role not just in informing the public about what is happening, but also in moulding public opinion regarding who is to blame for causing them. These difficulties stem from the large amount of available information and the necessity to keep track of multiple sources. (An and Gower 2009; Iyengar and Kinder 1987) Once again in 2020, the mainstream media’s informational role remained paramount and critical in understanding what was happening at the Greek-Turkish border.

The paper seeks to discuss how the Greek and the Turkish news portals reported on the crisis along the Evros/Meriç River between 28 February and 11 March 2020. The research was conducted by performing qualitative con-

tent analysis and a codebook was created for the empirical work of the analysis of the news items. The analysis is based on the research question: “how do Greek and Turkish news portals portray the migration crisis by the Evros/Meriç River?”. The question evaluates the news items as an example of crisis reporting and analyzes the coverage by looking at the items’ general tone and the usage of adjectives, labels, and actors in the news texts.

The research sample includes eight news portals, four from Greece (*kathimerini.gr*, *eleftherostypos.gr*, *efsyn.gr*, *tanea.gr*) and four from Turkey (*sabah.com.tr*, *sozcu.com.tr*, *hurriyet.com.tr*, *T24.com.tr*), which were chosen by considering their popularity and their different political stances. *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherostypos* are considered to be pro-government and center-right oriented news portals, which also exist as daily political newspapers since the 19th century. The other two news portals, *Efimerida ton Syntakton (Efsyn)* and *Ta Nea*, can be said to be oppositional and center-left oriented media organizations. *Ta Nea* was founded almost 90 years ago and has been Greece’s best-selling newspaper for decades. *Efsyn* is a cooperative daily newspaper, which was first published in 2012. It supports political theses of the left and center-left and prioritizes the reporting of human rights, humanitarian, and refugee issues.

The news portals from Turkey that can be perceived as pro-government and leaning to the center-right are *Sabah* and *Hürriyet*. Both papers have been widely circulated titles in the last 30-40 years. Their news portal editions are also popular and are two of the most read news websites. The other two portals are oppositional news organizations. *Sözcü* can be evaluated as a secular-nationalist and widely read newspaper and news portal. T24 is relatively a young alternative media initiative and receives attention from young and white-collar readers. The portal does not have a paper version and it can be categorized within the left-leaning editorial line which prioritizes coverage on human rights, women’s rights, and issues related to refugees.

The sample of the research consists of the exact days of the developments at the Evros/Meriç River between 28 February and 11 March 2020.

Therefore, the sample starts with the day of the announcement made by the Turkish Government, stating that Turkey would not stop refugees trying to cross the border into Greece. The sample ends with the day when Covid-19 took center stage both in Turkey and in Greece and the refugee issue lost its momentum in the media agenda. Hence, all news items published between 28 February and 11 March 2020 were included and analyzed in the code-book.

In addition to Google Search's News tab, which was used with advanced settings, the search option of the news portals was also used. The aforementioned dates were chosen and the keywords "refugees", "migrants", "Evros" in Greek and Turkish were used to reach the data set.

BACKGROUND

The Syrian refugee crisis is the largest refugee and displacement crisis since the Second World War. Turkey, apart for hosting the largest proportion of Syrian refugees estimated at approximately 3.6 million people, also serves as one of the key transit countries in many refugee routes towards Europe. (UNHCR 2021) Greek-Turkish relations had already been beset by complications for centuries. The war in Syria unavoidably affected Greek-Turkish relations and a new challenge was added to the list of differences between the two countries. The summer of 2015 saw the peak of irregular migration towards Europe. The so-called Balkan Route became porous, and refugees arrived in Western European countries via Turkey, Greece, and other Balkan countries. The issue became the most popular topic in the EU agenda.

Thereby, Turkey and the EU agreed on a statement of cooperation on the migration crisis in 2016. This agreement was aimed at reducing the high number of refugees who arrived in Europe in 2015 and attempted to regulate the flows from Turkey to the Greek islands. (Arribas 2016) Meanwhile, Greece, which is attempting to recover from its decade-long economic woes, has taken on the role of Europe's gatekeeper. While the number of migrants

coming to Greece surged dramatically in 2018, resulting in extreme congestion and filthy conditions in refugee and migrant camps, the EU-Turkey Agreement has kept some 16,000 people in situ in the Greek islands. (Enria and Gerwens 2020)

Consequently, the agreement was not able to deter all problems related to the migration crisis between Turkey and Greece. Turkey blamed the EU by claiming that it follow through with its obligations. The EU and, principally Greece, were concerned about Turkey's insufficient control of its coastal borders. In 2020, the Pazarkule/Kastanies checkpoint at the Turkish-Greek border, just by the Evros/Meriç River became the new focal point of tension. Turkish authorities claimed that the EU did not transfer the agreed upon sum of 6 billion Euros to Turkey and, therefore, did not keep to the agreement signed on 18 March 2016. (Anadolu Ajansı 2020)

Also, the rising tensions in the city of Idlib in Syria were becoming a cause for concern for Turkey regarding a “new refugee wave”. (BBC News 2019) Lastly, the attack against a Turkish Army brigade in Idlib by the Syrian Air Force in February 2020 triggered a change in Turkey's migration policy leading it to lessen the control at its western borders. Consequently, the massive media interest in the agenda-changing phenomena emerged just before the world was globally hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. The section that follows focusses on how the news portals in Greece and Turkey portrayed the crisis at the border by the Evros/Meriç River.

DISCUSSION: FINDINGS FROM THE GREEK AND TURKISH NEWS PORTALS

According to Table 1 below, 240 news items published on the Greek news portals, which cover the events that took place on the Greek-Turkish border of Evros/Meriç, between 28 February and 11 March 2020 were analyzed. *Kathimerini* is the news portal with the most news items (92), while the other three news portals, *Efsyn*, *Eleftherostypos* and *Ta Nea*, have about 50 news items each.

Table 1: Distribution of the analyzed news items on Greek news portals

News items/ Portal & date	efsyn.gr	elftherostypos.gr	kathimerini.gr	tanea.gr	Total
28 February	2	4	8	3	17
29 February	6	3	9	2	20
1 March	4	1	6	2	13
2 March	2	4	9	6	21
3 March	4	7	16	2	29
4 March	2	7	9	4	22
5 March	1	4	7	6	15
6 March	6	8	3	10	27
7 March	6	4	8	4	22
8 March	3	3	3	2	11
9 March	5	3	6	3	17
10 March	2	1	2	2	7
11 March	7	1	6	2	16
Total	50	50	92	48	240

Table 2 reflects 153 news items published on the Turkish news portals, which cover the events that took place on the Greek-Turkish border of Evros/Meriç, between 28 February and 11 March 2020 which were analyzed by the author. *Sabah and Sözcü* are the news portals with the most news items (50 per portal) while *Hürriyet* and *T24* published 28 and 25 news items respectively.

Table 2: Distribution of the analyzed news items on Turkish news portals

News items/ Portal & date	sabah.com.tr	sozcu.com.tr	hurriyet.com.tr	T24.com.tr	Total
28 February	9	6	2	3	20
29 February	2	7	3	7	19
1 March	5	4	2	5	16
2 March	9	10	4	3	26
3 March	5	2	3	3	13
4 March	7	3	2	2	14
5 March	2	8	2	1	13
6 March	4	1	3	-	8
7 March	1	3	-	1	5
8 March	-	2	2	-	4
9 March	2	3	2	-	7
10 March	2	1	1	-	4
11 March	2	-	2	-	4
Total	50	50	28	25	153

What follows is a discussion of how the Greek and the Turkish news portals covered and portrayed the refugee crisis at Evros/Meriç border between 28 February and 11 March 2020. The following common characteristics arise according to the news items that were collected and analyzed from both Greece and Turkey.

First, the type of coverage is highlighted. That is, in most of the Greek and Turkish portals, it is obviously negative and directed against one of the two countries, while some portals describe a “war” scene, blaming correspondingly Greece or Turkey. Some of the portals maintained a neutral tone while reporting. However, a positive aspect of the coverage is difficult to discern due to the unstoppable nature of the crisis. Regarding the use of the language, the use of militaristic language is the obvious common characteristic. Journalistic clichés and expressions, puns, and irony are some of the other characteristics of the news items about the coverage. Among the news portals, the prominence of the words “refugees”, “migrants”, “illegal entries”, and words that derive from the political orientation of the news portals from both Greece and Turkey, were observed.

According to the findings, some of the Greek and the Turkish news portals used international news agencies and sources to describe the situation at the border, while others preferred to depend only on local and national media organizations, official government statements as well as those of political leaders, as well as the EU position. This can again be explained according to the political inclinations of the news portals.

The use of the terms “fake news”, “disinformation” and “propaganda” were observed in all eight news portals. Only two of the Greek news portals (*Efsyn* and *Ta Nea*) analyzed further the killing of Muhammad Gulzar, one of the casualties of the border crisis, while the Turkish *Sabah* and *Hürriyet* news portals claimed there were more killings. Only the Greek portals *Efsyn* and *Ta Nea* commented on the existence of a “secret detention center for migrants” along the Evros/Meriç border.

THE GREEK NEWS PORTALS

Efsyn.gr

Efsyn, a left-wing news portal, reported on the border crisis by trying to maintain a neutral tone, without adding further aggressive language on the actors of the crisis, especially about Turkey, and without abusing the use of militaristic language. Most items were predominately characterized by a neutral use of the language. The use of some words such as “explosive”, “barage”, “pressure”, “risk”, indicate the intensity of the incidents. (*efsyn-1-2*) The use of some puns such as “kleftopolemos” (*efsyn-10*), “oriental bazaars” and “sultan” was evidenced. These “orientalize” the refugees and the other side of the border (*efsyn-44*). In the first instance, it is described a “war” scene by making a parallelism with a Greek military tactic during the Greek War of Independence of 1821 against the Turks; while in the second case, the text refers to the bad communication between the EU and Turkey and that the Turkish President Erdoğan, “continues misusing the millions of refugees and migrants he hosts in his country” (*efsyn-44*).

According to the findings, *Efsyn* mainly used the word “refugees”, and sometimes “migrants”, to refer to the “thousands of desperate people who remain trapped in Evros”, “victims not only of Turkish propaganda but also of the Greek actions”. (*efsyn-6-7*) Many news items presented and highlighted, via the reports of international news agencies, how Syrian refugees arrived at the Greek-Turkish border motivated by the misinformation of the Turkish government and the media. (*efsyn-11-22-32*) There are also items that indicate a “humanitarian drama” blaming the decisions taken by all sides – Greece, Turkey, and the EU. (*efsyn-14*) *Efsyn* reported on the issue of human rights, while it highlighted the reaction of the international community in favor of the protection of human life. (*efsyn-17-28-49*)

According to the findings, *Efsyn* seems to have covered the border crisis both by sending its own reporter to the field and by presenting coverage and photo reportages by international news and photo agencies (*efsyn-4-41-50*). *Efsyn* covered the “symbolic move” of the Greek Prime Minister who together with European Officials visited the Evros/Meriç border (*efsyn-16*), with

the support of some European leaders such as Angela Merkel (*efsyn-37*) and FRONTEX's announcements. (*efsyn-15*) *Efsyn* also covered President Erdoğan's statements, who said, "The doors are now open, share the burden" (referring to the EU), while sometimes mocking the EU by referring to a "Solidarity in words only". (*efsyn-14*)

The news items that are worthy of analysis and were presented through the reports of the international news agencies, are those that referred to the loss of human life and violations of human rights, combined with underlying the extensive use of "fake news". *Efsyn* presented "the killing of Muhammad Gulzar" and the existence of a "secret detention center for migrants" on the Evros/Meriç border through testimonies, satellite photos, maps, on-site reporting, and the use of electronic tools of spatial analysis by Sky News, Reuters and *The New York Times* and by providing the Greek government's statements on the issue. (*efsyn-20-21-41-50*)

Eleftherostypos.gr

According to the news items that were analyzed, *Eleftherostypos*, one of the center-right oriented Greek news portals, seemed to present the facts with a lack of a neutral tone, while the heavy use of the militaristic language led the readers to believe that the two countries were in a state of war. Titles such as "Greece shields Evros", "Scene of war in Evros: Wild incidents at the border with migrants", "Nonstop thriller in Evros", "Blockade of 2,867 people" are some demonstrative examples. (*eleftherostypos-2-6-35*) *Eleftherostypos*, in comparison with *Efsyn*, used primarily the words "migrants" and "illegal entries", and only occasionally the word "refugees". (*eleftherostypos-1-6-15*) Furthermore, it focused on the number of attempts of the refugees to enter Greece by publishing that there were "38,500 attempts to enter illegally". (*eleftherostypos-27*)

Eleftherostypos seems to have covered the crisis at the Greek-Turkish border via the use of reports and photo reportages that were mainly from other Greek media agencies. (*eleftherostypos-20-29-33*) However, some stories came from its own reporter on the ground with the most characteristic being a reference to those "who guard Thermopylae". (*eleftherostypos-42*) Also, many

of its news items were accompanied by unaccredited photos. (*eleftherostypos*-8-10-13) In fact, most stories in the portal included the Greek government's statements and primarily the military actions to keep the border closed, aiming to boost the Greek national sentiment. (*eleftherostypos*-4-5-7-9-44) In several items, it was highlighted that "Greece defending an asymmetric threat at the European borders" (*eleftherostypos*-30), that "Turks pull the strings" (*eleftherostypos*-40), and that "the EU categorically rejects the use of migration pressure by Turkey for political purposes" (*eleftherostypos*-32), while supporting Greece. (*eleftherostypos*-10-24-49)

Eleftherostypos also made use of the terms "fake news" and "propaganda" differently from *Efsyn's* approach. It focused on how the Greek's Government's spokesperson contradicted "The killing of a migrant at the Greek-Turkish border", which was first presented in an article in the German magazine "*Der Spiegel*", focusing on the Turkish "disinformation campaigns". (*eleftherostypos*-46) Finally, *Eleftherostypos* referred to Erdoğan's "delirium" and "provocation", who likened Greeks with Nazis by stating that "What the Greeks did is similar to what the Nazis did. It makes no difference". (*eleftherostypos*-50)

Kathimerini.gr

Kathimerini presented the facts in a remarkably neutral tone, without adding any additional aggressive connotations on the actors of the crisis. Most news items in the sample are characterized by careful use of language, with no puns or irony, as was sometimes the case in *Efsyn's* coverage, that could add more tension to an already tense context. (*kathimerini*-3-8-10) Furthermore, both the words "refugees" and "migrants" were used (*kathimerini*-3-8-35), with no mention of "illegal entries", as was the case with *Eleftherostypos*, and with very few words that could invoke a "war" scenario. (*kathimerini*-12-55-87)

Kathimerini seems to have covered the crisis at the Greek-Turkish border by presenting reports and stories mostly by specific Greek media agencies. (*kathimerini*-34-54) Although some stories were written by its own reporters in situ (*kathimerini*-19-21-35) and others made use of international

media sources. (*kathimerini-6-12-29*) In most news items, *Kathimerini* presented the Greek government's and the EU's statements and actions. (*kathimerini-22-24-41-81*) It also included interviews that made reference to the situation at the border with various Greek Ministers and relevant military personnel. (*kathimerini-4-15-20*) Finally, yet importantly, *Kathimerini* used the term "fake news" in the context of presenting the statement of the Greek Government's representative with regard to Turkey's actions. (*kathimerini-53*)

Tanea.gr

Ta Nea's news coverage of the crisis culminated between a neutral approach to a negative one. Most of the news items were characterized by words and expressions that contributed to the heightened tense atmosphere while describing the incidents as a "war" scene. Some characteristic examples include: "alarm signalled in Evros", "police and military forces are on alert in Evros", "battles in Evros between refugees and migrants on the one hand and the Greek forces on the other", "war scene at the border crossing point in Kastanies of Evros". (*tanea-8-12-15-16*) The portal used many negative adjectives and aggressive connotations against Turkey, while the use of the militaristic language was remarkably heavy-handed. In most of its news items, it was highlighted that "Turkey is entering a new round of escalating tensions" and that it "weaponizes impoverished refugees and migrants to blackmail Europe and to secure more money for those living in the Turkish camps". (*tanea-19-20*)

According to the findings, *Ta Nea* used both the words "refugees" and "migrants", as *Kathimerini* did (*tanea-7-25-34*). However, it also highlighted that the Greek government "will no longer allow any illegal entry into the country" (*tanea-5*) and that Turkey "pushes, with unprecedented cynicism and analgesia, tens of thousands of refugees towards Europe, trapping them at the given time on the border with Greece, resulting in absolute chaos". (*tanea-18-41*) *Ta Nea* presented all the statements made by the Greek government, military personnel, and those stressing the EU's support. (*tanea-10-17-33-48*) Finally, yet importantly, it reported on how the users of Twitter used the hashtags "#IstandwithGreece", "#Greece_under_attack" (*ta-*

nea-8), how Turkey used “smartphones to guide refugees at the borderline” (*tanea-2*), and the role of fake news and disinformation. (*tanea-43*)

THE TURKISH NEWS PORTALS

Sabah.com.tr

The *Sabah* news portal is an openly pro-government news organization in Turkey. During the days of the crisis, *Sabah*’s coverage was heavily loaded with content that originated from governmental institutions or President Erdoğan’s remarks. (*Sabah-8*)

In the Turkish context, the word “*göçmen*” (migrant) is historically associated with the migrants coming from the Balkans, Crete, and the Caucasus. (Kodaman and İpek, 2000) Syrians living in Turkey since 2011 have been mostly called “*mülteci*” (refugee) and “*sığınmacı*” (asylum seeker) in the media coverage. (Pandır et al 2015). However, during the Evros/Meriç River border crisis, the *Sabah* started to refer to the Syrian and other refugees in the region as “*göçmen*” (migrants). For example, in an article published on 28 February 2020, the word “migrants” is preferred to the term “refugees” throughout the text. However, when the journalist talked to a refugee heading to Edirne at the Eskişehir bus station, the refugee defined himself as a “refugee” (the portal does not use the word migrant here) who wanted to go to Greece and from there go live in Germany. (*Sabah-1*)

Sabah sometimes used journalistic expressions that are normally reserved for historical events or football matches in the Turkish press. One title read: “Migrants arrive at the European Gates”. The reference to “European Gates” refers to past Ottoman victories on the battlefield Ottomans or to football matches where the Turkish side had good results against their European rivals. (*Sabah-12*) Moreover, *Sabah*’s coverage also employed military concepts to explain the situation by the Greek border. In one instance, the portal used a striking word in its title which read “Landing operation to Greece”. This warlike rhetoric was accompanied by a photograph showing refugees arriving on Greek soil by boat via the Evros/Meriç river. The lead argued that the refugees were already arriving via land to Greece. In this context, the

report referred to Turkey's Interior Minister comments that more than one hundred thousand refugees left Turkey as of 1 March 2020. (*Sabah-2*) Numbers were important for *Sabah* in the construction of its own narrative, widely shaped by statements by Turkish officials.

Sabah published several reports targeting the EU during the crisis where Greece was foregrounded while the portal blamed Germany and other European countries for the occurrence of the refugee crisis on the land border between Greece and Turkey. (*Sabah-6*) Reports with headlines referring to the EU's position during the crisis were usually connected with the word "fear", in that the EU was scared and looking for cooperation with Turkey by offering more money to Turkey to find a solution to the crisis, according to *Sabah*. (*Sabah-10*)

Sabah emphatically referred to the rubber bullets, tear gas, and sound bombs used by Greek border guards in almost all its reports. (*Sabah-19*) As the tension rose at the border and between the two countries, the portal also escalated its news coverage. *Sabah* claimed that the Greek soldiers killed two migrants. The relevant title alluded to "cruelty" and "murder". The paper also argued that Greek soldiers seized migrants' money and clothes and sent them back to Turkey in their underwear. (*Sabah-13*) Another item used the title "Barbarism" in a story about the half-naked migrants who were sent back by the Greek police. The report claimed that Greek police removed the migrants' clothes while beating and whipping them. The author of the report claimed that the cruelty of Greek police was reminiscent of Nazi actions. (*Sabah-25*)

Sözcü.com.tr

Sözcü is fundamentally an opposition newspaper. As opposed to *Sabah*, *Sözcü* preferred to use the word "refugee" instead of "migrant". The paper insisted on the word "refugee" even if the news item came from a news agency that used the word "migrant". *Sözcü* was relatively mild in its criticism of Greece in contrast to *Sabah* who covered similar topics in a more sensational manner. For instance, *Sözcü* used the statement "Greek security guards' pressure" (*Sözcü-2*) and presented the actions of Greek border guards as "precautions". (*Sözcü-5*)

One news item published by *Sözcü* was on the bus stop in Istanbul used by refugees who wanted to go to the Greek border. The title read “Refugees’ journey for hope is continuing” with the item including some comments by a refugee who said that “Turkey is dirty. No money here. That is why we are leaving. Turkey is poor”. (*Sözcü*-15) While another refugee is quoted as saying similar things by stating that unemployment in Turkey is the reason why he and others want to migrate to Germany. Besides, *Sözcü*’s critical anti-government political stance is reflected in the quote from a bus driver: “If we did this job in the past, we would be jailed. Now we drive the refugees to the border and the police do not say anything”. (*Sözcü*-15) *Sözcü* wrote about the volunteer fishermen who offered free boat ride to the refugees by claiming that according to the fishermen it was now the European states’ turn to worry. Some other fishermen suggested that the refugees were “the headache of Turkey”. Interestingly, *Sözcü*’s editorial line reflected these comments as some sort of positive news for Turkey. (*Sözcü*-16)

Sözcü was remarkably weak in its coverage of the crisis. Most news items referred to the comments of the political elites or they were simply prepared by news agencies. (*Sözcü*-23) The portal did not use precise language regarding the shootings at the border; in fact, in contrast to *Sabah*’s coverage, *Sözcü* referred to the “alleged” shootings. The paper also covered how Greek officials responded to those allegations (*Sözcü*-34) and how they rejected the Turkish claims that thousands of refugees had gained entry to Greece; thereby the portal questioned the claims of the Turkish Interior Minister that many thousands had entered Greece. (*Sözcü*-38)

Hürriyet.com.tr

While the first movements to the border were underway, *Hürriyet* also began to use the term “migrants” (*göçmenler*) instead of “refugees” (*mülteciler*) for the people gathering by the Evros/Meriç River. *Hürriyet*’s coverage presented the harsh conditions experienced by the migrants at the border while the portal continuously highlighted the violence used by the Greek security forces. Some news items referred to the remarkably harsh examples of “the relentless approach” of the Greek security forces to counter the migrants. One item even claimed that the Greek police removed the shoes and socks

of babies and children and send them back to Turkey barefoot. (*Hürriyet-15*) Another report claimed that Greek soldiers beat migrant children and women. In one story, it was reported that a migrant claimed that even a pregnant woman was exposed to violence by Greek border guards. (*Hürriyet-28*) *Hürriyet's* visual choices also empowered its narrative about the violence. In one story, the photos used by the portal were photo-journalistically powerful as they reminded the reader of a torture camp. The news item claimed that the migrants were beaten by Greek security forces and then sent back to Turkey while all migrants were in semi-naked condition as they were forced by the Greek security forces to remove their clothing. (*Hürriyet-8*)

Another report published in the last days of the crisis dealt with the possible legal actions against the human rights violations at the border. The main protagonist of the story is Metin Feyzioğlu, the president of The Union of Turkish Bar Associations, who claimed that the Union would file a suit to the European Court of Human Rights and sue the Greek Government for human rights violations at the border. Feyzioğlu claimed that Greece's actions at the border amounted to "oppression" while he also pejoratively referred to Greece as "the spoilt child of Europe". (*Hürriyet-7*)

While criticizing the Greeks for the events at the Evros/Meriç River, *Hürriyet* justified its critical stance by putting forth two interesting reports from the historical archives. The first was about the Greek migrants in Syria during the Nazi invasion of Greece. The report blames the Greeks of today and claims that they have forgotten their past, including the time they were themselves seeking refuge elsewhere during WWII. (*Hürriyet-22*) With a similar leitmotif, the second story was about the former Greek prime minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the father of Greece's current prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who at the time of the military junta in Greece, he escaped to Turkey. (*Hürriyet-24*)

T24.com.tr

T24's coverage of the crisis was generally superficial. Most reports were produced from the content of news agencies. Although it is a left-leaning news portal, *T24* did not give enough importance to the humanitarian event at the

border. Thus, the portal presented limited material for analysis and contribution to this study. Among these restricted findings, one report had a different stance. In contrast with most of the news coverage in the research sample, one report asked a meaningful question: “why migrants do not want to live in Turkey?” The item quoted an expert on migration studies and claimed that migrants are not happy with working and housing conditions in Turkey, a point which was mostly overlooked by the other portals. The item also referred to the possibility that some Syrians are content with living in Turkey and would not prefer to move to EU countries even if access to them were possible. The expert claimed that this had to do with the socio-cultural ties that had been created by the Syrians living in Turkey. (*T24-6*) *T24*’s main difference from the other Turkish portals in the sample is that also covered the voice of Syrian migrants who were not happy with their lives in Turkey. (*T24-14-25*)

SUGGESTIONS AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings from our study demonstrate the complexity of the challenges associated with the media coverage of the refugee/migration crisis at the Evros/Meriç border and the complexity within the context of Greek-Turkish and Turkey-EU relations. The challenges, which relate to the media coverage, could be assessed according to the crisis reporting context, the political parallelism in the Greek and Turkish news portals, and the constructive stance of the news media of Greece and Turkey.

Crisis reporting context

As part of hard news reporting, crisis reporting is a field where essential journalistic standards, such as objectivity, detachment, and impartiality, are continually tested. (Tumber 2006) Nonetheless, among journalistic genres, crisis reporting has a high level of legitimacy (Allan and Zelizer 2004: 4) and is thus a realm in which any break with the professional ideology becomes visible. Journalists covering crises must reconcile the conflict between journalism’s traditional normative conceptions and the committed narrative that underpins the concept of witnessing. (Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013; Tumber 2006; Glück 2016)

Journalists and the media had once again to cover rapidly developing stories during the humanitarian crisis at the Evros/Meriç border. According to the findings, some reporting showed familiarity with covering humanitarian crises, but others did not, thereby exacerbating the already tense atmospheres. Therefore, the preparation for covering such incidents and the training of the staff on how to approach sensitive and humanitarian issues, should have been and should be a priority of the media organizations and the journalists themselves.

Political parallelism in the Greek and Turkish news portals

The media's coverage of the Evros/Meriç crisis was inextricably linked to Greece's and Turkey's governmental decision-making. According to the findings, the mainstream political narratives were reflected in the journalistic coverage of the news portals of both countries. It was observed that most presented the crisis through the statements and the stance of each government, always referring to the EU's position on the issue, and always accusing the other side of using hate speech, aggressive, and militaristic language. However, primarily *Efsyn*, among all the news portals, reported on the crisis by presenting how the international media covered the incidents and by using a more sympathetic and "humanitarian" language towards the refugees at the border.

The Constructive stance of the news media of Greece and Turkey

The dynamics shaping the media environment of any country is complicated. The key to having a more trustable media ecosystem is related to the quality of democracy in the country. The ideal media coverage about the relations of two countries that have crucial political differences requires a free media system. The tenser the state of political relations between Greece and Turkey, the more antagonistic is the media coverage. The deadlock should be broken by more empathetic and understanding journalists, media management structures, and politicians paving the way for a better media environment and healthier democratic structures. This can be provided by increasing the cooperation opportunities between Greek and Turkish media workers, artists, NGOs, think tanks, and academics.

The news media of both Greece and Turkey should have a constructive stance instead of blaming and demonizing each other in the context of the issues related to irregular migration. The irregular migration issue itself is usually covered during humanitarian crises. Therefore, the media professionals should be aware of the harsh conditions that people are facing in the crisis zone. In other words, both the Greek and Turkish media should play the role of conciliator, instead of that of the provoker while producing content about migration issues.

CONCLUSION

The coverage of the migration crisis at the Evros/Meriç border on the Greek news portals showed that politics played a crucial role in the way the media reported on the issue. Five years since the refugee/migration crisis of 2015, the news portals, which were analyzed for this study, did not agree on how to characterize the people at the border, who were struggling to enter an EU country: “refugees”, “migrants” or “illegal entries”. It is obvious that each news portal reported on the crisis according to its political/ideological stance – either right-wing and against the “illegal entries” or left-wing by focusing on a new “humanitarian drama”.

The analysis of the Turkish news portals showed that the coverage was highly affected by the political atmosphere and the discourse used by politicians. The border crisis even led to a change in how the Turkish media refers to the refugees. A refugee could stay in a place for a long period of time and might even be permanently settled but the new term “*göçmen*” (migrant) in the Turkish media discourse tells us that now these people are on the move and that they are heading to the West.

As a final noteworthy point, some reports in the Greek portals referred to the new fences built at the Evros/Meriç border (*Efsyn* and *Ta Nea*) which was portrayed as a solution to curb migration to Greece. The construction of a wall can be intimidating to migrants but one should also consider that the physical existence of strong fences and barriers could increase the political and psychological division between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, protecting the land border with the erection of fences or high walls could imply that the

Greeks are distancing themselves from the Hellenic heritage of Asia Minor and contributing to the alienation of Modern Greece from the antiquity of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace.

REFERENCES

- Allan, Stuart, and Zelizer, Barbie. 2014 *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*. Routledge.
- Anadolu Ajansı. 2020. “Göçmenler Avrupa yolunda: Türkiye kapıları neden açtı?” Accessed May 28, 2020. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/signmacilar-avrupa-yolunda/gocmenler-avrupa-yolunda-turkiye-kapilari-neden-acti/1754700>.
- An, Seon-Kyoung, and Gower, Karla K. 2009. “How do the news media frame crises? A content analysis of crisis news coverage”. *Public Relations Review*, 35(2): 107-112. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0363811109000113?via%3Dihub>.
- Arribas, Gloria Fernández. 2016. “The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt at Patching Up a Major Problem”. *European Papers*, 1. DOI: 10.15166/2499-8249/80.
- BBC News. 2019. “Syria war: Turkey can’t handle new ‘refugee wave’, says Erdogan”. Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50886120>.
- BBC News. 2020. “Syria war: Alarm after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib”. Accessed June 5, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717>.
- Enria, Nicoletta and Gerwens, Sarah. 2020. “Greek-Turkish border crisis: Refugees are paying the price for the EU’s failure to reform its asylum system.” *The London School of Economics and Political Science blog*. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/03/25/greek-turkish-border-crisis-refugees-are-paying-the-price-for-the-eus-failure-to-reform-its-asylum-system/>.
- Georgiou, Myria and Zaborowski, Rafal. 2017. “Media coverage of the refugee crisis: A cross European perspective”. *Council of Europe report DGI (2017)03*. <https://edoc.coe.int/en/refugees/7367-media-coverage-of-the-refugee-crisis-a-cross-european-perspective.html>.
- Glück, Antje. 2016. “What Makes a Good Journalist? Empathy as a central resource in journalistic work practice”. *Journalism Studies*, 17(7), 893–903. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.1175315.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Kinder, Donald R. 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kodaman, Bayram and İpek, Nedim. 2000. “Balkanlar. Girit ve Kafkaslarda Anadolu’ya Yönelik Göçler ve Göçmen İsken Birimlerinin Kuruluşu (1878-1912).” *Erdem*, 12(35): 377-417.

- Papadopoulos, Kari A., and Pantti Mervi. 2013. "Re-imagining Crisis Reporting: Professional Ideology of Journalists and Citizen Eyewitness Images." *Journalism*, 14(7): 960–977. DOI: 10.1177/1464884913479055.
- Pandır, Müzeyyen, Efe, İbrahim, and Paksoy, Alaaddin F. 2015. "Türk Basınında Suriyeli Sığınmacı Temsili Üzerine Bir İçerik Analizi/A Content Analysis on the Representation of Syrian Asylum Seekers in the Turkish Press." *Marmara İletişim Dergisi*, (24): 1-26. DOI: 10.17829/midr.20152419995.
- Tumber Howard. 2006. "The Fear of Living Dangerously: Journalists who Report on Conflict". *International Relations*, 20(4): 439–451. DOI: 10.1177/0047117806069405
- UNHCR. 2021. "Syria Regional Refugee Response" Accessed May 5, 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>.

Appendices

Cited news items from Greek news portals

Efsyn.gr

- efsyn-1 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/kosmos/233144_ekriktiki-katastasi-stin-intlimp-me-toys-prosfyges-apeilei-pali-o-erntogan (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-2 (2020) <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/233229> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-10 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233419_omiroi-se-xira-kai-thalassa (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-44 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/kosmos/eyropi/234524_kombikis-simasias-i-26i-martioy-gia-tis-sheseis-ee-toyrkias (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-6 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233330_hiliades-anthropoi-omiroi-ton-paihnidion-toy-erntogan-ston-ebro (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-7 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/233343_epikoinoniaka-paihnidia-agkyras-me-toys-prosfyges (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-11 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233380_egklobismos-prosfygon-ston-ebro-enishyseis-stelnei-i-frontex (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-22 (2020) <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/234116> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-32 (2020) <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/234225> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-14 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233437_anthropistiko-drama-sta-synora-i-eyropi-symparistatai (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-17 (2020) <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/233640> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-28 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/234182_tin-prostasia-tis-nomimotitas-kai-tis-anthropias-zitoyn-66-organoseis (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-49 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/234767_ekklisi-dianooymenongia-tin-prostasia-ton-prosfygon-se-ebro-kai-nisia (Accessed: 10.10.2020)

- efsyn-4 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/233263_ebros-proti-efarmogi-toy-dogmatos-apatropis (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-41 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/234353_ki-alli-sfaira-stin-kardia-metanasti (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-50 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/234745_emmesi-epibebaiosi-petsa-gia-mystiko-kentro-kratisis (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-16 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233499_mitsotakis-me-eyropai-ki-troika-ston-ebro-se-aihmalosia-oi-prosfyges (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-37 (2020) <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/234414> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-15 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/233465_prasino-fos-apo-tin-frontex-gia-taheia-epembasi-sta-ellinotyrkika-synora (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- efsyn-20 (2020) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/233698_xana-gia-nekro-prosfygamila-i-agkyra-diapseydei-o-petsas (Accessed: 10.10.2020)

Eleftherostypos.gr

- elefetherostypos-2 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/530200-pairnei-metra-i-ellada-meta-tin-apeili-tis-toyrkias-gia-anoigma-synoron-thorakizei-ton-ebro/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-6 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/530568-skiniko-polemoy-ston-ebro-%ce%acgria-epeisodia-sta-synora-enisxyontai-o-dynameis-tis-el-as/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-35 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/532849-epistoli-57-ey-roboyleyton-stin-igesia-tis-ee-lysi-sta-ellinotyrkika-synora-tora/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-1 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/530232-deite-live-kymata-metanaston-apo-tin-toyrkia-se-ebro-kai-nisia/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-10 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/531280-metanasteytiko-ek-takto-symboulia-ton-ypourgon-exoterikon-tis-ee-ti-eipe-o-sxoinas/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-15 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/531611-metanasteytiko-apo-trapikan-pano-apo-26-500-paranomes-eisodoi-ston-ebro-218-oi-syllipseis/>
- elefetherostypos-27 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/532563-ebros-mono-to-4-einai-prosfyges-pano-38-500-apopeires-paranomis-eisodoy/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-20 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/531753-binteo-ntokoumento-tourkoi-astynomikoi-rixnoun-ximika-sta-synora-enantion-tis-ellinikis-pleyras/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- elefetherostypos-29 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/532435-apisteyta-pragmata-kanoun-oi-tourkoi-ston-ebro-markaroun-metanastes-promitheyouneroukes-kai-stelnoun-aidikes-dynameis/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)

- eleftherostypos-33 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/532873-xastouki-stin-tourkia-kaiminyma-plirous-allileggyis-pros-tin-ellada-apo-tous-ypex-tis-ee/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-42 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/533082-odoiporiko-toy-e-tston-ebro-konta-sa-aytoys-poy-fylane-thermopyles/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-8 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/530744-stefanis-apotrepssame9-600-paranomes-eisodoy-stin-ellada/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-13 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/531564-o-mitsotakis-edeixe-se-oli-tin-eyropi-ton-omo-ekbiasmo-erntogan-kare-kare-i-aytopsia-ton-xenon-ige-ton-ston-ebro/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-4 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/530319-xrysoxoidis-apo-ton-ebro-i-ellada-einai-asfalis-xora-poy-prostateyei-ta-synora-tis/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-5 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/530466-synagermos-ston-ebro-pa-no-apo-3-000-sta-synora-enisxyontai-oi-dynameis-tis-elasi/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-7 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/530415-ektakti-syskepsi-sto-maximoy-gia-tin-krisi-sto-prosfygiko-metanasteytiko/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-9 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/531045-synexizetai-to-thriller-ston-ebro-enisxysi-ton-synoron-kai-askiseis-me-pragmatika-pyra/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-44 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/533403-stefanis-dexomaste-epithesi-apo-tin-tourkia-me-oxima-tous-metanastes/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-30 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/532499-ebros-ayto-einai-to-binteo-ntokoumento-me-to-opoio-i-ellada-xemprostiase-ton-erntogan/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-40 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/570137-trabane-to-skoini-oi-tourkoi-dyo-nea-peristatika-me-pyrobolismous-ston-ebro/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-32 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/533001-ektakto-o-erntogan-zitise-apo-tin-merkel-anatheorisi-tis-symfonias-gia-to-metanasteytiko/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-24 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/531849-o-erntogan-pseydetai-kai-apeilei-tin-eyropi-neo-paralirima-apo-ton-tourko-proedro-gia-to-metanasteytiko/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-49 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/538062-stirixi-merkel-gia-ebro-kai-nisia-aparakti-symperifora-apo-toyrkia/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-46 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/politiki/571287-oi-toyrkoi-arxisan-pali-ta-fake-news-skliri-apantisi-petsa-gia-dimosieyma-toy-spiegel/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)
- eleftherostypos-50 (2020) <https://eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/538677-aisxres-diloseis-erntogan-paromoiase-toys-ellines-me-toys-nazi/> (Accessed: 10.10.2020)

Kathimerini.gr

- kathimerini-3 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1066900/mazikes-afixeis-metanaston-sta-synora-ston-evro-lemvoi-se-samo-kai-lesvo-fotografies/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-12 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067046/anoigei-ta-synoragiatoy-sprosfyges-o-ermtogan/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-55 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067573/ameiotti-i-piesi-ston-evro-mploko-se-4-600-apopeires-eisodoy/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-87 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1068595/evros-periorismenes-oi-prospatheies-paraviasis-ton-synoron-apo-to-vrady-toy-savvatoy/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-34 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1067222/proedros-synorifylakon-evroy-kratame-gera-o-evros-den-peftei/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-54 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1067549/vinteo-apatropis-stachersaia-synora-kai-apothisis-metanaston/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-19 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1067125/ti-symvainei-stiskastanies-ena-gramma-apo-ton-evro/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-21 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1067154/stratitikes-askiseismepragmatika-pyra-simera-ston-evro/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-6 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1066941/evros-katadromeismat-kai-ayximenes-peripolies-sta-synora-fotografies/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-29 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/1067196/evros-pano-apo-4-000-prospatheies-paranomis-eisodoy-mesa-se-12-ores/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-22 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067155/ston-evro-tin-tritio-kyr-mitsotakis-mazi-me-ton-proedro-toy-eyropaikoy-symvolyioy/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-24 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067164/oi-antidraseis-tis-antipoliteysis-gia-tis-anakoinoseis-toy-kysea/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-41 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067379/fon-nter-laien-ta-synora-tis-elladas-einai-kai-eyropaika/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-81 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1068272/mitsotakis-apaiteitai-emprakti-allagi-stasis-tis-toyrkias-sto-metanasteytiko/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-4 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1066925/chrysocho-dis-apo-evro-i-ellada-prostateyei-ta-synora-tis/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- kathimerini-15 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067063/m-chrysocho-dis-i-ellada-kai-i-eyropi-echoyn-synora-kai-ta-synora-oi-ellines-ta-fylame/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

kathimerini-20 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067130/n-papagiopotoylos-ta-synora-froyroyntai-kai-fylassontai-arista/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

kathimerini-53 (2020) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1067540/st-petsas-fake-news-tis-toyrkias-ta-peri-nekroy-prosfyga/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

Tanea.gr

tanea-8 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/02/greece/istandwithgreece-kyma-symparastasis-meso-twitter-stin-ellada/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-12 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/02/greece/evros-epithesi-me-dakrygona-dexontai-oi-ellinikes-dynameis-metanastes-apokalyptoun-ti-methodeysi-tou-erntogan-2/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-15 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/03/greece/evros-apetrapi-i-paranomi-eisodos-5-138-prosfygon-se-ena-24oro-45-syllipseis/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-16 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/04/greece/aprospelastos-o-evros-apeprepsan-allous-2-791-prosfyges-oi-arxes/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-19 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/06/04/greece/evros-ora-miden-oi-tourkoi-etoimazontai-gia-nees-pieseis-me-oplo-tous-metanastes/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-20 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/05/world/i-ee-katadikazei-tin-tourkia-giaton-ekviasmo-tis-sto-prosfygiko-metanasteytiko/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-7 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/01/greece/nea-epeisodia-ston-evro-petropolemos-kai-ximika/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-25 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/05/greece/evros-kataylismo-gia-perisso-terous-apo-10-000-metanastes-stinoun-oi-tourkoi-stin-andrianoupoli/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-34 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/06/politics/i-agkyra-travaei-to-skoini-1-000-tourkikes-narkes-sti-synoriaki-grammi-tou-evrou/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-5 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/02/28/greece/metanasteytiko-ekrythmi-i-katastasi-sta-synora-oi-energeies-tis-kyvernisis-gia-na-elegksoun-tis-ayksimenes-roes/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-18 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/04/greece/evros-nea-syntonismeni-epithesi-stis-ellinikes-dynameis-asfaleias-apo-metanastes-kai-tourkous-astynomikous/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-41 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/08/greece/evros-ta-synora-enisxyontai-meta-tin-epixeirisi-doliofthoras/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-10 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/02/greece/stratigos-kostarakos-sygxaritiria-se-osous-fylane-ta-synora-kai-mas-prostateyoun/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

tanea-17 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/03/04/greece/oi-ellinikes-dynameis-asfaleias-apothoun-nees-prospatheies-eisodou-metanaston-kataigismos-dakrygonon-apo-tourkous-astynomikous/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

- tanea-33 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/09/06/greece/frourio-o-evros-me-drones-thermikes-kameres-kai-thorakismena-tzip/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- tanea-48 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2021/03/12/politics/evros-anisixia-stin-ee-gia-to-neo-peristatiko-me-pyrovolumous/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- tanea-2 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/02/28/politics/apokalypsi-sms-se-120-000-metanastes-na-einai-etoimoi-na-perasoun-stin-ellada/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)
- tanea-43 (2020) <https://www.tanea.gr/2020/05/09/greece/spiegel-nea-stoixeia-gia-ton-thanato-metanasti-apo-ellinika-pyra-ston-evro/> (Accessed: 10.01.2021)

Cited news items from Turkish news portals

Sabah.com.tr

- Sabah-1 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/yasam/son-dakika-idlib-krizi-sonra-si-turkiye-avrupa-kapilarini-acti-sinirda-hareketli-dakikalar-yasaniyor> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-2 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/03/02/yunanistana-cikarma> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-6 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2020/03/02/iletisim-baskani-altundan-gocmenlere-iliskin-son-dakika-aciklama> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-8 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/03/04/son-dakika-gocmenlere-biber-gazi-sikan-ulke-ahlaktan-bahsedemez> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-10 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2020/03/04/avrupa-birliginde-gocmen-korkusu-turkiyeye-170-milyon-euroluk-katkida-bulunacagiz> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-12 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/gocmenler-avrupa-kapilarina-dayandi-akin-akin-gidiyorlar> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-13 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/03/05/orantisiz-guc-zulume-cinayete-donustu> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-19 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2020/03/01/yunanistandan-tamponbolgedeki-gocmenlere-cok-sert-mudahale-gaz-bombasi-ve-tomalarla> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sabah-25 (2020) <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2020/03/07/barbarlik> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)

Sözcü.com.tr

- Sözcü-2 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/son-dakika-suleyman-soylu-turkiyeden-ayrilip-avrupaya-giden-multeci-sayisini-acikladi-5654721/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sözcü-5 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/lastik-botla-mericden-yunanistana-gectiler-5652206/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)

- Sözcü-15 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/multecilerden-yillarca-barind-iklari-turkiye-ile-ilgili-tepki-ceken-sozler-5656462/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sözcü-16 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/multecileri-gonullu-olarak-avrupaya-tasiriz-5651942/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sözcü-23 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/son-dakika-erdogan-acikladi-iste-sinir-gecen-multeci-sayisi-5653022/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sözcü-34 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/dunya/midilli-adasinda-gocmenlerin-kon-akladigi-bolgeyi-alevler-sardi-5666830/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Sözcü-38 (2020) <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/dunya/son-dakika-yunanistandan-multeci-aciklamasi-5654141/> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)

Hürriyet.com.tr

- Hürriyet-7 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/metin-feyzioglu-yunanistanin-gocmenlere-siddetini-aihmye-goturecegiz-41466331> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Hürriyet-8 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/galeri-yunan-askerleri-dovdugu-gocmen-leri-yari-ciplak-geri-gonderdi-41462773> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Hürriyet-15 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/sinirda-son-durum-gocmenler-meric-nehrinde-yikandi-41464436> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Hürriyet-22 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/suriye-yunan-multecilere-kucak-acmisti-41460541> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Hürriyet-24 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/micotakis-in-babasi-turkiyeye-sig-inmisti-41461497> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- Hürriyet-28 (2020) <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yunan-askeri-8-aylik-hamile-kadini-bile-dovdu-41460000> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)

T24.com.tr

- T24-6 (2020) <https://t24.com.tr/haber/sinirdakiler-multeciler-neden-turkiye-den-ayril-mak-istiyor,864701> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- T24-14 (2020) <https://t24.com.tr/haber/samil-tayyar-sanki-gelin-bizi-kurtarin-dedik-di-yen-siginmaciyi-hedef-gosterdi-su-soytariyi-suriye-ye-geri-birakin,864173> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)
- T24-25 (2020) <https://t24.com.tr/haber/yunanistan-a-gecen-afgan-siginmaci-polis-her-seyime-el-koyup-beni-turkiye- tarafina-birakti-yuruyerek-geri-dondum,864468> (Accessed: 22.01.2021)

The Missing 50%:

Women in Trust-Building, Crisis Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Greece-Turkey Relations

Yvonne Efstathiou and Polen Türkmen

Abstract

Acknowledging the vital role of women in conflict prevention and given the current urgency in fostering a mechanism to ease tensions between Greece and Turkey, this policy paper argues for 1) the inclusion of Greek and Turkish women and 2) the adoption of a gender dimension, in all diplomatic and grass roots efforts. The paper provides a literature review on the role of women in peace and security, before it examines their participation in the Greek-Turkish context. It will assess women's participation in diplomatic efforts since 1996, examining whether they have occupied a prominent role in government, embassies, or official negotiations. It will also discuss a case study of a female-led peace and security related civil society organization for Turkish-Greek relations to discover best practices in trust-building activities. Ultimately, this policy paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the missing role of women from both Greece and Turkey in official relations. It also provides some concrete recommendations on how to better include women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

Keywords: Greece, Turkey, Women, WPS, foreign policy, international relations, international security, crisis, conflict, diplomacy, trust-building, civil society

INTRODUCTION

Greek - Turkish relations have deteriorated in recent years, over, among other issues, migration, hydrocarbons, and a divergent understanding of territorial boundaries. At a time when tensions are high, open channels of communication and diplomacy are ever more urgent. The United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1325 that was adopted on 31 October 2000, reaffirms the important role that women play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and prompts all actors to pursue a gender-balanced approach in terms of participation and women's full involvement in all efforts for the promotion of peace and security. To that end, this policy paper addresses the role of females in trust-building, diplomatic and conflict management processes between Turkey and Greece from 1996-2020 and explores ways in which an increase in the female participation in crisis diplomacy can provide added value to future exploratory talks and negotiations between the two countries.

We first provide a brief background to Greek-Turkish relations since 1996. Second, we discuss relevant literature findings to understand why the absence of women mediators in Turkish-Greek relations is both a human rights issue as well as an issue in terms of the effectiveness of trust-building and crisis diplomacy between the two countries. Our third section discusses the findings of our content analysis of over fifty reports, documents, official statements, newspaper articles and images on the exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey since 1996. In our last section, we will provide several policy recommendations for those concerned with Greece and Turkey's bilateral relations and argue that it is not just an increase in women's participation that is needed, but also the inclusion of a gender dimension in all activities pertaining to Greek-Turkish relations.

BACKGROUND: THE CONTEXT

The relations between Greece and Turkey have been bumpy, marked by alternating periods of mutual hostility and reconciliation. Relations deteriorated after the 1950s over several events such as the 1955 Istanbul pogrom, the expulsion of the Istanbul Greeks in the 1960s, the 1974 Cypriot coup

d'état, the ongoing Cyprus dispute, the Öcalan incident, the Imia/Kardak military crisis in 1996 and subsequent military confrontations over the Aegean (Karakatsanis 2014). Despite a relative normalization after 1999 with the so-called “earthquake diplomacy,” the two neighboring NATO countries continue to be at odds over several issues, with tensions reaching high levels in the past few years (Yildiz 2020).

The Aegean disputes, which remain unresolved, are still a major source of tension and conflict in Turkish-Greek relations. The stalemate in reaching a settlement is liable to give rise to new frictions resulting in an acute strain on relations. Greece and Turkey’s differences date back to the 1970s, starting with the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf (1973) and Greece’s desire to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (Hurriyet Daily 2020). Turkey is disputing the extent of Greek national airspace; the Greek regime and sovereignty over islands; the delimitation of the territorial sea; the responsibilities within the Athinai FIR; Greece’s jurisdiction within the search and rescue region under Greek responsibility; while it demands the demilitarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean. The signing of the Turkish - Libyan Memorandum of Understanding in 2019 added another source of contention (Dalay 2021). Despite over 60 rounds of exploratory talks and countless meetings and negotiations among the two states’ leadership, Greece and Turkey remain far from reaching an agreement, even on the mechanism to resolve them.

BACKGROUND: THE LITERATURE

In academia, feminist security studies have focused on how gender plays a role in shaping foreign and security policy, theories, and ideas. Studies overwhelmingly show that the inclusion of women in trust-building and peace-building processes can lead to more comprehensive and inclusive agreements that can better reflect the needs and concerns of a society, which in turn lead to better peace agreements. Since the adoption of S/RES/1325, worldwide, women have participated in only 9% of peace negotiations (UN Women 2012, 4). Between 1992-2019, women represented 13% of negotiators, 6% of mediators, 6% of signatories of major peace processes globally (Council on Foreign Relations 2020).

This lack of female representation is indeed grave and regrettable, given that when women do participate in peace processes, the agreements are more durable and better implemented (Krause, Bränfors 2018). There is also a further link between gender equality, peace, and security. Where there is a greater gender equality and political representation in parliaments, a country is less likely to be involved in wars (Caprioli 2005, Hudson et al. 2012, Fearon 2002). With greater gender equality, they are also less likely to resolve disputes with other countries through violent conflicts (Caprioli 2003). There is also evidence that the degree of violence in a conflict decreases when a country is more gender equal and where there are more female leaders (Caprioli & Boyer 2001).

Women in Foreign Policy (DPK) in Turkey recently published a paper titled “Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Turkey and Women in Diplomacy: How to Integrate the WPS Agenda in Turkish Foreign Policy” which interviewed a dozen diplomats, ten of whom are still on active duty. They provided important information regarding women’s place in the foreign ministry, especially within the context of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Their in-depth interviews with diplomats reflect important findings from the diplomats’ experiences. First, all the female diplomats interviewed agreed that they were “convinced that they are better at starting a dialogue and building communication channels with their foreign counterparts, be they male or female” (Alemdar and Yinanç 2021, 9). Nonetheless, what is most striking about Alemdar and Yinanç’s findings is that while increasing female representation, including in top diplomatic positions were indeed important, an increase in percentage does not necessarily help build a gender-sensitive foreign policy (Alemdar and Yinanç 2021, 8). They explain that many female diplomats are largely unfamiliar with S/RES/1325 (2000) and therefore do not make use of the WPS agenda, which would require a gender perspective to contribute with a difference from their male counterparts to foreign policy (Alemdar and Yinanç 2021, 8). As they have adapted to a patriarchal bureaucratic culture, none of the interviewees “seem to have looked at the issues through a gender lens” (Alemdar and Yinanç 2021, 8). Ultimately, this shows that there are two issues at hand - first: the equal representation of women in Greek and Turkish diplomacy, and second: the inclusion of the gender dimension in both countries’ foreign policy-making.

FINDINGS & DISCUSSION

Having reviewed the literature, we compared the number of women in leadership and ministerial positions in Greece and Turkey, as well as researched the role of women in exploratory talks between the two countries. We found that out of the eight Greek Prime Ministers (Table 1) that were in power from 1996-2020, the period under consideration, not a single one was female. Similarly in Turkey (Table 1), out of the nine Prime Ministers that held the post only one was female; Tansu Çiller (1993-1996), who remained in power only for a few months following the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996.

Table 1: Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers between 1996 and 2021¹

Greek Prime Ministers	Term	Turkish Prime Ministers	Term
Kyriakos Mitsotakis	2019- present	Binali Yıldırım	2016-2018
Alexis Tsipras	2015-2019	Ahmet Davutoğlu	2014-2016
Antonis Samaras	2012-2015	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	2003-2014
Panagiotis Pikramenos	2012-2012	Abdullah Gül	2002-2003
Loukas Papademos	2011-2012	Bülent Ecevit	1999-2002
George Papandreu	2009-2011	Mesut Yılmaz	1997-1999
Konstantinos Karamanlis	2004-2009	Necmettin Erbakan	1996-1997
Kostas Simitis	1996-2004	Mesut Yılmaz	1996-1996
		Tansu Çiller	1993-1996

This does not suggest that the leaders listed in *Table 1* have not worked alongside women diplomats or advisors. For example, Eleni Sourani is the director of the current Prime Minister's diplomatic office and very much involved in the exploratory talks, meetings, and negotiations, while Alexandra Papadopoulou, Greece's Ambassador to the US is also advising Mitsotakis. Similarly, President Erdogan has been advised by Gülnur Aybet, who is Senior Advisor to the President of the Republic of Turkey and member of the Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Council. Moreover, in the latest round of

¹ The position of Prime Minister in Turkey ceased to exist in 2018. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the President of Turkey since 2014 and de facto leader of the country.

exploratory talks that took place on 25 January 2021, Evgenia Kanara participated in the meeting as part of the Greek delegation along with Pavlos Apostolidis and Alexandros Kuyu. However, in our content analysis of over fifty open-source documents, articles, and press statements, we found that women were either not included in bilateral talks at all or were a significant minority in the delegation when included. We also found a serious data gap and transparency in the identity of the delegates involved in the negotiations. On the other hand, as the following *Table 2* suggests, both countries had respectively only one female Foreign Minister, a key position that allows them to shape policy and engage in negotiation processes.

Table 2: Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers between 1996 and 2021

Greek Foreign Ministers	Term	Turkish Foreign Ministers	Term
Nikos Dendias	2019-present	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	2015-present
George Katrougalos	2019-2019	Feridun Sinirlioğlu	2015-2015
Alexis Tsipras	2018-2019	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	2014-2015
Nikos Kotzias	2015-2018	Ahmet Davutoğlu	2009-2014
Petros Molyviatis	2015-2015	Ali Babacan	2007-2009
Nikos Kotzias	2015-2015	Abdullah Gül	2003-2007
Evangelos Venizelos	2013-2015	Yaşar Yakış	2002-2003
Dimitris Avramopoulos	2012-2013	Şükrü Sina Gürel	2002-2002
Petros Molyviatis	2012-2012	Ismail Cem	1997-2002
Stavros Dimas	2011-2012	Tansu Çiller	1996-1997
Stavros Lambrinidis	2011-2011	Emre Gönensay	1996-1996
Dimitris Droutsas	2010-2011	Deniz Baykal	1995-1996
George Papandreou	2009-2010		
Dora Bakoyannis	2006-2009		
Petros Molyviatis	2004-2006		
Tasos Giannitsis	2004-2004		
George Papandreou	1999-2004		
Theodoros Pangalos	1996-1999		

The complete historic absence of Turkish female ambassadors in Athens and the identical absence of Greek female ambassadors in Ankara also highlights the lack of women in decision-making and influential positions. Overall, 64 out of 257 (~25%) of the current Turkish ambassadors are women. This number has been increasing steadily over the last two decades; in 2000, there were notably only 8 women ambassadors (Çetin and Yüzbaşıoğlu 2021). In contrast, about 36% of the current Greek ambassadors are women, with indication of a positive change over time (Personal Communication 2021). This indicates that we are far from achieving full equality in the field of diplomacy and therefore from reaping the benefits suggested by the literature. Yet, it also shows that there is gradual change in the right direction. It is important to remember that while equal numbers in male and female diplomats are important due to the simple matter of human rights, the increase in the number of women ambassadors cannot be said to contribute entirely to the adoption of a gender dimension in the respective diplomatic policies, as pointed out in literature.

Besides these findings, the proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament is 22% in Greece and 17% in Turkey (World Bank Open Data 2020). Moreover, in Greece the third strongest party (KINAL) is presently led by Fofi Gennimata, while in Turkey, the IYI Party is led by Meral Aksener. This means that in each country, only one major parliamentary party is led by a woman. The absence of female politicians, policy-makers, and negotiators, particularly in Greek-Turkish diplomatic, trust-building and conflict management initiatives is starkly evident and regrettable. Yet, these findings do not indicate that dialogue and the gender dimension in conflict mediation between women from the two countries is lacking. On the contrary, there are several peace and mediation projects created by women networks, such as WINPEACE.

CASE STUDY: GREEK-TURKISH-CYPRIOI MEMBERS OF WOMEN'S INITIATIVE FOR PEACE (WINPEACE)

Having discussed our findings on the role of (or lack of) women in Greece-Turkey external relations, we also examined WINPEACE as a case study of a bottom-up approach to further the WPS agenda in the context of the two countries. WINPEACE was created by Zeynep Oral (Turkey) and Margarita Papandreou (Greece) in the context of the Kardak/Imia crisis in 1996. The crisis involved a small set of islets over which both Greece and Turkey claimed sovereignty. On the night the crisis emerged, Margarita Papandreou was watching television and found that the tone of the talks on what to do was militaristic and “.... irresponsibly macho. I kept zapping around the channels, with one purpose only: to find out if any woman had been asked how she felt about the situation, how it should be handled and what it was all about. There was none. They were talking about war! And, who are the true victims of war for god’s sake? Women and children.” (WINPEACE 2010, 9).

As a result, Papandreou wrote an open letter to the women of Turkey claiming that “regardless of who is responsible for the recent incidents in the Aegean, we urge you to join us in pressuring our governments to avoid all acts of provocation which might result in an armed conflict” (WINPEACE 2010, 10). Alemdar responded to the call and invited women’s organizations in Turkey who were interested in jointly working with Greek women towards certain goals, “mainly for building a peace culture” (WINPEACE 2010, 10). Fifteen women from both countries representing different NGOs met on the Greek island of Kos and, later, in Bodrum in Spring 1998 to launch WINPEACE. Of WINPEACE’s achievements, Papandreou claims that they did not necessarily stop a war from occurring but rather, they “started a process that in large part created a climate that made it impossible for a small incident to lead to a war. This is a great achievement” (WINPEACE 2010, 11). Oral clarifies this: “[...] we could point the way to resolution without violence and without threats. We would put all our efforts together to develop non-violent

solutions to all problems and tensions. We would do this using a gender analysis and women’s practical problem-solving methods. We would develop an atmosphere of trust and understanding between us.” (WINPEACE 2010, 11). This was meant to be achieved through creating common short- and long-term projects and to adopt a different framework of mentality, “In the learning process, we, women from both countries, were trained by experts in conflict resolution” (WINPEACE 2010, 10).

The women were also engaged in several joint projects on issues such as the reduction of arms in Turkey and Greece, reassessing the common history, peace education, contribution of non-governmental institutions in conflict resolution and agro-tourism (WINPEACE 2010, 10). These statements from Papandreou and Oral speak volumes regarding the amount of expertise and training that these women acquired in trust-building and mediation, throughout their activities. While their efforts were mostly a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach from politicians and governments, the amount of media activity generated by the group did not go unnoticed. Ultimately, two women parliamentarians from Greece and Turkey met in Ankara under the initiative of WINPEACE and signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” committing themselves to a first step of maintaining “a dialogue between our political parties and parliamentarians at all levels, starting from women politicians” (WINPEACE 2010, 54). These efforts can be analyzed as not only valuable for promoting peace, identifying points of cooperation and in political lobbying for better relations, but also in demonstrating that trust-building between the two communities, even during a crisis context, is possible. WINPEACE also demonstrates that there already are a large number of educated women from both communities in matters of peace-building and mediation which remain on the sidelines of diplomatic structures.

While WINPEACE emerged in the context of the Imia/Kardak crisis, in the recent escalations between the two countries over the Eastern Mediterranean, there was also a joint call for peace from women in Greece and Turkey

initiated by a women's rights activist, Gülseren Onaç. The call expressed the women's "determination to strive for peace in the Aegean, enhance shared culture, and embrace solidarity and friendship despite the patriarchal system that threatens the world" and was signed by more than 350 women (BIA News Desk 2020). In contrast to WINPEACE, the call for peace did not garner attention from political representatives or large news organisations. Yet, the sheer number of signatures from the two countries' women demonstrated once again their contempt for the recent escalations and militarisation, and their willingness to resolve differences through constructive dialogue and peaceful means.

It can therefore be said that women activists and civil society groups do aim to prevent conflict between Greece and Turkey and to build bridges across the Aegean communities via the use of a gender dimension. It strongly appears that there is a recognition by women's organizations that the current state of affairs is heavily masculine, macho and militarized. Yet, there appears to be a continuing mutual desire for peaceful dialogue and mediation across women's communities on both sides. It also appears that there is a lot of knowledge and experience that civil society organizations, who already appreciate the value of WPS agenda, can bring to the policy world. The trust-building and mediation activities have thus far remained mostly as informal bottom-up initiatives on the sidelines of formal diplomacy structures. Respective governments, organizations and other members of civil society that focus on Greece - Turkey relations must take note of the achievements of WINPEACE, particularly in conflict resolution. For example, the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF), the invite-only "one-and-a-half-track diplomacy initiative" only involves four women members out of twenty-five members (Greek-Turkish Forum, 2020). It is therefore clear that there is room for improvement on all fronts. Emphasising the effectiveness of involving female mediators and acknowledging that equal representation is also a human rights issue is the responsibility of all who work in Greece - Turkey relations, as Soner Cagaptay from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy highlighted:



Having analyzed the role of women in Greece-Turkey relations, we will now provide some policy suggestions based on the literature and our discussion.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. More female diplomats should be included in the external relations and mediation efforts between the two countries.
 - a. Through increasing the number of diplomatic training programs and ensuring they have a minimum quota of 50% female trainees.
 - b. Through posting the first women ambassadors to Athens and Ankara.

- c. Through agreeing to include more balanced delegations in forthcoming meetings including military delegations and in exploratory talks.
 - i. This would have to be accompanied by increased transparency in the identity of the delegations to the exploratory talks, as the lack of transparency has resulted in a data gap.
 - ii. Evidence suggests that the issue is not a lack of expert women, but rather a lack of inclusion. Therefore, agreeing on a gender balance for future meetings would be a low-hanging fruit.
 - iii. Future meetings should be encouraged to include considerations for gender issues.
2. An effort to adopt a gender dimension and the WPS agenda at the respective foreign ministries could be initiated.
 - a. This could be an area of official cooperation between the two countries where they learn from best practices elsewhere in Europe and receive joint training from experts in feminist foreign policy and organizations like PeaceWomen², Mediterranean Women Mediators Network³ and WINPEACE, on how to mainstream gender into their institutional practices.
 - i. In addition, the expertise of women involved in joint peace organizations in Cyprus could also be included, such as those who participated in Hands Across Divide and the Women's Civic Initiative for Peace in Cyprus⁴.

2 PeaceWomen facilitates the monitoring of the United Nations System, with a focus on the Women Peace and Security Agenda by engaging in advocacy and providing outreach and capacity building in order to support local gendered conflict analysis and expertise (PeaceWomen, 2021).

3 The Mediterranean Women Mediators Network's aim is to fulfill the need to increase the number of women involved in peacemaking efforts. Its geographic scope is the Mediterranean area with members including both Greece and Turkey (Womenmediators.net, 2021).

4 Hands Across Divide is an autonomous women's group founded by a Greek Cypriot woman peace activist and a Turkish Cypriot woman peace activist. It is a bi-communal NGO of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot women who work towards building a culture of peace in Cyprus. The women involved were trained by conflict resolution experts to create a joint future together (Peace-Cyprus, 2021a). Likewise,

- ii. Building a “policy channel” between these civil society organizations and the policymakers would facilitate the share of knowledge and expertise.
- 3. A Parliamentary group could be created: it could fall under a regional umbrella (eg. Eastern Mediterranean) that will cater for the present inability to forge a parliamentary friendship group⁵.
 - a. Parliamentarians could facilitate women NGOs in Greece and Turkey to be more involved in peace-making efforts.
 - b. Parliamentarians in both countries could jointly build a policy channel between civil society and policy-makers, exchanging policy ideas and practices on women’s issues in both countries.
- 4. Civil society organizations, the media, the policy world, and academia working on Greece - Turkey relations must also do its part:
 - a. By ensuring more equal female participation and membership.
 - b. By bringing the gender dimension into their frames of reference (rather than seeing it as a secondary consideration).
 - c. By encouraging media organizations to invite more women experts to prime-time television programs both in Greece and Turkey that discuss the state of bilateral relations. For instance, experts should reject participating in panels that do not include a minimum of 40% female experts and should be vocal about this issue on their social media platforms.

Women’s Civic Initiative for Peace in Cyprus was formed in 1999 to defend and contribute towards peace in Cyprus by creating a culture of peace through joint work on conflict resolution and strengthening relationships across women’s communities (Peace-Cyprus, 2021b). Both organisations have extensive experience in training women in conflict management and resolution, and in trust-building capacities. Given this experience and the geographic, historic, and cultural similarities of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot women’s organisations with Greek and Turkish women’s organisations, there is a possibility and clear value in facilitating a transfer of knowledge in terms of best practices.

- 5 To date, the lack of a Greek-Turkish Friendship group can be traced to the Casus Belli in 1995 passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

CONCLUSION

While increasing the presence of women in foreign policy and diplomacy within the two nations is a desirable goal, it is also important not to forget the importance of improving gender mainstreaming in foreign policy in both countries. That is because it is one thing to increase women's participation in the external relations between the two countries and another to adopt a gender dimension. While civil society organizations like WINPEACE can provide this dimension and conduct important political activism and develop trust-building projects, they mostly remain on the fringes of diplomacy and mediation, and therefore in key decision-making structures. Without institutionalization, they are also dependent on external support, finance and facilitation.

It also appears that the policy world could utilize and learn much from the established knowledge and expertise prevalent in women's organizations in both countries. This is important not only because the lack of representation of women is a matter of human rights, but also because as evidence strongly suggests, women's inclusion is beneficial to facilitating peace, preventing conflicts and in trust-building between communities.

Moreover, while there has been an increase of female ambassadors in both Turkey and Greece over time, they may be adopting patriarchal behaviors, rather than reshaping policy by contributing a gendered lens. Therefore, while women's participation needs to increase, so too does training on the WPS agenda and its importance for mediation, in both countries. Civil society, academia and the policy world involved in Greece - Turkey relations also need to actively ensure equal participation from women to adopt and support the WPS agenda, and to reform the patriarchal culture prevalent in the fields of diplomacy, conflict prevention, management, and resolution. However, above all, what has become most evident throughout our research is that there is a serious lack of data tracking the gender representation of delegations from both sides in bilateral meetings, without which many problems pertaining to equal representation cannot be identified, discussed, and resolved.

REFERENCES

- Alemdar, Zeynep and Barçın Yinanç. 2021. 'Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Turkey and Women in Diplomacy: How to Integrate the WPS Agenda in Turkish Foreign Policy.' Women Peace and Security Policy Reports for Turkey. http://wfp14.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Women_in_Diplomacy.pdf.
- BIA News Desk. 2020. '350 women from Turkey and Greece make a call for peace'. Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://bianet.org/english/gender/230914-350-women-from-turkey-and-greece-make-a-call-for-peace>.
- Cağaptay, Soner. [@SonerCagaptay]. 2021. *Masculine Turkish-Greek summit today in Ankara. Turkey and Greece alike have many well-qualified female diplomats and policymakers. Women's conspicuous omission from this summit speaks in volumes regarding the red-blooded state of affairs between the two countries.* Tweet, April 15, 2021. Twitter. <https://twitter.com/SonerCagaptay/status/1382763006216564739>.
- Caprioli, Mary. 2003. Gender equality and state aggression: The impact of domestic gender equality on state first use of force. *International Interactions* 29(3): 195-214.
- Caprioli, Mary and Mark A. Boyer. 2001. Gender, violence, and international crisis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 503-518.
- Caprioli, Mary. 2005. "Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 161-178.
- Council on Foreign Relations. 2020. 'Women's Participation in Peace Processes - Explore the Data.' December 17, 2020. <https://wpp-v2-interactives1.pantheonsite.io/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/explore-th>.
- Çetin, Şerife. and Nazlı Yüzbaşıoğlu. 2021. 'Türk diplomasisine yön veren kadın diplomatların sayısı artıyor.' *Anadolu Ajansı*. Accessed July 9, 2012. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/turk-diplomasisine-yon-veren-kadin-diplomatlarin-sayisi-artiyor/2167475>.
- Dalay, Galip. 2021. 'Turkey, Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock.' Accessed June 21, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-europe-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-charting-a-way-out-of-the-current-deadlock/>
- Fearon, Kate. 2002. 'Northern Ireland Women's Coalition: institutionalizing a political voice and ensuring representation.' *Conciliation Resources*.
- Greek-Turkish Forum. 2021. *Members*. Accessed June 3, 2021. <http://greekturkishforum.com/members/>.
- Hudson, Valerie M., Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett. 2012. *Sex and world peace*. Columbia University Press.
- Hurriyet Daily News. 2020. 'Turkey says Greece's decision to extend its territorial waters in Aegean is case of war.' Accessed in June 21, 2021. <https://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-says-greeces-decision-to-extend-its-territorial-waters-in-aegean-is-cause-of-war-157805>.

- Karakatsanis, Leonidas. 2014. *Turkish-Greek relations: Rapprochement, civil society and the politics of friendship*. Routledge.
- Krause, Jana, Werner Krause and Piia Bränfors. 2018. Women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace. *International Interactions* 44(6): 985-1016.
- Oral, Zeynep. 2010. *Winpeace: A miraculous experience*. Accessed 25 May 2021 at: (PDF) WINPEACE: Women's Indispensable Role in Conflict ...<https://www.researchgate.net> › ... › Conflict Resolution.
- Peace-Cyprus. 2021a. *Hands Across the Divide*. Accessed July 9, 2021. <http://www.peace-cyprus.org/womenbridges/index2.htm>.
- Peace-Cyprus. 2021b. 'Women's Civic Initiative for Peace.' Accessed July 9, 2021. <http://www.peace-cyprus.org/WCIP/>.
- PeaceWomen. 2021. 'About Us.' Accessed June 9, 2021. <https://www.peacewomen.org/about-us>.
- UNSC. 2000. 'Resolution 1325 (2000): adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000', *S/RES/1325(2000)*, 31 October 2000.
- UN Women. 2012. Women's participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence. *UN Women, New York*.
- Womenmediators.net. 2021. 'The Network | MWMN - Mediterranean Women Mediators Network.' Accessed in July 9, 2021. <https://womenmediators.net/the-network/>.
- World Bank Open Data. 2020. 'Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)'. Accessed in December 30, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL>.
- Yildiz, Güney. 2020. *Disaster Diplomacy Will Not Reconcile Turkey and Greece*. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Accessed July 8, 2021. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/disaster-diplomacy-will-not-reconcile-turkey-and-greece>.

Claiming the Glory of the covid-19 Vaccine:

Lessons for Better Societies via a Success Story Nearly Lost in Translation

Mary Drosopulos and Jegar Delal Tayip

Abstract

The BioNTech-Pfizer cooperation has led to the invention of a revolutionary vaccine against covid-19, upon which many countries of the world have based their hopes for a gradual salvation from an unprecedented global pandemic. At a scientific level, this is a formidable achievement marking a new era for humanity. At a human level, the story of the people who contributed to this prodigious step, is a bright example of Greek-Turkish friendship developed in a German context. Dr. Şahin and Dr. Bourla, respectively, scientists of an immigrant background, joined forces and produced a vaccine which has been delivered to European countries, with Greece being among the first to have received doses. The international media has hailed this remarkable story of scientific success, highlighting, also, its human aspect, illustrating the fruit of Greek-Turkish cooperation as a paradigm of a successful outcome despite bilateral antagonism and cultural constraints. This has not been the case, however, with the Greek and Turkish media. What has been celebrated on American or European media as an example of ‘Greek-Turkish friendship’, has been manipulated or distorted by Greek and Turkish news. The vaccine story has either been depicted as a ‘made in Germany’ accomplishment, or has been presented one-sidedly, aimed at generating national pride by focusing only on the existence of the one partner and silencing the existence of the other. What is even more interesting is, how, in some cases, the same piece of information, coming from a foreign original source, has been translated into Greek and Turkish, respectively, in a way that conveys different messages, directing, thus, the readers’ attention into the elements that each country prioritizes as more important or more appropriate for its audience. If seen, however, in its real and full dimension, not only at a scientific, but also at a social-cultural level, the story behind the vaccine is a fascinating illustration of how, given the right conditions and opportunities, scientists coming from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, can thrive together and serve science and humanity.

Key words: ideology, media representations, Greek-Turkish cooperation, BioNTech-Pfizer, culture and science, youth, immigrants

INTRODUCTION

This paper is the result of a 4-month research conducted by two investigators of different cultural and professional backgrounds, yet, with the joint aspiration to explore the following two, interconnected topics:

At a first level, the paper discusses the Greek-Turkish human story behind the BioNTech-Pfizer vaccine as it has been represented in the international media. By juxtaposing the representation of this human narrative in the Greek and Turkish newspapers, respectively, and then comparing it to selected articles written in the international media, we have attempted to identify the ideological axes underpinning local and international media platforms as illustrated via the strategies throughout which they have covered this interethnic friendship. We have discussed consequently, how the very same story has been -in some cases- highlighted and projected to the wider audience as a bright and hopeful paradigm of intercultural dialogue, while in some other cases, it has been silenced, distorted, or even manipulated, to serve dividing nationalistic discourses.

At a second level, the paper discusses the basic conditions that allow interethnic friendships to grow and produce fruits in a country like Germany, where scientific excellence and academic deontology obviously prevail over ethnic and religious labels. In order to touch upon the core ideas stemming from such an ambitious question, the researchers have conducted personal interviews with immigrants from both Greece and Turkey in Germany, who, each in their own means, field of expertise and capacities, have achieved their personal success story in German territory and discuss how they have witnessed the Burla-Şahin story within the media and what this symbolic cooperation has meant to them.

METHODOLOGY

The idea for this research topic emerged while reading news in different languages and observing that different media platforms followed divergent strategies -implying, thus, different ideologies-regarding the coverage of the story behind the Pfizer vaccine. The first stage of the research was there-

fore dedicated to further investigated articles and interviews published on the news; firstly, on platforms providing news in the Turkish and Greek language, respectively, and secondly, on international websites publishing stories mainly in English, but also in French and German.

The desk research was succeeded by primary investigation in the form of personal interviews, conducted mainly online, due to traveling restrictions imposed as a result of the pandemic. Some interviews were conducted separately by each investigator, while others jointly; the latter applied for the three focus groups that took place among members of the same family or community (two focus groups conducted in Turkish and one in Greek).

Specifically, this paper presents findings from the analysis of 18 theme-guided, semi-structured and open in-depth interviews that took place between March and May 2021. Interviews have been conducted in Turkish, Greek and/or English. With regards to the respondents' profile, candidates for interviews were initially chosen through each investigator's wider social circle, while some interviews have been the result of snowball sampling, as some of the people that we talked to introduced us to acquaintances of theirs, that could enrich our investigation. The criterion for choosing candidates for interviews has been their relevance to the topic at hand and their connection with the three relevant countries – Greece, Turkey, and Germany.

In this context, we have talked to people representing interesting combinations: young scientists or entrepreneurs from Greece or Turkey, but also from the so-called 'third countries',¹ who migrated to Germany in quest of a better education, career or even, the *opportunity to live in a more 'resilient' or 'multicultural' society*, to use their in vivo words; also, Greek or Turkish citizens² who spent an important period of their life in Germany, working, studying or participating in youth programs and then returned to their homeland, some permanently and others only to move back to Germany after a few

1 By 'third countries', we mean regions outside the EU. We have interviewed economic migrants and refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan and Afghanistan who are now living and working or studying in Germany.

2 Of different ethnic backgrounds. For instance, some of our interviewees have been Greek citizens of Albanian origin (coming from either Albania or Kosovo); while others, Turkish citizens who represent different ethnic communities (Kurdish, Arabic, Rum etc.).

months or years. Furthermore, we have also talked to experts from Greece, Turkey, and Germany with a significant experience in the field of youth and intercultural dialogue. In relation to age, respondents could be classified in three groups: young students aged 21-25; young professionals (scientists or entrepreneurs) aged 30-38; and senior professionals/experts aged 50-65.

This research has been epistemologically based on Stuart Hall's *Media Representation Theory*, as shaped within his rich bibliography in cultural theory. Ideological reflections have been largely inspired by Teun A. van Dijk's study on *Ideology and discourse* (2000), which builds upon Hall's theory.

MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER

'Media Representation' refers to how the media choose to depict the reality surrounding us, directly influencing, thus, our perception of individuals and events (Hall 1980, 117-121). According to Hall, there can be various grades between an accurate or distorted reflection of a fact or a person, but news platforms are the ones that can subtly promote a positive or a negative interpretation of any given situation or individual and mold the so-called 'public feeling' or public opinion. For instance, if the media choose to present a public figure in negative or positive terms, then our understanding of that person and even our feelings towards them will be a direct reflection of that representation. This explains how we can like or dislike people that we have never met in real life, based on their public image, which may not necessarily accurate. In other words, the media are the conceptualizing force of 'meaning', a term which Hall sees as a constantly changing, dynamic notion, that can be remade and reshaped: media platforms can turn heroes into villains and vice versa; a coordinated series of positive or negative media representations can uplift or ruin completely the public image of an individual, even if these representations are untrue and unfair. With this kind of influence, media can have a direct impact on both individual and collective ideology.

Hall defines ideology as "the mental frameworks — the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation — which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense

of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works.” (Hall 1996, 26) Van Dijk further elaborates on this definition, adding that “ideologies are not limited to making sense of society, but that they also serve to regulate social practices.” (2000, 7) As a result, ideology shapes not only the way we choose to do things, but also the things we strongly believe to be ‘good or bad’; ‘right or wrong’ (Van Dijk 2000, 16). In other words, our ideology dictates the norms, ideals, and values that we preserve and cherish within a society; it is these beliefs and norms that differentiate groups and render them distinct from one another. Hall emphasizes the catalytic role that ideology plays regarding the stabilization of power and dominance. (Hall 1982, 1996, 2017) The manipulation of ideologies by the media can shape politics (Hall et al 1978, 2011), but also challenge them, as Van Dijk argues (2000, 9). This is why Hall (2017) stresses the necessity of treating any type of information we receive with a critical eye and constantly interrogating the accuracy of every piece of news that reaches us.

It is open to discussion whether our educational systems equip us with the skills, attitudes and competences that would enable us to be critical towards the information we get exposed to. This is a topic that we will touch upon further below, when referring to policy recommendations for better societies. For now, we will simply provide a brief comment: if a citizen’s main armor against media manipulation is critical thinking, as Hall suggests, then the school is the first place where critical reading and active citizenship should be cultivated. There are countries where schools truly cultivate critical thinking and others where educational institutions promote exactly the opposite: passive reception of information, parroting and attachment to title-based hierarchies. In the first case, education is seen as a vehicle for more resilient and pluralistic societies, while in the latter, schooling institutions serve nationalistic purposes that usually preserve and deepen stereotypes connected with one’s role in society, as dictated by their ethnicity, religion, or gender.

The narrative of the Pfizer vaccine could have three readings, all equally important for the ‘good’ in our societies:

Firstly, it could be read as an optimistic example of Greek-Turkish friendship, made possible, however, in a third country, Germany, which stands out-

side of this longstanding rivalry between Greeks and Turks and obviously offers the ground for such paradoxical friendships to grow and flourish.

Secondly, it could be seen as the inspirational success story of two immigrants who saw their hard work pay off, despite the hardships of living in the so-called ‘gurbet/κουρμπέτι’³.

The third reading focuses not on the Şahin-Burla duet, but rather on the husband-and-wife synergy, referring here to Dr. Şahin and his life partner, Dr. Özlem Türeci, who contributed significantly to the Pfizer achievement. Both are bright scientists and together they founded BioNTech, a company which, in the pre-covid-19 era, would focus on cancer treatment (Gelles 2020). In 2020, *Time* magazine featured them among the most significant people for the year.

Let us see how these three versions of the same story have been represented by the international and local media.

TRANSLATING SUCCESS IN THE GREEK AND TURKISH CONTEXT: CELEBRATING THE COVID VACCINE WITH OUZOU AND ÇAY

*We realized that he is from Greece and that I'm from Turkey.
It was very personal from the very beginning.*

Uğur Şahin about his friendship with Albert Bourla,
New York Times (Geller 2020)

This extract is from the *New York Times* and it is one of the few articles in prominent news platforms (among *Euronews*, *Voice of America*, etc.) that have concretely mentioned the Greek-Turkish synergy underpinning the Pfizer story. Many articles shared by the local media in the Greek and Turkish language, respectively, have been translations of articles originally published by global news platforms, such as the aforementioned *New York Times* or *Euronews*. The headlines of these translated articles have been following the diplomatic protocol, that wants the reference to the host country being mentioned

³ The same word exists in both Greek and Turkish and refers to the ‘foreign land’, usually connoting a hard place to live in, compared to the homeland, where one feels always accepted and welcomed.

first. For instance, a Greek article published on the Greek *Euronews* site bears a headline beginning with the phrase ‘ένας Έλληνας και ένας Τούρκος’ (A Greek and a Turk), while a similar article on the Turkish *Euronews* site refers to ‘Türk-Yunan dostluğu’ (Turkish-Greek friendship).⁴

The desk research findings in articles written originally for the local platforms indicate the following: the Greek-Turkish friendship behind the production of the vaccine has not been particularly highlighted by the local media, but rather by independent blogs, either personal or initiated by groups of people.⁵ The fact that ordinary people are indeed interested in stories of intercultural cooperation beyond politics is optimistic for the future of the Greek-Turkish dialogue. The bilateral relations of the two countries have always had their ups and downs, yet, the specific story was published at a quite turbulent time, when news coming from both sides would cause even further tension between the two nations. Blogs, however, tend to be read by a much narrower audience, therefore hypothetically have a significantly smaller impact on public opinion compared to large news companies. This hypothesis has been verified by the findings of our primary research: the vast majority of our respondents knew little or nothing about the human story behind the Pfizer vaccine and those who did, often had a unilateral perspective of the story: the Greeks knew about Bourla,⁶ while the Turks knew about Şahin,⁷ not to mention respondents from other ethnic communities living in Germany who had heard about two German citizens of a blurred origin who ‘had saved the world’.

This finding is a direct reflection of the fact that the local media in Turkey, Greece, as well as Germany have chosen to represent the Pfizer story fragmentally, as a one-sided story of ethnic pride. In Greece, most news platforms have focused mainly on the personal story of Albert Bourla, a Greek Jewish scientist from Thessaloniki, who graduated from the Aristotle University and left

4 Έλληνας και Τούρκος οι CEO των εταιρειών που ανακοίνωσαν το εμβόλιο για την COVID-19 | Euronews; Pfizer ve BioNTech: Covid-19 aşısının arka planındaki Türk-Yunan dostluğu | Euronews

5 For example, Το ελπιδοφόρο εμβόλιο κατά του κορωνοϊού είναι Ελληνοτουρκική υπόθεση – Olympia.gr (wordpress.com)

6 See, for example, Αλ. Μπουρλά: Πώς αναπτύξαμε το εμβόλιο Pfizer/BioNTech σε χρόνο – ρεκόρ | Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ (kathimerini.gr)

7 There are exceptions, too. See, for example, Turkish German vaccine pioneers receive Germany’s highest award | Daily Sabah

Greece in search of better opportunities. After the publicity received due to the Pfizer vaccine, Greek platforms hosted extensive articles on the personal story of Albert Bourla and his family, accentuating his love for his homeland, his connections to Halkidiki and other places around Thessaloniki. Objects related to the Bourla enterprise in Greece suddenly became tokens of high symbolic significance; small treasures culturally binding Bourla to the Greek Jewish Community of Thessaloniki: a bottle of ouzo, for instance, with a kosher label written in Hebrew, produced by the distillery of the Bourla Brothers, as Leon Saltiel recalls in an article published by one of the largest news agencies.⁸

Similarly, the Turkish media have portrayed Şahin and Türeci as the ‘the two Turks behind the vaccine’.⁹ Turkish media platforms, just like their Greek counterparts, have engaged in cultural representations of objects and rituals stereotypically attributed to Turks: ‘We celebrated by brewing tea’ (*Çay demleyerek kutladık*), reads the headline of an article in *Yeni Şafak* (11.11.2020).¹⁰

The local media, however, consciously or not, have preserved another cultural stereotype, connected this time with the position of women in Turkey. The Turkish media have referred to Dr. Türeci mainly as ‘Dr. Şahin’s wife’, playing down her capacity as a scientist in her own merit (Türkmen 2020).¹¹ Despite their joint work, it is the male character of the story, Uğur, who has been in the spotlight.

Overall, Turkish speaking media have preferentially depicted the story as a source of national Turkish ‘pride’: ‘gurur’ to cite ad verbum the word in Turkish that appeared in many articles.¹² In most cases, however, local media platforms have eloquently refrained from elaborating on the social and economic factors that allowed for this success to happen in a country like Germany. It has been critical voices via smaller blogs or less popular news platform, that, like in the case of Greece,¹³ commented that this success might have

8 The story of a bottle of ouzo and its modern connection to the Covid vaccine - ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ (amna.gr)

9 See, for example, Corona virüs aşısının arkasındaki iki Türk: Uğur Şahin ve Özlem Türeci kimdir? | NTV

10 Koronavirüs aşısının arkasındaki iki Türk: Çay demleyerek kutladık - Yeni Şafak (yenisafak.com)

11 See, for example, Piyasalara ‘aşı’ dopingi - InBusiness

12 Uğur Şahin ve Özlem Türeci’nin baba ocağında gurur var! - A Haber Son Dakika Gündem Haberleri

13 Popular websites in Greece, such as Capital.gr or DW, hosted articles on the brain drain issue and the

never happened had the scientists not been living in countries like Germany or the USA, allowing them to prosper.

On the contrary, German websites have been eager to highlight that this success was *made in Germany*. There have been different representations of the story in various Germany-based media, varying from articles that overemphasize the scientists' migrant background, to those not referring to it at all. DW for instance, a leading media platform, has opted for different representation strategies. In an article titled 'Angela Merkel 'incredibly proud' of BioNTech founders'¹⁴ dated 17 December 2020, there is no reference whatsoever to the origin of the scientists. The article focuses solely on their scientific excellence and novelty, factors that have made all Germans proud, starting with the Chancellor herself. In another DW video, titled 'Who are the BioNTech founders?'¹⁵, the following interesting phenomenon takes place: in the first part of the video, referring to the couple's current status, Şahin and Türeci are depicted as the people behind the 'German vaccine maker BioNTech', who are characterized as 'celebrities', 'Nobel candidates', 'people of the year' (denoting the homonymous *Financial Times* front cover) or even 'scientific superheroes'. The video's second part, however, refers to the scientists' origin by characterizing it as 'humble'.

Other German news platforms such as *Focus* have represented the story as a "shining example of successful integration."¹⁶ This success has been largely seen in Germany as an opportunity to justify the governments' policy to be hosting large numbers of migrants and refugees. Furthermore, local media celebrated this interethnic narrative as proof that the German society is multicultural, pluralistic and that it provides to all its citizens equal access to educational and vocational opportunities. It should be mentioned, at this

reasons obligating young and promising scientists to flee their country: Γιατί έφυγε από την Ελλάδα ο Μπουρλά της Pfizer | Capital; Γιατί έφυγε από την Ελλάδα ο Μπουρλά της Pfizer | Κοινωνία & Πολιτισμός | DW | 30.01.2021

<https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-incredibly-proud-of-biontech-founders/a-55971775>

14 https://www.focus.de/finanzen/boerse/aktien/produktion-gestartet-biontech-wird-immer-mehr-zum-hoffnungstraeger-fuer-die-welt_id_12596565.html

15 <https://www.facebook.com/dw.deutschewelle/videos/133862535266446>

16 See, for example, "<https://www.firstpost.com/world/how-an-immigrant-couple-in-germany-developed-leading-vaccine-against-covid-19-9014261.html>" How an immigrant couple in Germany developed leading vaccine against

point, that the German media never failed to emphasize the fact that Şahin and Türeci are German citizens.

Nevertheless, there have been cases where the German media (and not only), in an attempt to outline the success of Germany's integration policy, placed more emphasis on the ethnic background of the two scientists than their scientific capacity per se. In her 2020 article in *ResetDoc*, Gülay Türkmén observes how, upon the discovery of the scientists' ethnic background, "the axis of the debate shifted to the lingering questions about migration, integration, diversity, and discrimination in Germany (and beyond)." (Türkmén 2020). A few Greek sites have also referred to them with benevolent yet pejorative terms,¹⁷ such as 'children of Turkish *Gastarbeiter*', to mention an indicative example of a source that attempts to celebrate this story, yet ends up falling into conventional representations of immigrants, that further deepen existing stereotypes.

What is worth noting is that in many cases, the same article, taken from an original, international source has been translated into Greek and Turkish, respectively, in ways that appeal to their readers. In other words, articles have been adopted and translated in ways that give emphasis to the one ethnicity or the other. This is quite evident for instance in media platforms providing news in many languages, such as DW. A Greek-speaking reader, who will click to the DW platform from Greece, will find a list of Pfizer-related articles relative to their reality. Anyone entering DW Turkish, however, will see on the top of the list articles where the two scientists are illustrated as Turkish.

'WE GO WHERE WE CAN SEE THE LIGHT OF THE TUNNEL': THE VOICE OF YOUNG IMMIGRANT

Elaborating on the role of Germany as a country facilitating social and educational integration, the reality is quite different than the one depicted on the media of all countries at issue. Germany is not the 'heaven' that many migrants and refugees had dreamt of before leaving their country (Trines 2019,

¹⁷ Quite the contrary image is represented in another, English speaking website where the couple is depicted as being 'billionaires': *A Billionaire Couple Is Behind the Historic Coronavirus Vaccine* ([businessinsider.com](https://www.businessinsider.com))

Türkmen 2020); it is, however, a country offering opportunities to those who work and study hard.

Many of our respondents admitted that there have been times when they have felt like ‘second class’ citizens for various reasons: not speaking the language; practicing a different religion; coming from another culture or simply for having a darker skin complexion and physical attributes distinct than those of the average ‘European’ type figure. These are parameters existing in many societies hosting migrants and refugees and certainly not limited to Germany only.

Similar feelings of social isolation, yet attributed to different reasons, have been shared by Greeks living in Greece and Turks living in Turkey, who mentioned among others, that factors such as a bad economy, unemployment, lack of opportunities and corruption have often made them feel as ‘strangers in their own country’. According to our interviewees, however, what differentiates Germany from other countries, namely Turkey and Greece, is that it offers them reasons to endure negative feelings and hardships by thinking that if they try hard enough, they will eventually be rewarded, as there is a system in place allowing for people and enterprises to prosper. We are quoting this extract from an interview with a young migrant from Eastern Anatolia, who is now living and studying in Germany, after having spent some months working as an interpreter in Greece. His words clearly highlight his hope to soon reach the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’.

‘I cannot compare myself to a German citizen. I don’t think there is a point in even trying to. I don’t have a job. I don’t speak good German. But I want to stay here, because I know that at least here there is a system that can support me if I work hard enough. I feel safe because I see a strong economy. I see people of different cultures every day in the streets. Do you think that the Pfizer people would have succeeded if they had stayed in their countries? No. Their countries couldn’t have supported them. Trust me; being in Germany played a big role in their achievement.’

Mustafa, 21

Mustafa accentuated the parameters of a vibrant economy and an educational system open to people of his age. The authors of this article both have lived and working experiences with migrants and refugees in Greece and Turkey, where the age between 18-22 is often seen as a ‘transit’ age and very few (if any) educational opportunities exist for the young people who belong to this group (Drosopoulos 2017; 2018). Our young interviewee talked emphatically about the multicultural character of the German city he is living in, where people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds co-exist.

Another respondent, this time a refugee from Afghanistan living in Germany has provided another, equally interesting perspective:

On my way to Germany, I spent some months in Turkey first and then in Greece. As an asylum seeker, I worked as a volunteer in refugee camps. As soon as I received my residence permit, they said that I could work as a cultural mediator because of the languages I know. But you know what? I saw how other young people were there; they don't get real opportunities. They study and study... and then, they can't find a job and if they find one, they get a one-month or a three-month contract and get paid less money than a worker in Germany. You know what the problem is? Turkey and Greece don't trust in youth. I would have no future there. I spent so many years doing nothing. Look at me now. I am studying. I am planning to finish university. I know that Germany will support me. Germany believes in young people.

Aras, 25

A similar opinion is voiced by a Greek female student, who after having spent some time in Turkey learning the Turkish language, has decided to flee to Central Europe. Her words identify some of the major plagues for youth in both Greece and Turkey, such as corruption, lack of opportunities, nepotism and a clientelist mentality when it comes to finding a job:

I am studying German to pursue a job either in Germany or any other German speaking country. I don't want to leave my country, but eventually I will have to. Who would leave their home if they

could have a good life there? When I graduate I will have no one to support me. My dad is not in the same field of work, so as to put me in his office. I don't belong to any political party. Plus, I am young, and I am a woman. Who will trust me with their case? At least, abroad I will be given opportunities. I will know that I didn't study in vain. I didn't waste my youth for nothing.

Vasiliki, 22

Overall, the interviews conducted show that in both Greece and Turkey young people suffer from similar challenges, often forcing them to migrate to countries such as Germany, where they believe they will stand better chances of having academic and professional success in life on their own merit. An issue emphasized by respondents coming from both countries is the lack of cooperation between Greece and Turkey, especially in science and academia. Young people interviewed believe that constructive synergies between Greece and Turkey would lead to innovative projects and would significantly reverse the process of the brain drain.

CONCLUSIONS

The human story of the Greek-Turkish friendship behind the BioN-Tech-Pfizer vaccine has been represented fragmentally by the media: the Greek media has focused on the Greek figure in the story, while the Turkish media on the Turkish origin of the two scientists. In this sense, translation from one language to the other has played a key role in adopting and manipulating the story in order to appeal to the prevailing public sentiment in each case. The German media have minimal references to the Greek-Turkish dimension; they have focused instead on the marriage of the two scientists, Şahin and Türeci. The Germany-based media has focused its attention to the favorable conditions that have allowed two scientists of migrant origin to create a life-saving vaccine.

Despite its limited coverage, the aspect of a Greek-Turkish friendship behind the Pfizer vaccine is indeed a bright example, which become a source of inspiration for scientists and scholars from both countries. The fact that

this friendship grew and blossomed in a third country, namely Germany, indicates that in the presence of favorable conditions, constructive and long-term Greek-Turkish cooperation is indeed possible. This story also serves of an optimistic paradigm of the fact that in humanitarian crises, human lives are above political disputes.

Young people from both countries have seen this Greek-Turkish example as a way to move forward. For them, regional cooperation is the key to progress, innovation, and success. Despite young people's willingness to work and interact with each other, at the moment, there are no resources or institutions supporting the meaningful and sustainable exchange of ideas, resources and good practices. The Pfizer story of Greek-Turkish friendship could become a starting point for cooperation and synergies; a source of inspiration for scientists, scholars, young entrepreneurs and policy makers from both countries willing to work for the good of the region.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of both primary and secondary research conducted for this project, we would like to suggest the following policy recommendations:

- The countries at issue should invest more in their youth and provide access to resources that would allow young people to stay in the region and contribute to its progress.
- Cooperation between Greece and Turkey in the field of science, academia and technology is essential not only for the bilateral relations of the two countries, but for the overall good of the region. Academic and professional opportunities that would emerge from such as synergy could have an effect on the prevention and management of the brain drain.
- Greece and Turkey should follow the example of Germany and should further enhance and consolidate the youth sector, by taking steps such as updating their youth strategy and providing open and accessible spaces where young people could interact, network and exchange

ideas. In this regard, Greece could follow the example of Turkey, which has established a Ministry for Youth and Sports and has invested on high-quality youth centers, some of which¹⁸ meet the quality standards of the Council of Europe. It could also be inspired by Germany's youth centers and social houses for youth.

- Last but not least, the specific paper proposes the establishment of a Greek-Turkish Youth Cooperation Office, with branches in both countries, which will promote bilateral relations via youth entrepreneurship, intercultural dialogue, and academic/scientific cooperation. Both researchers express in writing their commitment to support this cause.

REFERENCES

- Chrysopoulos, Philip. 2020. 'A Greek to Save the World: Who is Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla? Greek Reporter.' *Greek Reporter*. <https://greekreporter.com/2020/11/10/a-greek-to-save-the-world-who-is-pfizer-ceo-albert-bourla/>
- Drosopulos, Mary. 2018. 'The other brick in the wall: Integrating and empowering refugee students through intercultural education; a case study from Greece'. In *The Shifting Global World of Youth and Education* edited by Brown, Mabel A. Routledge.
- Drosopulos, Mary. 2017. 'The circle of trust: Redefining intercultural education and youth work in Greece.' In *Europe in transition: Perspectives on cultural diversity in a changing Europe*, 61-66. SALTO Diversity: Brussels.
- Gelles, David. 2020. 'The Husband-and-Wife Team Behind the Leading Vaccine to Solve Covid-19'. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/business/biontech-covid-vaccine.html>
- Hall, Stuart. 1980. 'Introduction to media studies at the Centre.' In *Culture, Media, Language* edited by Hall, Stuart, Hobson, Dooty, Lowe, Andrew, Willis, Paul, 117-12. London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, Stuart. 1982. 'The rediscovery of "ideology": return of the repressed in media studies'. In *Culture, Society and the Media* edited by Bennett, Tony, Curran, James, Gurevitch, Michale and Woollacott, Janet, 56-90. London and New York: Methuen.
- Hall, Stuart. 2011. 'The neo-liberal revolution'. *Cultural Studies* 25(6): 705–728. doi:10.1080/09502386.2011.619886.
- Hall, Stuart. 2016. *Cultural Studies 1983: A Theoretical History*. Edited by Slack, Jennifer D. and Grossberg, L. Duke University Press.

18 At the Euromed Youth Center/Akdeniz Gençlik Merkezi in Adrasan, Antalya.

- Hall, Stuart. 2017. *Selected Political Writings: The Great Moving Right Show and other essays*. Edited by Davison, Sally, Featherstone, D., Rustin, M., Schwarz, B. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Hall, Stuart. 2017. *Familiar Stranger: A Life Between Two Islands*. Edited by Schwarz, Bill. London: Allen Lane; Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hall, Stuart. and Jefferson, Tony. 1976. *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, Stuart, Lumley, Bob, and McLennan, Gregor. 1978. 'Politics and ideology: Gramsci', in *On Ideology* edited by Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, . 45-76. London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, Stuart, Hobson, Dorothy, Lowe, Andrew, and Willis, Paul. 1980. *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, Stuart, Evans, Jessica, and Nixon, Sean. 2013. *Representation (2nd ed.)*. London: Sage.
- Özdemir, Yücel. 2021. 'Uğur Şahin ve Özlem Türeci Der Spiegel'e konuştu: Kimliğin siyasallaşması zararlı'. *Evrensel*. <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/422676/ugur-sahin-ve-ozlem-tureci-der-spiegele-konustu-kimligin-siyasallasmasi-zararli>
- Türkmen, Gülay. 2020. 'When a Vaccine Speaks Volumes: What the BioNTech Story Tells Us about Migration, Integration and Discrimination.' *Reset Dialogues*. <https://www.resetdoc.org/story/when-a-vaccine-speaks-volumes-biontech-story-migration-integration-discrimination/>
- Trines, Stefan. 2019. 'The State of Refugee Integration in Germany in 2019'. *WENR*. <https://wenr.wes.org/2019/08/the-state-of-refugee-integration-in-germany-in-2019>
- Van Dijk, Teun. 1998. *Ideology, a multidisciplinary approach*. London: Sage.
- Van Dijk, Teun. 2003. *Ideology and discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction*. Barcelona, Spain: Pompeu Fabra University.

Breaking Down Barriers: Trust-Building through the Mobility of Academic Elite between Greece and Turkey

Nur Sinem Kourou, Müge Dalkıran, Antonios Alexandridis

Abstract

This study aims to shed light on the role of academic mobility in the development of relations between Turkey and Greece by focusing on junior and senior participants' experiences from both countries. Examining the literature on the mobility of academics worldwide shows that academic cooperation between two or more countries, at global, regional, or bilateral level, has been utilized to raise mutual understanding and enhance awareness and recognition towards each other. One of the academic mobility outcomes is to improve trust between the states by conducting research. The exchange of knowledge, experience, culture, and language between parties and fostering intercultural dialogue become critical "soft" indicators in the building of trust between them. Therefore, it is critical to understand how mobile academics connect with local people, researchers, and NGOs in the host country. Drawing from those experiences, we intend to examine how the mobility of academics between Greece and Turkey enables trust-building and consolidates the relations between them, especially in this current period of turbulence in the relations between the two states.

Keywords: Academic mobility, Turkish-Greek Relations, Trust-building

INTRODUCTION

Academic mobility is an established process due to various available scholarships and exchange programs. These schemes that encourage academics to continue their research in different countries, not only aim to lead new developments in science, but also aim to establish mutual understanding between countries (for example, Fox International Fellowship, Fullbright), to increase awareness on democracy (for example, the Erasmus project), to the exchange of language and culture, and to establish networks among academic elites. Therefore, *brain circulation* is vital for disseminating scientific knowledge and supporting cooperation between the scientific communities across countries. (Chepurenko 2015) Moreover, in the literature the mobility of academics is also perceived as a “counterbalance to parochial thinking”. (Teichler 2015) At this point, Teichler argues that “internationalisation and, notably, mobility have a strong positive under-current: they are expected to serve peace and mutual understanding, quality enhancement, a richer cultural life and personality development, technological innovation, economic growth and societal well-being.” (Teichler 2015, 10) Furthermore, in their study, Bilecen and Faist identify international doctoral students as knowledge brokers who are able to hold a wide range of knowledge, to create bridges and to disseminate knowledge. They also underline the importance of reciprocity, trust, and solidarity as social conditions of the knowledge transfer through doctoral students. (Bilecen and Faist 2015)

From this perspective, this project’s objective is to understand whether and how the mobility of academics between Greece and Turkey can be a tool for trust building. To answer this question, we conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with six academics who have had training or research in Greece and Turkey (Turkish scholars in Greece and vice versa). While the participants of academic mobility differ, inter alia, in terms of their academic interests, academic level, and place of visit; all the interviewees come from various fields of the social sciences, with different academic status, and different places where they conducted their mobility. During the interviews, we aimed to reveal the influence that the existing scholarships and exchange programs have on the scholars’ role in the inter-state dialogue. Moreover, we

asked them to reflect on their individual level of motivation, experiences, and networks they were involved in, if any, as well as in the advantages and disadvantages of conducting their research abroad either in Greece or Turkey. Due to data protection issues related to the ethical practices of anonymity and confidentiality, we have replaced the names of interviewees with letter and number codes where G denotes a Greek citizen and T denotes a Turkish citizen.¹

THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG CAUSALITY DILEMMA²

Drawing from our qualitative research, the multilevel academic mobility between Turkey and Greece in the framework of the relations between these two states, are interdependent. On the one hand, the positive feature of the relations led to increased academic mobility and cooperation between the two states especially during the “Turkish-Greek Spring” – which started with the Cem-Papandreou rapprochement process between Ismail Cem and George Papandreou- between 1999 and 2007. During this period, a gradualist approach was followed that led the two countries to build cooperation in areas concerning “low-politics” including collaborations in the realm of culture and civil society. In particular, between 2000 and 2004, various new agreements were signed to improve economic, social, and cultural relations. (Onis and Yilmaz 2008)

Many of the interviewees started their academic mobility during the years of rapprochement. On the other hand, with regards to the consolidation of bilateral relations, deepening beyond their temporality and providing sustainability between the two states, the importance of academic mobility has been repeatedly highlighted in the interviews as a source of establishing a mutual understanding. G1, in particular, a Greek scholar who worked in a Turkish university for almost 10 years, emphasized the interdependence between the political/diplomatic atmosphere between Turkey-Greece and academic mobility. He underlined how good relations enable academic dialogue and exchange as well as how academic mobility and good relations are contributing to a “mentality change” which pave the way for a sustainable form for better relations between the two countries.

¹ See the appendix at the end of the chapter for more information.

² The metaphor was used during the interview with G1.

From a bird's eye view, participants shared similar outcomes about the role and place of academic mobility in Turkish-Greek relations. For instance, T2, an academic in a state university in Turkey, brought our attention the fragile characteristics of academic mobility due to the volatility of bilateral relations while explaining her decision for her own academic pathway. After she completed her MA degree in Greece, she did not want to take the risk to continue with a doctoral degree at the same university. She narrated her anxiety by stating that “if the relations between the states deteriorate, my PhD could be in jeopardy.” After her experience on both sides of the Aegean, she interpreted how the positive atmosphere can quickly be reversed and cause negative outcomes on multiple fronts.

In parallel with the concerns of T2, G2, a Greek national conducting her PhD studies in Turkey and working as a lecturer in a state university, highlights that during the periods when bilateral relations deteriorate, it can be discouraging to choose Turkey as a place of work if there is no further motivation. She adds that she feels in a more precarious position in terms of losing her job as well as terms of her relationship with the Turkish state during times of crisis between the two countries. She adds: “I thought several times before these crises hit me, I should leave”.

In the past, Turkey and Greece seized an opportunity in their diplomatic relations thereby impacting various areas of interaction, including academia. Yet, academia has its own dynamics, uniqueness, possibilities, and limits which distinguishes it from other sectors. Through its direct and indirect impact on bilateral relations, academic mobility must be considered as one of the key elements that can contribute to the consolidation of a sustainable framework. Although relations between Turkey and Greece possess multiple elements and multifaceted characteristics, this paper looks the issue from the perspective of academic mobility. The narratives and experiences of academics who have been mobile between Turkey and Greece, reveal some commonalities and differences on this issue. After presenting the current situation including the advantages, as well as the challenges that academics face during their mobility, this paper will offer recommendations to strengthen academic mobility between the two countries. What does experience say about the

interdependency between Academic Mobility and Relations between Greece and Turkey?

INITIATING ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT: INDIVIDUAL EFFORT VS. INSTITUTIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT

The experiences of our interviewees show that individual efforts are more prominent than institutional encouragement from the beginning of the mobility or visits to the establishment of networks during the period of mobility or work, in particular for the early-stage researchers. Both G1 and G2 visited Turkey several times on their own initiatives before they started to study and/or work in Turkey due to their academic interest in Turkey. Even after they moved to Turkey for a longer period of study/work in Turkish universities, their engagement in the academic environment and the establishment of networks was limited to their individual efforts. The lack of institutional encouragement to integrate them into the already existing academic environments in those universities limited their capacity to create a sense of belonging. For instance, G2 explains why she could not establish relationships at the university where she was working as a lecturer despite her advanced level of Turkish:

I could not get in contact with the people at the university. Except the ones working in my department. There were some people that I knew but I could not make habits at the university because I was only going for the lecturing hours. (...) There were certain issues at the university including not having an office. I was not able to work there. For a while, I did not even have a desk there. Then, we were sharing as four people three desks. Later on, I had a desk but I was not able to work with someone else so I could not go there. I was going there when I was giving lectures but I was not going when I did not have. I have never said that I should go to the university to work.

Together with the absence of a sense of belonging, the establishment of academic networks for future projects usually takes place through individual relations or friendships rather than any institutional encouragement for involving them into the academic projects.

The importance of individual relations is reflected in the experience of T3, an academic in Turkey who conducted her doctoral research in Greece. Beyond the academic framework, she utilized her biographical background while visiting historical archives in Kavala. Her family moved to Turkey from Greece during the population exchange of the 1920s. During her Kavala visit, she met the manager of the Kavala Tobacco Museum who was also a descendant from a migrant family. T3 describes the situation between them as one of “sympathy” which comes from having a shared memory. Indeed, apart from the academic background, the biographical background is critical in such an environment where individual efforts define one’s destiny.

WHO ARE YOU?: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE IN THE EYES OF THE INSTITUTIONS

During their academic mobility between Turkey and Greece, the participants experienced both the feeling of being an academic “as an outsider” as well as being “a member of a nation”. This is a process that is also being shaped by the individual’s background in academia, be it by either a senior or junior academic, as well as by the place he/she visits. As understood by the narratives of the interviewees from both sides, they have established their experiences during their academic mobility in the intersection of their academic interests and their national identity. While they all have shared experiences due to this intersection, their position in the academic hierarchy and the local configurations of the places they visited are crucial to understand the differences among them.

G2 is a historian who wrote his doctoral thesis on Turkey. He had been visiting Turkey since the late 1990s and he worked in relevant archives in the summers between 2003 and 2005. At the time, he was also giving lessons on the Greek language and the history of Greece. He explains this situation:

There is no problem if you are giving lectures on Greece to the students in Turkey even if your expertise is on Turkey. You can lecture whatever you want. Your national identity is more important than your scientific expertise. I was also giving a comparative lecture on Greece and Turkey but then, a new professor came as a head

of the department and he decided about everything. He did not tell explicitly but it was obvious. As much as you are expert on Turkey, as a Greek, you cannot give any lecture on Turkish history and you cannot even give any lecture on history. "We are Turks, we give history classes." It was explicitly nationalism.

The junior scholars from Turkey talked about how they observed doubtful views towards them. T2 was a MA student in the field of International Relations, and she emphasized that how the perceptions are different towards Turks even they were a member of an international program; she shared how the academics questioned her aim to learn Greek:

You feel that distance easily. They are doubtful towards you by asking why you are learning Greek, or why you are here. Because Greece is a small country, and they are questioning why it has an importance for an expert of International Relations.

Nevertheless, she explained how the place where she did her academic mobility is also important for the experience by underlying that she was on the outside of the mainstream university tradition of Greece.

I was in the Komotini and the professors were coming from Thessaloniki or Athens according to their expertise biweekly. It provides for a more flexible environment... Indeed, I thought not being in Athens was a negative situation for me, but no, being out of mainstream discourse was better.

While the place of visit matters while shaping the experience, it would not produce the same outcomes every time. T3 explained how she had to manage the local dynamics during her research stays in Kavala and in Crete.

I think the difficult part of the job was to manage the reaction of people and the dynamics of the locals. You don't want to be anti-pathetic to anyone, you don't want to hurt anyone. That's not your purpose for being there, but in a way, you might want to manage them and distance yourself by setting boundaries. At that point being a researcher provides an opportunity. Thanks to your identity as researcher, people behave moderately even their negative reactions.

It shows that beyond the local dynamics, one's academic background is important and shapes the opinions of others. Even though T3 referred to the same feeling about the “doubtfulness”, she explained her experiences differently. Even a slight difference in the academic level impacted attitudes towards the visitors. However, T3 shared an anecdote which reveals how national identity becomes a serious matter in academia:

When I was in Kavala, I was researching in the archive of the Kavala Tobacco Museum. Then the director invited me at a local conference in Kavala to present what I found. Yet, a serious discussion emerged, and they were angry with the museum director because of me. They said that you opened the archive to the Turks before us.

Even though the archival materials were about the records of the Tobacco workers, and not critical to issues of “national security”, T3 and the director of the museum experienced a public outcry. Beyond the experiences of junior academics, the senior ones are more welcomed to the academic environment on both sides. When T1 or G1 explained their narratives, they did not make any reference about doubtful views towards them.

On the one hand, G1 was the first full time academic in a Turkish University as a Greek academic where his cadre was assigned by YÖK (Turkey's Institution of Higher Education). Moreover, he brought to our attention, that he was employed as an expert in International Law and International Relations. Instead of hindering him, his expertise provided opportunity to him and became the founder of a research center with a focus on Turkey and Greece under the umbrella of the university he worked.

On the other hand, T1 was one of the outstanding professors in Turkish academia who had been in the Republic of Cyprus as a visiting professor for three semesters. He also pointed out that he did not face any negative reaction:

In academic life, people are evaluated by what they write, produce, and think. When I was in Cyprus, I was professor. I was respected in there.

While being a senior or junior academic shaped the experience of academic mobility participants together with the impact of local configurations, all underlined the importance of research interests regardless of the aforementioned differences. Even though they focused on various fields of the social sciences - politics, international relations, history, literature, and law - they underlined their challenges as well as the importance of comparative research between Turkey and Greece.

On the one hand, T3 stressed that Greece was the place to be due to her research interest. Both academic interest and shared history between Turkey and Greece lead to the mobility of researchers. On the other hand, all the participants reflect on their experiences and observations on how difficult it is to sustain a common institute, research, or dialogue due to prevailing political sensibilities:

Working on diplomatic relations is different than focusing on cultural studies. Complicated or politically extreme issues may complicate the situation. At that time, you can become two parties of a litigation.

However, academic mobility and experiences from both sides provide an abundance of inputs for the participants. According to shared expertise, G1 and T2 referred to the in-depth understanding they reached on domestic politics and the political culture of both countries. While they spent their times as ‘outsiders’, they deepened their understanding towards the components of the political culture or domestic politics dynamics of the host country. Thus, they acquired an insider’s outlook which is required for academic objectivity and rationalization. G1 further expanded on this, as he and other university colleagues established a Turkey-Greece research center and a related post-graduate program. He stressed that it was the first and only research center which had been created during a time of positive momentum between Turkey and Greece. Yet, this initiative ended both due to the economic crisis in Greece and the emerging political crisis between Turkey and Greece. However, this initiative proved that there is an audience for an institute to establish academic dialogue with a demand from both sides. The most important outcome and transfer of experience is the methodological approach that was adopted by G1:

We were really keen to deconstruct the nationalist narrative. Not from the top-down but from the bottom-up on both sides. We left the students alone for two weeks in the beginning to know themselves. All narratives were deconstructed and then we started the educational process to move beyond them. That was the unique feature of the program. To deconstruct what they had previously learned. Very few people only declined to change their ideas. But many of them changed their ideas without any pressure, only after they got to know each other.

The program aimed to dismantle preconceptions before embarking to build dialogue between participants from both countries. It motivated students to increase mutual understanding and emphatic relations instead of clashing through nation centric discourses about shared historical events. Through the program, the rational and objective perspective were the key building pillars. Also, G1 commented on the experience of those who refused to change their ideas. According to him, even though they were not receptive to changing their preconceptions, they were at least aware of the ideas of those that were.

As the experience of the center for Turkey-Greece relations shows, although academic dialogue is required, it is not capable to solve every problem. However, the outcomes of the program led to a “normalization” of the mentality and brought greater understanding to both sides. Based on the experiences of academics from the two countries, and through their own narratives, this part examined the intersection of national identity and academic expertise. Considering individual differences and various local contexts, it shows the challenges and prospects for an academic dialogue between Turkey and Greece as a key trust building factor. As previously mentioned, academia and diplomacy are interrelated when it comes to relations between Greece and Turkey. While the tendency shows that academic mobility provides an ongoing and long-lasting bridge between Turkey and Greece, it should be seen as an opportunity to deepen and widen the dialogue.

SEEING YOURSELF OR BEING SEEN BY OTHERS AS A MISSIONARY

An examination of the experiences and narratives of the participants of academic mobility provides some answers about how and why they have a place in the discussions of Turkey-Greece relations beyond the academic context. However, one must ask whether the participants consider themselves as key figures in the trust-building between the two states. The answer is two-fold:

- i) It depends on the location of the participants and where they position themselves during their experience, and
- ii) It depends on the views of the environment where they are located.

Many of our interviewees began their academic mobility during the “Turkey-Greece Spring” and stressed that it was a different time than the present. The efforts of senior scholars prove that they aimed to utilize the positive context to deepen bilateral relations while the junior scholars benefitted for the further pursuit of their research in both countries. While the senior scholars furthered the relations within the institutional framework, the junior scholars followed more solitary paths. However, beyond their academic self-identification, they faced different perceptions as well. For instance, T2 explained her own experience while emphasizing the others’ views as:

They looked at us differently, even in the international environment, because you are the one that can be identified as the “other” of the everyone else within that environment. They are looking at you how you are sitting, smiling and what you are doing. They just look. Because of the image of the Turk in their mind. You are faced with that. I even said once, “I am not a representative of something. We are not representing our countries”. But it was not like that. Moreover, they were questioning me as a woman. You always meet and face judgments.

G2 reflects on his position vis-à-vis the university’s hierarchy and his relations with the other academics:

You are more flexible as a foreigner than a local in terms of the relationship between employee and institution. But it is in the practice.

We had the same duty with Turkish citizens but in practice, they were expected to do more work than us. There was more freedom for the foreigners. (...). There is a language issue. They cannot ask from you to do bureaucratic work that a Turkish citizen can do. Second is about trust. I don't say that it is a hidden nationalism, but it is about controlling. Not retaining. As a foreigner, you can flee. They cannot control you as much as a Turkish citizen. It can be also something cultural. "They are not like us". (...) I guess that they think that these strict hierarchical relations are not suitable for foreigners, Europeans, Westerners. But it is my guess.

In terms of his relations with other academics, he adds:

There was a type of relation with other academics, in particular senior academics that was very respectful. If I compare it with their relationship with Turkish, local academics, I could say it was more respectful with extra distance, extra understanding. He or she can give more work to a local or can speak more abruptly, etc. There can be some exceptions, but it is usually personal. There is also a possibility that since he is a foreigner, he should not say something bad about us. (...) They were more comfortable while talking to us. They did not have any competition with us. There was no competition between us. I guess it made our relations more relaxed.

Indeed, the mobility participants aimed to focus on their research, yet the nature of academia and various type of human interactions lead to many of the unplanned direct or indirect outcomes which are introduced above. In terms of direct impact, the participants became members of an international/bilateral academic circle which provides a venue for dialogue between both sides. Beyond their academic interactions, they became public figures who present the ideas, and commentary on television or write newspaper columns. For instance, T2 has a book published in Greek, and she has contributed to both Greek and Turkish academia; she also participates on television news programs as a specialist on Turkey-Greece relations. On the other hand, the impacts of academic mobility can be diverse. Indeed, G1 underlined this issue while talking about the impact of the research center in the University

in terms of helping bring about a change in the mentality of many people. Moreover, long lasting changes in one's mindset – G1 identified the process as “someone who learned the critical outlook would never come back from that understanding” – can enable the spread ideas among those with whom they are interacting. In addition, G1 shared another example by emphasizing the importance of experience-sharing within the mobility.

In a two-three days long event in a University in Istanbul, only a few students came from Greece in its first year. Then the number increased, because when the first students returned home, they shared their observations and experiences in Istanbul.

This is an unexpected, and not costly interaction, that can contribute to developing sustainable relations between Turkey and Greece. By interacting with the “other” paves the way to recreating shared memories, deconstructing the grand ethnocentric narratives, and getting rid of the burdens and luggage of the past while deepening knowledge, mutual understanding, and cooperation between each other. In this sense, G3 says that she has never been confronted with any prejudice from her students. On the contrary, her students felt that it is beneficial that they have a Greek lecturer so they can learn from her. As a response to their positive attitude, G3 was also feeling responsible to introduce Greece to her Turkish students:

I consider all my classes from a holistic point of view. They are about language but I see them as classes on culture. I try to introduce Greece as much as possible with songs, movies, studies on Athens, etc. There are many senior students (students in the Modern Greek Language Department) who have never been in Greece yet. I am their connection with Greece. I perceive my role from this angle as well.

Nevertheless, regarding how one is perceived, G2 underlines how others assign to him the role of representative of his country:

Even if you say that you don't have that kind of mission, just because people see you as a Greek, there is such a thing. I have been going to Turkey for 20 years and you are the only one as a Greek person. For instance, there

is a football game between Turkey and Greece, they can see you as a representative. Even if you do not want it, they can see you as a representative of Greece.

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

First, our interviews show that the individual efforts for participating in academic mobility in both countries are more predominant than the institutional efforts, in particular for the junior researchers. Even though the individual efforts are always crucial for any type of academic engagement, the lack of institutional support brings limitations to the mobility. Also, the diversity of funding mechanisms for the researchers to apply is insufficient. There are several scholarships to support researchers in both country such as those provided by the Onassis Foundation and the American Research Centre; however, they need to be followed through individual efforts rather than institutional encouragement. Therefore, the possibility of a continued and enhanced academic dialogue between the two countries is primarily left to individual initiatives. Nevertheless, more institutionalized scholarships that are designated for specific purposes such as the European Union's Jean Monnet funding schemes prove their value to improve academic mobility. Additionally, our qualitative data showed that while Greek citizens benefit less from scholarships during their research period in Turkey, they have opportunities chance to find academic jobs while in Turkey whereas the possibility of finding an academic position in Greece for junior researchers from Turkey is rather limited.

Secondly, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece have a significant impact on the researchers' motivation in terms of the start or the continuation of their research or work in the other's country. At this point, it should be also highlighted that for those who choose to stay in their country of mobility, the feeling of insecurity leads to further self-censorship in their selection of research topics or to their freedom of expression. The restrictions over academic freedom (either auto-censored or institutional) carry the risk a reduced number of academic publications as an outcome of the academic mobility. Therefore, core values such as safeguarding academic freedom and

respect for the freedom of expression emerge as essential challenges for both countries.

Taking into consideration the lack of institutional encouragement and the impact of the political atmosphere, our third recommendation concerns the establishment of a model for an institution, or a center designated for academic mobility in various disciplines between Turkey and Greece. Within the framework of this model, a committee designated to support certain number of researchers at different levels of their academic development from different disciplines could be established. Nonetheless, it is crucial for this committee to be politically independent and to prioritize academic objectivity. Additionally, this committee should have recognition and credibility in both countries.

Finally, to increase efficiency and derive outcomes from the academic mobility, institutionalized networks should be improved. Early-stage researchers, in particular, do not usually take part in already existing projects or academic networks in these institutions but try instead to establish their networks through personal and professional relationships established during their mobility. However, bringing together the expertise of young academics from both countries across different disciplines for knowledge production and enhancement is also beneficial for the institutions where researchers are undergoing their academic mobility.

REFERENCES

- Bilecen, Basak and Thomas Faist. 2015. 'International Doctoral Students as Knowledge Brokers: Reciprocity, Trust and Solidarity in Transnational Networks.' *Global Networks* 15 (2).
- Chepureenko, Alexander. 2015. 'The Role of foreign scientific foundations' role in the cross-border mobility of Russian academics.' *International Journal of Manpower* 36(4): pp. 562-584.
- Onis, Ziya and Suhnaz Yilmaz. 2008. 'Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?' *Political Science Quarterly* 123(1).
- Teichler, Ulrich. 2015. 'Academic Mobility and Migration: What We Know and What We Do Not Know.' *European Review* 23 (S1): S6-S37.
- Milliyet. 2003. 'Ege'de TürYunan Baharı.' 10 Accessed June 9, 2021. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/egede-turk-yunan-bahari-320678>.

APPENDIX

Table A: Profile of the interviewees

	Current Job	Academic Mobility
G1	He is a Professor and working in a research Institute	Full-time _Professor in Turkey
T1	He is a Professor in a private university in Turkey	Visiting Professor, University of Cyprus
G2	He is a Lecturer in Germany	Research visits during his Doctoral studies After acquiring his PhD, he became a full time lecturer in a state university in Turkey
T2	She is an Associate Professor in a state university in Turkey	MA student & Doctoral Researcher in Greece
G3	She is a PhD candidate in a state university and a Lecturer in another state university in Turkey	Doctoral Researcher and Lecturer in Turkey
T3	She is an Assistant Professor in a private university in Turkey	Doctoral Researcher in Greece

Audi Alteram Partem:

Enhancing Trust-Building in Greek-Turkish Relations through Youth Empowerment

Abdullah Arslan, Erman Ermihan, and Kleopatra Moditsi

Abstract

Greek-Turkish relations have been experiencing yet another turbulent and challenging time. Driven mainly by the regional conflicts and historical representations of the “other”, the publics of both sides are also negatively affected by the ongoing tense relationship. However, not much attention has been given to the role of youth in enhancing trust in Greek-Turkish relations. This paper proposes that by increasing the role of youth in bilateral relations, both countries will have more common ground to cooperate and negotiate instead of competing with each other. To understand why youth can play such a role in improving bilateral relations, we first aim at determining what youth think about Greek-Turkish relations in general. Secondly, we will focus on the factors that can contribute to better relations among youth. In this study, to consolidate our aims, a survey was distributed to all the participants of the annual Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS). GTYLS participants’ perceptions of Greek-Turkish relations were meant to provide an overview from the perspective of youth. Additionally, based on the survey results, the impact of the Symposium on the participants’ perceptions of communities is observed on three themes: Trust, Empathy, and Future contact intention to understand the influence of the GTYLS on participants. With regard to the analysis and guided by the survey results, this study provides a number of requisite policy recommendations.

Keywords: Greece, Turkey, Trust, Youth, GTYLS

INTRODUCTION¹

“Audi alteram partem”, which means “listen to the other side”, is lacking in today’s political atmosphere. Especially in the context of Greek-Turkish relations, several issues contribute to the lack of dialogue. As the substantial literature suggests, geopolitical competition, the image of “other”, populism, and identity structures are driving bilateral relations to a downward spiral which is detrimental to the population of both countries. However, not much attention has been given to the root causes of the misperceptions of the “other” among Greek and Turkish youth. Inspired by Cuhadar, Genc, and Kotelis’ research titled “A Greek–Turkish peace project: assessing the effectiveness of interactive conflict resolution” (2015) and interested in understanding the youth’s role in the Greek-Turkish conflict and its potential resolution, we propose research focusing on youth perceptions. We will focus on youth dialogue because, as the literature suggests, dialogue between peers is a significant element of youth empowerment to build a sustainable relationship for peace between communities (Ungerleider 2012) since it increases the active participation of youth. By enhancing the role of the youth in the two countries, we believe that the cyclical and harmful bilateral context of Greek-Turkish relations would eventually evolve into cooperation and solidarity among the two communities.

In this chapter, we will first lay out the main discussions in the literature, which focuses on Greek-Turkish relations, youth empowerment, and trust-building. Then, we will outline our methodology of survey research and its possible limitations. The following section will then analyze the ways in which youth empowerment can play a role in maintaining better relations between the Greek and Turkish communities, guided by the survey results. Finally, several policy recommendations will be provided along with a discussion section at the end.

1 We would like to extend our sincere gratitude to all the participants from GTYLS for our survey. Also, we would like to thank Prof. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou and Dr. Emrah Karaoğuz from Kadir Has University and Dr. Cihan Dizdaroğlu from Başkent University for their valuable feedback.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature that guides our research is threefold: Greek-Turkish relations, youth empowerment, and trust-building. To start with Greek-Turkish relations, a recent priority of the literature that dominates the fields of Political Science and International Relations is the issue of populism. As is the case elsewhere, populism also affects Greek-Turkish relations. Grigoriadis (2020) observes populism in the Greek-Turkish relations context along the left and right wings of the political spectrum and suggests that it erodes state institutions, liberal democracies, and interstate relations. A recent survey led by the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Dianeosis research institute and conducted by MRB and KONDA reveals such an erosion based on populism in bilateral relations. In the survey, the escalating tensions between the two countries resulted in 70.2% of the Greek and 41.9% of the Turkish participants believing that a military incident between the two countries is possible (Nedos 2021).

Moreover, the role of institutional actors, such as the European Union (EU), is also being observed in the literature on Greece-Turkey relations. Although the EU had a positive impact on Greek-Turkish relations after 1999, the ideational framing of the European Neighborhood Policy consolidated the EU's borders and could not appeal to non-EU members and non-Europeans, such as Turkey (Rumelili 2007). Furthermore, the NATO membership of both countries since 1952 has provided ground for cooperation and peace, although their relations were strained on multiple occasions. The United States' presence and intervention arguably prevented more escalations (Binder 2012).

Secondly, the literature on youth empowerment is also another significant area developing over the past decade. A seminal work by Jennings et al. (2006) creates an alternative model to youth empowerment by focusing on a safe environment, participation, engagement, and power-sharing. Based on these elements, the "YES!" project was designed by Wilson et al. (2008) to increase social action among elementary and middle school children. An under-represented part in the youth empowerment literature is the role of youth in inter-state conflicts and peacebuilding, although there is evidence that it may play

a key role. For instance, in the Cyprus issue, which causes multiple tensions for Greek-Turkish relations, the role of youth is also key in shaping intercommunal relations. However, as Dizdaroğlu (2020) suggests, more than half of the young Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots believe that there will never be a solution to the Cyprus issue, which prevents the chances for resolution.

Finally, the literature on trust-building is also necessary for our research, particularly because of its significant societal and international roles. Here, a seminal piece of research by Kelman (2005) suggests that in the cases of protracted conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “interactive problem solving” is a substantial method that can help towards conflict resolution. Eventually, trust-building measures are maintained and developed. This could be applied to Greek-Turkish relations, as they would develop solutions with more youth participation and inclusion. According to research conducted in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, there is evidence supporting that high-quality contact experiences between communities increase the intention for future contact, meaning that trust-building can influence future behavior (McKeown & Psaltis, 2017). Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) showed that intergroup contacts have a negative relationship with prejudice. In other words, when contact between groups in conflicts increases, the level of prejudice decreases. In that sense, intergroup contact allows for building trust between groups (Tam et al., 2009). An event such as the Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS) represents an opportunity for trust building among youth from Greece and Turkey because it creates an environment conducive to high-quality contact and incentivizes participants to change their future behavior through the promotion of collaborative initiatives after the completion of the Symposium.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The Greek Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS) is a forum between young Greeks and Turks aiming to establish dialogue and networking between both communities.² In 2021, the GTYLS held its seventh annual event as an online event for the second year in a row due to the Covid19 pan-

² Further information on GTYLS can be reached through <https://greekturkishrelations.org/>.

demic. The GTYLS represents a good example of youth empowerment, trust, and empathy-building because it offers thematic sessions as well as workshops. Symposium participants are empowered through the knowledge they gain about the subject matter and the opportunities they have to collaborate with people from the “other” side, thus creating collaborative relations and challenging the prevalent narrative of the “other” as an opponent. By the end of the event, participants form mixed groups, i.e., from both communities, and are required to create project ideas that are doable and address issues of relevance to Greek-Turkish relations. Collaboration towards a common goal increases cross-cultural communication, empathy, and trust-building among Greeks and Turks. For this reason, GTYLS participants offer a solid sample for measuring empathy, trust, and future contact intentions between the Greek and Turkish communities.

The authors used an online survey to measure the change in GTYLS participants’ perspectives and potential future behavior. Survey questions measured the three aforementioned concepts: trust, empathy, future contact intentions. Besides demographic questions, participants are also asked questions regarding Greek-Turkish relations. The survey was organized in nine sections and distributed to all GTYLS participants (that took part in the first six editions of the Symposium) through the Symposium’s participant mailing list. The mailing listing was provided by the organizers of the symposium with their permission. The survey was distributed to all the GTYLS participants individually via email. Out of all the participants, 68 people attempted to fill the survey, and 58 people completed it. The survey was prepared on the Survey Monkey platform and took about 10 minutes to complete. The survey questions can be viewed in the link below.³

The survey conducted also had several limitations for observing the three aforementioned concepts. First, due to the Covid-19 travel restrictions, only one (2020) out of six Symposiums was conducted online, making the prior five symposiums face-to-face events (2015-2019). We assume that the participants (10) who only attended the online symposium might show qualita-

³ Survey is available at <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TvjkISugXb3-ArF5mFRfhJofnwym-PfQw9wjq-8dmH4/edit?usp=sharing>.

tively different results than face-to-face participants. Moreover, there are also participants who attended multiple symposiums, both face-to-face and online (4). Thus, this might create different results, which might have an impact on the scales that were used.

Finally, this study is designed as two-fold: first, the survey with the GTYLS participants; and second, semi-structured in-depth interviews. Following this study, the survey results will be triangulated with semi-structured interviews that offer more content and detailed answers from the participants, something which is not possible with the survey methodology (Adams 2015).

YOUTH IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS: THE GREEK-TURKISH YOUNG LEADERS SYMPOSIUM

To start with the demographics of the survey participants, it is observed that the majority of the participants (44.83%) are between 31 and 35 years old. Moreover, the GTYLS participants are evenly split in terms of their nationality (Greek or Turkish) and gender (50%). In addition, most of the survey participants have master's degrees (56.90%). For the questions regarding the GTYLS, most participants reported having participated in the online symposium in December 2020 (24.14%), followed by the one held in Kavala in 2019. Because the 2020 symposium was the only one held online, most respondents attended the symposium in person (75.86%). An overwhelming majority of the participants stated that they only participated once in the symposium (93.10%). Participants either heard about the symposium through someone (46.55%) or via social media (41.38%). Participants also recommended the symposium to 6 or more people in their social circles (29.31%).

ANALYSIS: ROOT CAUSES OF NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER

When asked about Greek-Turkish relations where participants could choose multiple options, 82.76% of the participants answered that they are neighbors, and 68.97% said they are in geopolitical competition. 39.66% think that there is much conflict in the relationship. Accordingly, 75.86% think that

bilateral relations are bad. As to the causes of bilateral conflicts, participants suggest that the Cyprus issue and geopolitical competition lead to conflict. On the other hand, participants were asked the first three words that come to their minds regarding Greek-Turkish relations. As Figure 1 shows, participants mentioned both negative words as well as positive connotations such as “peace”, “neighboring”, “similarities”, or “friendship”. Thus, it can be highlighted that they are aware that Greek-Turkish relations are like a coin with two different sides. While there is the presence of differences on certain political issues/interests, there is also a side consisting of good neighborly relations.

Moreover, to triangulate the close-ended questions, participants were asked to answer open-ended questions about the root causes of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations. As seen in Figure 2, mostly “history” and “historical competition” or “historical disputes” were pointed out by the participants. In other words, it can be argued that a motivated group of young Greeks and Turks interested in bilateral relations think this is not only an issue of daily politics but that there are unresolved problems with a long historical background. Indeed, historical narratives have been fueling mutual mistrust, prejudice in the negative perceptions towards each other (Heraclides 2011). Additionally, like the closed-ended answers, some participants mentioned geopolitical rivalry as one of the root causes for unstable relations in the open-ended questions.

Besides the aforementioned points, participants also underline the fact that “populism/populist discourses” or “politicians/politics” have an impact. For instance, one participant said that “politicians from both sides use the problem [Greek-Turkish relations] to manipulate their voters” while another suggested that the “interests of both sides and both governments use this [Greek-Turkish relations] as a distraction from domestic issues”. These arguments match with the answer to the question of “How do you evaluate your government’s policy towards Greece or Turkey.” Most of the respondents (39.66%) stated that they find their governments neither successful nor unsuccessful towards Greece or Turkey. 20.69% stated their government’s policy is very unsuccessful, 24.14% stated that it is unsuccessful, while only 15.52% suggested that it is successful. No one replied that it is very successful.

When asked about potential solutions to ease Greek-Turkish relations, most respondents referred to political dialogue (79.66%), civil society cooperation (71.19%), economic cooperation (61.02%), and youth empowerment (57.63%). The prevalence of political dialogue as the most popular answer to this question is in concurrence with a general trend observed in this section of the survey: political leadership in both countries plays a significant role in Greek-Turkish relations. Although the GTYLS cannot directly influence government policies, it contributes significantly to civil society cooperation and youth empowerment, which are also highly popular choices among survey participants.

ANALYSIS: FACTORS THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER RELATIONS AMONG YOUTH

Trust, Future Contact Intention, and Empathy

As mentioned in the literature review, this study builds its argument on building trust, empathy, and future contact intention among youth. The GTYLS is a rare example of an event that allows young Greek and Turks to come together for networking purposes. In that regard, we try to evaluate how such an event can impact the participants on three levels: *future contact intention*, *trust*, and *empathy* which are components of interactive problem-solving in conflicts and trust-building among youth.

To measure *future contact intention*, this study utilized the scale previously used by Mckeown and Psaltis (2017). The scale has three questions, such as “I would like to know more about the other community” on a 5 points Likert scale. In this scale, higher scores show more intention, while lower scores show less.

To measure *trust*, the Intergroup Trust scale previously used by Tam et al. (2009) was utilized. As in the case of the *future contact intention* scale, higher scores show more while lower scores show less. The questionnaire consists of 4 questions, such as “I trust ordinary people of the other community when they say they want peace”.

Additionally, the empathy levels of respondents were compared before and after. To measure it, this study adapted the *empathy* scale from Malhotra and Liyanage (2005). The questionnaire has five questions, such as “I would get very angry if I saw a Greek/Turkish person being ill-treated” on a 7-point Likert scale. In this case, lower scores indicate a higher empathy level, while higher scores indicate less.

All the scales were provided two times in the survey. First, respondents were asked to fill the questionnaire according to their feelings before taking part in the GTYLS. The second time, they were asked to fill the questionnaire according to their feelings after taking part in the GTYLS.

Statistical analysis was run through the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software. Initially, the results were checked to see whether they meet the normality requirements and were normally distributed. The test results can be seen in Table 1. We believe that since GTYLS participants already possess high-level trust, contact intention, empathy scores accumulated in higher levels, normality tests failed. As a result of this, we decided to do nonparametric analysis on scales and conduct a Wilcoxon Signed-rank test suitable for non-normal distributed data to compare before and after results (Blair and Higgins 1980).

Table 1 and Table 2 shows that for all grounds, when means are compared, there is an increase in a positive manner. Additionally, Table 2 shows Wilcoxon test results and indicates Future Contact Intention–After was statistically significantly higher than Future Contact Intention–Before $Z = -2.318$, $p = .020 < 0.05$. In others, it can be argued that after the Symposium, participants started to have more future contact intentions towards their neighbors. To illustrate, our survey questions whether participants recommended the GTYLS to their peers can be given as an example. Participants recommended the symposium to their social spheres by 6+ people (29.31%), while more than 50% of them recommended it to at least two of their peers. This table also indicates that Empathy-After scores were statistically lower than Empathy-Before scores $Z = -3.355$, $p = .001 < 0.05$. Since for the Empathy scale, lower scores indicate a higher level of empathy, we can argue that participants’ left the event with more empathy towards the other community. Lastly, when

trust scores are compared, even though according to the means of Trust-Before and Trust-After scores, there is an increase in trust, Wilcoxon test results indicate no statistically significant difference: $Z = -1.349$, $p = .177 > 0.05$. We interpreted that improving trust within a three-day event is harder than improving empathy and future contact intention. Although it requires more time and contact, enhanced empathy and contact intention are important foundations that can be a strong base to build trust. Christie (2006) argued that intergroup contacts would enhance the trust-building process and cooperative relations among groups. Enhancement of empathy towards each other can pave the way to collaborate more while diminishing the negative perceptions that cause mistrust (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). Therefore, we underline that youth involvement in networking events can be a significant tool in reconciling Greek-Turkish relations since it might generate actively engaged and dynamic youth collaboration.

Findings and Policy Recommendations

Focusing on youth empowerment has long-term benefits for interstate cooperation and dialogue. Thinking of the youth as potential policy entrepreneurs, they could and should be part of conflict resolution mechanisms between states, such as Greece and Turkey. For this reason, this study focused on youth empowerment in developing the relations between two countries, using the Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS) as the event that has prompted youth empowerment. As the descriptive analysis of the survey and the statistical analysis on *trust*, *empathy*, *future contact intention* showed, the GTYLS participants are aware of the existing problems which need to be addressed for reconciliation. Furthermore, even though they already were strongly motivated, the GTYLS positively influenced them on the three aforementioned themes, leading to more cooperation and dialogue among youth.

We believe that this study can be an example for further studies as well. Due to time limitations, we cannot compare the results with a control group. For larger studies, control groups can be included to bring more generalizable results and comparisons among youth. We believe that such a study would help create a great roadmap to empower the youth in greater involvement in bilateral relations.

Considering our study, the following policy recommendations aim to improve the efficiency of youth involvement in developing Greek-Turkish relations:

- 1) As *future contact intention* analysis shows, participants to the GTYLS have high intentions to engage in a dialogue with their neighbors. Therefore, a youth platform that ensures contact between Greeks and Turkish youth can be established. Through this platform, young people can initiate further projects, ideas, and the like. In other words, youth-led initiatives should be encouraged and embraced to be actively involved in bilateral relations.
- 2) As GTYLS participants pointed out in the survey, the youth consider historical narratives a root cause of unstable relations between Greece and Turkey. Hence, symposiums or events like the GTYLS can add sessions focusing on tackling historical narratives to their curriculums.
- 3) According to the survey results, GTYLS participants suggest civil society cooperation as a policy area that could improve bilateral relations. Thus, dialogue between civil society actors from Greece and Turkey should be increased to develop sustainable cooperation. Civil society dialogue can focus on either encouraging political dialogue or creating cross-border synergies on other issues such as the economy, the environment, culture, and the like.
- 4) Youth mobility between Greece and Turkey should be supported. As previous experiences and our survey results show, interaction among youth helps create favorable relations between peers. Mobility opportunities would contribute to dealing with negative perceptions.
- 5) The Cyprus issue is one of the reasons that makes Greek-Turkish relations more sensitive. Similarly to what the literature demonstrates, according to our survey results, the youth also consider Cyprus as one of the root causes of complex relations between Greece and Turkey. Thus, another platform can be established to allow young Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots to engage in dialogue.

REFERENCES

- Adams, W.C. 2015. Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews. In Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (eds K.E. Newcomer, H.P. Hatry and J.S. Wholey). <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781119171386.ch19>.
- Binder, David. 2012. "Greece, Turkey, and NATO." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 23(2): 95-106.
- Blair, R. Clifford, and James J. Higgins. 1980. "A Comparison of the Power of Wilcoxon's Rank-Sum Statistic to That of Students' Statistic Under Various Nonnormal Distributions." *Journal of Educational Statistics* 5, no. 4 (December): 309–35. <https://doi.org/10.3102/10769986005004309>.
- Christie, Daniel J. 2006. "What is peace psychology of psychology?" *Journal of Social Issues*. 62(1): 1-17. <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2006.00436.x>.
- Çuhadar, Esra, Orkun Genco Genç, and Andreas Kotelis. 2015. "A Greek–Turkish peace project: assessing the effectiveness of interactive conflict resolution." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 15(4): 563-583.
- Dizdaroğlu, Cihan. 2020. "Kıbrıs'ta Barışa Yönelik Beklentiler: KKTC'deki Seçimlerin Etkisi." *ISTANPOL Politika Raporu*, 16: 1-18.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. 2020. "For the People, Against the Elites: Left versus Right-Wing Populism in Greece and Turkey." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 11(1): 51-64.
- Heraclides, Alexis. 2011. "The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity." *GreeSE-Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*. 51. <https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45693/1/GreeSE%20No51.pdf>.
- Jennings, Louise B., Deborah M. Parra-Medina, Deanne K. Hilfinger-Messias, and Kerry McLoughlin. 2006. "Toward a critical social theory of youth empowerment." *Journal of Community Practice*, 14(1-2): 31-55.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 2005. "Building trust among enemies: The central challenge for international conflict resolution." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 29: 639-650.
- Malhotra, Deepak, and Sumanasiri Liyanage. 2005. "Long-term effects of peace workshops in protracted conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(6): 908-924.
- McKeown, Shelley, and Charis Psaltis. 2017. "Intergroup contact and the mediating role of intergroup trust on outgroup evaluation and future contact intentions in Cyprus and Northern Ireland." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 23(4): 1-13.

- Nedos, Vassilis. 2021. "Survey charts opinions of Greeks, Turks on politics, bilateral relations." *Ekathimerini*. Accessed May 19, 2021. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1161135/survey-charts-opinions-of-greeks-turks-on-politics-relations/>
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Tropp, Linda R. 2000. "Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice: Recent meta-analytic findings" In *The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology* "Reducing prejudice and discrimination" edited by S. Oskamp, 93–114. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Rumelili, Bahar. 2007. "Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(1): 105-126.
- Tam, Tania, Hewstone, Miles, Kentworthy, Jared, and Cairns, Ed. 2009. "Intergroup Trust in Northern Ireland." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 35(1): 45-59. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0146167208325004>.
- Ungerleider, John. 2012. "Structured Youth Dialogue to Empower Peacebuilding and Leadership." *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 29(4): 381-402. DOI: 10.1002/crq.21046.

APPENDICES



Figure 1: Word Cloud Q11. What are the first three words that come to your mind about Greek-Turkish relations?



Figure 2: Word Cloud Q17. What are the root causes of unstable relations between Greece and Turkey?

Table 1: Descriptive Normality Test Results

Variables		Statistic	Std.Error
EmpathyBefore	Mean	11.9310	.72166
	Std.Deviation	5.49597	
	Skewness	1.695	.314
	Kurtosis	3.933	.618
EmpathyAfter	Mean	10.4483	.70868
	Std.Deviation	5.39712	
	Skewness	1.676	.314
	Kurtosis	3.301	.618
FutureBefore	Mean	13.0000	.26831
	Std.Deviation	2.04339	
	Skewness	-.626	.314
	Kurtosis	-.631	.618
FutureAfter	Mean	13.6034	.26831
	Std.Deviation	2.04339	
	Skewness	-.626	.314
	Kurtosis	-.631	.618
TrustBefore	Mean	14.8621	.34996
	Std.Deviation	2.665523	
	Skewness	-.319	.618
	Kurtosis	1.270	.618
TrustAfter	Mean	15.2069	.38871
	Std.Deviation	2.96031	
	Skewness	-.877	.314
	Kurtosis	1.576	.618

Table 2: Wilcoxon Test Results

		N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks	Z	P
FutureAfter - FutureBefore	Negative Ranks	6 ^a	12.83	77.00	-2.318	.020
	Positive Ranks	19 ^b	13.05	248.00		
	Ties	33 ^c				
	Total	58				
EmpathyAfter - EmpathyBefore	Negative Ranks	35 ^d	21.41	749.50	-3.355	.001
	Positive Ranks	8 ^e	24.56	196.50		
	Ties	15 ^f				
	Total	58				
TrustAfter - TrustBefore	Negative Ranks	15 ^g	20.70	310.50	-1.349	.177
	Positive Ranks	25 ^h	20.38	509.50		
	Ties	18 ⁱ				
	Total	58				

a. FutureAfter < FutureBefore, b. FutureAfter > FutureBefore, c. FutureAfter = FutureBefore,

d. EmpathyAfter < EmpathyBefore, e. EmpathyAfter > EmpathyBefore, f. EmpathyAfter = EmpathyBefore

g. TrustAfter < TrustBefore, h. TrustAfter > TrustBefore, i. TrustAfter = TrustBefore

Pairs Through Borders: Aegean

Deniz Halman Tomaka and Eirini Aikaterini Barianaki

Abstract

Turkey and Greece, two Eastern Mediterranean countries, have had an official partnership for decades because of their geographical proximity by sharing the Aegean Sea in terms of their economy and cultural history. The area analyzed in this study is the Aegean Sea comprising the Greek Aegean islands and the Aegean coastal area (Anadolu/Asia Minor/Μικρά Ασία) currently belonging to Turkey. This paper investigates the economic, social, and cultural flows generated on the Aegean land-sea interface between Greece and Turkey contributing to local economic development, without focusing on the geopolitical aspects of international relations between the two countries. The paper also addresses the recognition of the economic and cultural interaction between Greeks and Turks that can be a starting point for the inclusion of socio-cultural values in cross-border Maritime Spatial Planning and exploring the aspects and potential of economic cooperation between the two areas. This aspect also includes synergies by locals/visitors and policymakers, allowing a place-based approach to planning and developing the area. The proposed action plans provided by the study can foster cooperation at local level.

Keywords: Local development, social flows, transboundary governance, bilateral economics, DIVE methodology, economic sustainability, interregional cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The Aegean Sea is a typical archipelago of continental islands, with around 7500 islands and islet at various topographic features and geographical levels (Sfenthourakis and Triantis 2017). The Aegean stands in the center of the conjunction of two continents, namely Europe and Asia, in the Mediterranean Sea situated between the Greek peninsula in the west and Asia Minor in the east between the main lands of Greece and Turkey (Maniopoulou 2017). Apart from the geographical characteristics of the Aegean Sea, there is also a strong connection between Greeks and Turks who live beyond a bipolar ideological orientation between west and east and a border landscape ridden with socio-economic challenges and geopolitical threats (Terkenli 2001).

Seas and coastlines interconnect states as a natural frontier that builds marine governance, specifically, the formulation and implementation of marine spatial planning (MSP) which is transboundary by nature. Due to the borders of the marine ecosystems and the many maritime activities' dynamics (such as, for example, navigation), political and administrative borders are not limited and regulated. Although the MSP processes are focused at sub-national and national levels, tension based on institutionalization arises between the limits of the marine ecosystem and its activities (van Tatenhove 2017). This perspective broadens from the theoretical framework based on local-state or nation-state relationships analysis through central conceptualization, in regard to the concepts of transnational networks and flows of people, capital, information, images, goods, and materials (i.e. Linde et al. 2017).

The primary purpose of MSP is to reduce negative aspects, and consequences caused by human activities in the sea and MSP is understood as the planning activities within the scope of the management and protection of the sea ecosystem. The process should be focused on active participation, layering all stages of spatial planning (Ehler and Douvere 2009). In this sense, the active work and involvement of MSP in recent years show that their management gains importance in the context of land-sea interactions (Kyvelou and Ierapetritis 2019).

This case of land-sea interactions is a part of what Castells (2006) refers to as the result of globalization and the rise of the “network society.” The

concept of the network society is based on the increasing validity of digital information and communication technologies, which determines society's social structures and activities and differs from previous network concepts. Even if the land-sea connections' flows are becoming increasingly essential daily through globalization (Castells 2006), the flows create "a timeless, boundless, and transnational space" within themselves. They have inter-flow mobility and are a complementary element of continuous, limited activity within "space of places." "Network societies" are constituted by the interaction between the network (the net) and the power of identity (the self). There are "space of flows" (dominant functions) – "space of places" (subordinate functions and people, disconnected), as well as "programmers and switchers" who can both constitute and program networks connect networks by sharing common aims and combining resources. Hence, the network of the marine governance in the seas and the coastlines, occurs (similarly in what Castells points out through the types of networks) at the intersection of the networks of global tourism, dredging and financial networks; and local social, economic, and civil society networks.

The increasing volume of trade also has a justification for the space of flows. The Turkish Statistical Institute's official data shows that in 1997, the volume of the bilateral trade was 729.017 in US dollars. Although by 2015, this number had increased to 2.993,069 dollars (Yazgan 2016). Officially signed agreements between the two countries since 2000 have also affected these trade dynamics. IMF data shows that Greece's biggest trade partner in 2014 was Turkey, amounting to 4,294.09 million dollars (Yazgan 2016). There is also a significant increase in bilateral tourism (ibid). For example, the number of citizens who visited Greece from Turkey was 170,019 in 2003. This number increased to 898,919 in 2015. Similarly, tourists from Greece to Turkey have almost risen by four times in 6 years, from 218,092 in 2010, to 755,414 in 2015 (Yazgan 2016).

Additionally, increasing dual mobility is an integral part of everyday life, especially during the summer months, between the Greek islands and the Turkish coastal cities. Specifically, the connections between the island of Symi and Datça are an empiric example of the situation. In fact, the two

authors share common Symi and Datça experiences which have contributed to the research of this paper. Due to their formed personal relations, they have observed many non-formal affinities beyond state-based agreements and relationships. This observation, from an anthropocentric perspective, demonstrates that there is also evidence from both sides that there are unstoppable flows of social and economic interaction.

Therefore, based on the socio-economic and geographical archipelago of the Aegean as well as the flows rising from the increasing political and social relations, this paper focuses on the networking flows and mobility between the Greek Aegean islands and the Turkish Aegean coastal areas (Μικρά Ασία/Asia Minor/*Anadolu*). The intention is to examine the governance in transboundary policy at the local level under the region's decision-making processes and stakeholder engagement, including “the pairs through borders” that are identified, because, between the two countries, there exist multiple networking flows that are defined by economic, spatial, and socio-economic connections. Thus, the primary significance of this study is to analyze and offer recommendations to the intertwined regions regarding their tourism-oriented relations and the legal basis and governance by answering the following research/policy questions: (1) What are the key- characteristics of the regions; (2) How can one “exceed” the borders by considering the increasing social flows and mobility between the pairs across the Aegean?

Thus, the study discusses the potential of the pairs across border and aims to fill the gap and neglect the research to improve the local policy-making processes as defined in this paper's areas of focus; i.e., marine governance and maritime spatial planning (MSP). Hence, this paper does not look at on the geopolitical aspects of the Greek-Turkish bilateral relationship, although it provides an analysis of the socio-economic flows as a “biotic” pattern in the shared Aegean Sea.

This paper consists of three main foci. First, it identifies the three “pairs through borders” (Symi-Datça, Rhodes-Marmaris, and Kastellorizo-Kaş) in the Aegean by analyzing historical, social, cultural, and landscape characteristics. Secondly, it provides a limited literature review elaborated by providing information, taking into account the DIVE methodology to discuss/ analyze

the results. Thirdly, the paper offers an “Action Plan” and recommendations on the local and transboundary development of the examined “pairs.”

CHARACTERISTIC OF THREE “PAIRS THROUGH BORDERS”

The geographical area addressed in this paper is the Aegean archipelago, and the study focuses on six interlinked areas. It analyzes the policies at the local administration level. In the case of Greece, the current administrative division of the country is formed by the “Cleisthenes I Program” and validated in the Government Gazette in 2019.¹ According to this new law, the country is divided into seven decentralized administrations, thirteen regions, and 332 municipalities. The regions and the municipalities are self-governing legal entities; their authorities are elected by universal suffrage by the registered citizens and, in turn, are divided into 74 Regional units. The study focus area on behalf of Greece are three Dodecanese Island municipalities (Rhodes, Symi, and Kastellorizo) which belong to the Rhodes and Kos Regional Units of the South Aegean, one of the thirteen administrative districts of Greece (NUTS 2 level).²

On the other hand, Turkey’s local government system is composed of municipalities, provincial administrations, and villages. Metropolitan municipalities are determined by focusing on the quantitative data of the population. (İzci et al. 2013). According to the Union of Municipalities of Turkey, the country consists of 30 metropolitan municipalities (0,2%), 51 provincial municipalities (4%), 519 Metropolitan District Municipalities (37%), 400 District Municipalities (29%), and 397 town municipalities (28%).³ Datça, Marmaris, and Kaş are governed by the metropolitan district municipality, although they are linked to the metropolitan municipalities of Muğla and Antalya.

The paper claims the “pairs through borders” due to the strong connections and networking flows between the Greek islands and the Minor Asia coastline towns that are analyzed and confirmed by historical evidence. In 700 BC, the Dorian Hexapolis (Greek: *Δωρική Ἑξάπολις* or *Δωριέων Ἑξάπολις*) was found-


1 Law number: 4555/2018 - ΦΕΚ 133/Α/19-7-2018

2 IONIAN SEA: “Everlasting Experience” Algean Property, Accessed April 28, 2021

3 <https://www.tbb.gov.tr/belediyelerimiz/istatistikler/genel-istatistikler/>, Accessed April 28, 2021.

ed by the Rhodian authority in six cities. The two coastal cities were the, Cnidus, and Halicarnassu on the east, the island city of Cos. The other three cities were the Ialysos, the Kamiros, and the Lindos in the island of Rhodes (Vassilia and Petsa-Tzounakou 1996). Today, these strong economic connections and networking flows still exist, especially in the geographical areas that are very close to each other. (Villing and Mommsen 2017). The paper thus assesses three pairs of six cities. Each consists of two territories (a Greek island and a Turkish Aegean coastal area). It highlights a conceptual approach for identifying and hierarchizing the characteristics of the “Aegean identity” among the “pairs.”

In defining and analyzing the pairs, we made use of the DIVE analysis concept (Tengberg 2012) to highlight the relevant identifications. The DIVE-analysis is composed of four steps: *Describe*, *Interpret*, *Valuate*, and *Enable*, that address some of the issues identified when viewing historical and cultural areas as qualitative and functional resources⁴. The DIVE methodology proposes a time/scale matrix used to organize collected data and analyze the way that societal changes affect the structures of the landscapes and/or the territories. Photographs, historical or contemporary maps, historical records, and quantitative inventories were systemized and analyzed within the matrix (see map 1 for the pairs).



Map 1: “Pairs through borders.”

4 Sustainable Historic Towns: A Handbook about DIVE - Urban Heritage Analysis, 2009

1. Symi-Datça

Symi is a part of the twelve islands of the Dodecanese (Δωδεκάνησα) located in the region where the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea meet in Greece. The island population consists of 2,500 residents, mainly involved in fishing, trade, and tourism. (Sfenthourakis 2017) The Datça peninsula is located on the southwest corner of Asia Minor, between Bodrum and Marmaris. The narrow part of the area widens into the Aegean between Kos and Rhodes, at a distance of 8 kilometers from the island of Symi (Artan 2009). According to the ethnic-archeological findings, the ancient commercial port city Cnidus (Wilker 2019) dates back to 350BC (Havelock 2007) is located on the Datça peninsula. Datça Municipality is a local administration, which is a part of the city of Muğla. Datça's population was 23,711 in 2020, a 5.84% increase compared to 2019.⁵ Datça is classified as a “tourism center”⁶ (GEKA 2014).

Besides their geographic proximity, Datça and Symi maintain their international relations through an administrative partnership they established at the local level. Every year, Datça Municipality organizes an event called “Swim for Peace,” where volunteer swimmers swim to the island of Symi.⁷ The Mayor of Symi also produces Turkish content in the promotional films made in support of the revitalization of the region's tourism. According to Mayor Lefteris Papakalodukas, in an interview in 2017, for Symi, Datça is “one of the sister/brother cities” and that tourism and trade fair held in Istanbul in 2013, Symi and Datça joint stand. Furthermore, he noted that during the summer, the locals visit each other for shopping on weekends.⁸

5 <https://www.nufusune.com/datca-ilce-nufusu-mugla>, Accessed April 20, 2021.

6 Turkish: Turizm odağı

7 <https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/09/02/datca-symi-swim-for-peace/>, Accessed April 20, 2021.

8 <https://www.cnnturk.com/seyahat/turk-turistlerin-sinir-otesindeki-gozdesi-simi-adasi?page=5>



Image 1: "Peace will win."

A tremendous socio-economic result is that the entrepreneur of a well-known restaurant in Symi invested and opened a new restaurant in D' Maris Bay in the Datca Peninsula because of the demand from Turkish clients.



Image 2: Restaurant in Symi (left)




Image 3: Restaurant in Datca (right)

2. Rhodes- Marmaris

Rhodes, the biggest island of the Dodecanese, is close to the southwest of Turkey at a distance of 20 kilometers (narrow corners) to Marmaris (Soucek 2004). Rhodes is governed by a local municipality, which is a part of the South Aegean administration. Every year, nearly two million travelers visit Rhodes for tourism (Fant et al 2003).

Rhodes and Marmaris share daily ferry services. Both sides, via their tourism agencies, have worked hard to improve the connections between the two.⁹ In 2015, the mayors of the two municipalities met to announce and sign a “brother/sister cities” agreement. To improve their bilateral economic relations, a project was prepared by the Marmaris Chamber of Commerce and the South Aegean Development Agency in 2015 to enhance the trade volume.¹⁰ Additionally, an economic flow has been in evidence in recent years, since the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the tenuous political situation whereby many entrepreneurs have moved to Rhodes and established Greek-based businesses.¹¹

3. Kastellorizo- Kaş

The Turkish city of Kas and the Greek island of Kastellorizo have always had relations with each other. The Turkish province is full of beautiful Greek houses with bougainvillea, as before the population exchange in the 1920s, a significant part of the town was inhabited by Greeks.

In the 1990s, a ferry service commenced between Kaş and Kastellorizo. An emblematic football match was enough to restart Turkish-Greek relations since 2005, every year¹². Also, today more than 25,000 people a year travel by boat from one area to the other. As some locals say, “Every Friday, they visit our market to shop.”¹³ Also, in 2019, the Antalya Metropolitan Municipality

9 See <https://tours.seadreams.gr/home>; <https://tours.seadreams.gr/home>; <http://www.mto.org.tr/haberler/detay/945>; <https://iskra.gr/%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%B4%CF%89%CE%B4-%CE%BD%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%AC->

10 <http://www.mto.org.tr/haberler/detay/945>

11 <http://www.mto.org.tr/haberler/detay/945>

12 <https://www.meiskasswim.com/>

13 https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/kas-kastellorizo-ekei-poe-ellenes-kai-toerkoi-einai-mia-oikoyeneia-para-tis-diafores-ste-mesoyeio_gr_5f68c5b2c5b6b9795b146f8f

and the Kaş Municipality organized the 14th International Meis (Kastellorizo)-Kaş Swimming Competition within the framework of the 21st Lycia Kaş Culture and Art Festival. Contestants swam from Kastellorizo to Kaş to promote friendship between the two countries.¹⁴



Image 4: “Meis-Kaş Open water swim event.”¹⁵

Yet, albeit it the strong connections of the three pairs, there are no efficient initiative that accept the flows of a next-level local policy initiative for cooperation in the guise of an “Action Plan”. This conclusion was reached by employing the first three parts (*describe, interpret, valuate*) of the DIVE methodology while introducing and analyzing the three pairs. Therefore, the last part (*enable*) of DIVE methodology will both provide an understanding of the local problems and help offering policy suggestions.

ACTION PLAN: SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The development of an efficient management transboundary model between the “pairs through borders” paradigm that will be analyzed will result from this research. This multi-use concept that will be defined throughout the research will underpin the character of Maritime Spatial Planning at the Aegean Sea as a creative social process of building attractive identities of the sea

14 <https://www.haberturk.com/antalya-haberleri/69825778-kasta-meis-acik-deniz-yuzme-yarisi-yapildi>, Accessed April 28, 2021.

15 <https://www.kas.bel.tr/kas39ta-meis-acik-deniz-yuzme-yarisi-yapildi.html>, Accessed April 28, 2021.

to create blue growth and new vocations. Maritime Spatial Planning also has a strong cultural dimension (Kyvelou and Papageorgiou 2018).

To improve the socio-economic connections and flows between the “pairs,” there can be cross-border cooperation created under the Interreg Programme for European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). In Greece, numerous “bilateral” Interreg cross-border cooperation projects were implemented during the last programming period (2014-2020) in order to strengthen the spatial cooperation in the European context, as well as with third countries.¹⁶ In our case, we recommend the implementation of a “Cross-border Cooperation Programme” between Greece and Turkey. This cooperation will create two main benefits:

1. Improvement of the cross-border cooperation between Greece and Turkey.
2. Encouragement of the integration of Turkey in EU policies.

Under the Interreg projects, both countries will have the opportunity to develop and promote the cultural heritage of the cross-border area, improving cross-border connectivity (such as reducing travel time, and improving road safety). An expanse of social entrepreneurship in the cross-border area will increase employment in social enterprises as well as the provision of social services to vulnerable communities. Additionally, both countries will enhance the tourist traffic in the border area by creating growth.

In order to sum up the main findings, it is curial to analyze main issues in a SWOT¹⁷ analysis. In the SWOT Analysis (Dyson 2004) below, the aim is to show the potential benefits and the barriers that could be created under an “Action Strategy Plan” between the “pairs”. Through the SWOT analysis, it is defined that a shared “Action Plan” between each pair would be effective or further development and cooperation.

16 Cross-border Cooperation Programme IPA INTERREG: “Greece –Albania 2014-2020, “Greece –The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2014-2020”, <https://interreg.gr/en/managing-authority>

17 SWOT analysis is a strategic planning and strategic management tool that used to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related project planning.

Table 1: SWAT Analysis for Action Plan

Internal Environment	Strengths	Weaknesses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Common cultural issues ✓ Socio-economic flows that still exists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Time needed to improve development and promotion of cultural heritage, tourism, business initiatives, travel opportunities and road safety
External Environment	Opportunities	Threats
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Territorial Cooperation ✓ Economic development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Tenuous bilateral relations

In Table 1, the frame of the action plan is designed through instrumentalizing SWOT analysis. Based on this table, the main and the broadest recommendation in the policy level is an agreement that can be signed between each “pair” to implement cross-border cooperation on a local level based on an action plan. The action plan and its content will help determine the economic impact of all the identified “pairs through borders”; additionally, it can assist in assessing the added value that socio-economic flows bring to the tourism product of those areas. The Action Plan will provide the relevant background information for creating future investments in the target areas (see table 1). This deliverable could include the following:

- Area identification (location determination, administrative affiliation, geographical coordinates).
- Strategy governing interventions in coastal areas/inland areas (spatial framework, environmental framework, tourism development, investments).
- Market research (data of international tourism, data of Greek and Turkish tourism, data of tourism of the “pairs”).
- Projected budget for the Action Plan

CONCLUDING NOTES

This study has emerged from our need to compensate for the academic deficit and our common observation and experience in “pairs” in recent years. The study discusses the Greek-Turkish pairs that have the potential to include their interaction at the local level, -low density in population but have a flow that should be considered. In this sense, although the action plan proposal focuses the three specific regions/pairs that the paper presents, it can be expanded and broadened to other cases in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions due to the holistic approach the paper introduces. These recommendations can contribute to local tourism/trade-oriented budget planning and cooperation between municipalities (in areas such as the facilitation of transportation and visa procedures). Finally, this study could lead to an analysis of other pairs such as Kos-Bodrum, Rhodes-Fethiye, and Izmir-Samos (where the management of natural disasters could be included as an area of cooperation) and research for a survey of the policy makers of the identified “pairs”.

REFERENCES

- Artan, Tülay. 2009. “Journeys and landscapes in the Datça Peninsula: Ali Agaki of Crete and the Tuhfezâde Dynasty.” In *Halcyon Days in Crete VI, Rethymnon*.
- Castells, M., M. Fernandez-Ardevol, Mireia, Qiu, Jack L., and Sey, Araba. 2006. *Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective*. MIT Press
- Dalkey, Norman and Helmer, Olaf. 1963. “An experimental application of the Delphi method to the use of experts.” *Management Science* 9(3), 458- 467.
- Dyson, Robert. G. 2004. “Strategic development and SWOT analysis at the University of Warwick.” *European Journal of Operational Research* 152(3): 631-640.
- Ehler, Charles and Douvère, Fanny. 2009. *Marine Spatial Planning: a step-by-step approach toward ecosystem-based management. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and Man and the Biosphere Programme*. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC).
- Fant, Clyde E., and Mitchell G. Reddish. 2003. “Rhodes.” In *A Guide to Biblical Sites in Greece and Turkey*. Oxford University Press.
- GEKA. 2014. *MUĞLA İLİ SOSYO EKONOMİK DURUM RAPORU*. https://geka.gov.tr/uploads/pages_v/mugla-ili-sosyo-ekonomik-durum-raporu-2014.pdf.
- Havelock, Christine. M. 2007. *The Aphrodite of Knidos and her successors: a historical review of the female nude in Greek art*. University of Michigan Press.

- İzci, Ferit, and Menaf , Turan. 2013. “TÜRKİYE’DE BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ SİSTEMİ VE 6360 SAYILI YASA İLE BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ SİSTEMİNDE MEYDANA GELEN DEĞİŞİMLER: VAN ÖRNEĞİ.” *Demirel University Journal of Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences* 18(1), 117-152.
- Kyvelou, Stella and Papageorgiou, Marilena. 2018. “Aspects of marine spatial planning and governance: Adapting to the transboundary nature and the special conditions of the sea.” *European Studies of Environmental Sciences* 8(1).
- Kyvelou, Stella and Ierapetritis, Dimitris. 2019. “How to make blue growth operational? A local and regional stakeholders’ perspective in Greece.” *WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs*.
- Landeta, Jon. 2006. Current validity of the Delphi method in social sciences. *Technological forecasting and social change* 73(5): 467-482.
- Linde K.J. Van Bets, Machiel A.J. Lamers and Jan P.M. van Tatenhove. 2017. “Collective self-governance in a marine community: expedition cruise tourism at Svalbard.” *Journal of Sustainable Tourism* 25:11: 1583-1599.
- Maniopoulou, Maria, Kyriazi, Zacharoula, Paraskevi, Karachle, Aikaterini, Dogramatzi, Grigoria, Kalyvioti and Vassiliki, Vassilopoulou. 2017. “CASE STUDY 7: MARINE RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES & DESALINATION, FISHING & TOURISM IN THE SOUTH AEGEAN: THE CASE OF MYKONOS ISLAND (GREECE - MEDITERRANEAN SEA.” *MUSES Project*.
- Sfenthourakis, Spyros and Triantis, Kostas A. 2017. “The Aegean archipelago: a natural laboratory of evolution, ecology, and civilisations.” *Journal of Biological Research-Thessaloniki* 24(4).
- Soucek, Svatopluk. 2004). “Naval aspects of the Ottoman conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete.”. *Studia Islamica* 98/99: 219-261.
- Tengberg, Anna, Fredholm, Susanne, Eliasson, Ingegard, Knez, Igor, Saltzman, Katarina and Watterberg, Ola. 2012. “Cultural ecosystem services provided by landscapes: Assessment of heritage values and identity.” *Ecosystem Services* 2: 14-26.
- Terkenli, Theonao S. 2001. “Towards a theory of the landscape: the Aegean landscape as a cultural image.” *Landscape and urban planning* 57(3):197-208.
- Urban Heritage Analysis – Riksantikvaren. 2019. “Sustainable Historic Towns: A Handbook about DIVE.”
- van Tatenhove, Jan P.M. 2017. “Transboundary marine spatial planning: a reflexive marine governance experiment?” *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 6: 783-794.
- Villing, Alexandra and Mommsen, Hans. 2017. “RHODES AND KOS: EAST DORIAN POTTERY PRODUCTION OF AN ARCHAIC PERIOD.” In *British School at Athens*, 99-154. Cambridge University Press.
- Wilker, Sarah. T., Leidwanger, Justin and Greene, Elizabeth, S. 2019. “Amphoras and the afterlife of a commercial port: Hellenistic Burgaz on the Datça (Knidos).” *Journal on Hellenistic and Roman Material Culture* 8.
- Yazgan, Nüve. 2016. “Politics of interdependence: an analysis of Turkish-Greek economic relations.” Thesis. Bilkent University.

The Power of Our Story is to Create Memories:

From Being Roommates in Kavala to Promising Project Partnership

Chrysanthi Athanasiadou and Hazel Çağan Elbir

Abstract

Language is the unprecedented way of creating a dialogue. It offers the elements that can lead to the creation of a powerful and meaningful conversation, not only between people speaking the same language, but also between people willing to communicate in a language that is different from their mother tongue. A human being and language are interconnected. Humans cannot live and flourish without their spoken languages because they function as the means of existing in society, while language is unable to survive and be positively promoted without being used daily by humans. This important relation between human nature and language is exactly what led us to try to provide an overview of the potential cultural approach offered by language teaching regarding Greece and Turkey. Through its words and phrases, language enables people to express their “being”. These words and phrases turn into culture and identity. Therefore, a language contains and conveys all the cultural nuances of its native speakers. This is the reason why one can understand a culture by only learning and speaking its native language. Because of this unique quality of language, people around the world are eager to learn and speak the languages of other nations. In a globalized world, it is crucial to learn English, French, and any other influential languages. But one cannot ignore the existence of neighborhood and diversified cultures. Considering the current not so optimistic period in Greek-Turkish relations, our belief in the power of language, as a means of creating relations based on mutual understanding and cultural multilateralism, appears to be stronger.

Keywords: Language, Culture, trust-based Dialogue, Geography, Cooperation, Herkül Millas



“Every story has its own beginning. It is up to you to draw its limits.”

INTRODUCTION

This essay’s vision is to offer a small introduction to the wide variety of the language-based cultural approach between Greece and Turkey. By focusing on the numerous advantages of language learning procedure, we strongly believe that through culture-oriented trust-based dialogue, these two neighboring countries can attain an extended level of cooperation. As an example of the creation of dialogue, one Greek and one Turkish citizen came together suddenly in a Youth Symposium and the whole story began. This is exactly the way how such cultural initiatives can lead to enormous promise for both peoples.

First, this paper will focus on the importance of learning a foreign language and its impact on the bilateral bridging between nations. Then, to make people realize the importance of dialogue, giving importance to storytelling plays a significant role. Next, this paper aims to show that the storytelling will help both peoples to realize the importance of being “neighbors”. Therefore, the next part of the paper will focus on the importance of transition from being globalized to the regional approach. In this manner, finally, the paper will pro-

vide the reader the uniqueness of sharing similar values by giving examples from common phrases, expressions, and common words.

The opportunities to understand each other are limitless. There is always a way to build bridges between hearts and minds.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING A FOREIGN LANGUAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON BILATERAL BRIDGING

Language is a strong cultural element that differentiates nations from each other. It reflects a country's history and its social identity. Also, it characterizes its people's philosophy of life. Deoksoon Kim states that the success of learning a language depends on the extent to which one can realize the deep connection between language and culture (Kim 2020). Learning languages influences people in a positive way by broadening their horizons and by exercising their mind in understanding deeply linguistic elements. Although a language learning procedure reflects a cultural interaction between nations, it can easily create political and social outcomes.

Learning a new language familiarizes people with the idea of co-existing with the different, the "other". New words, new grammar rules, and vocabulary variation introduce learners to a new way of thinking and understanding the world and its complicated contexts. Learning a new language lowers the barriers between different nations and prepares the ground for new forms of cooperation and multidimensional communication.

Language is a way of expressing ideas, feelings and thoughts. Language is an authentic way of externalizing inner thoughts and impressions. Learning a language is a significant skill in a globalized world. A language can create a common future for two nations. It is considered to be the way of transferring mind to another world of thoughts and understanding. There is an inexplicable power in choosing the right words and expressions while communicating through another language, because it shows that one can think in a way that is different from the one that he has been used to. Moreover, the ability to learn how to use the right expressions within the appropriate framework that facilitates communication and results into deeper conversations are crucial. This

is where friendships and potential professional collaborations based on true understanding can be created (Kim 2020).

Language learning is a matter of education and an indicator of how nations are receptive to different cultures. Open-minded nations launch tolerance, increasing the possibilities of building a peaceful and non-violent geopolitical framework. In other words, diversity helps people to be more tolerant and understand other people's principles/values, by being able to have access to an entirely new culture, and by learning to use its basic elements of communication. Diversity broadens people's horizons by helping them identify the importance and the beauty of exploring the difference. Language creates the framework where people can fill in the gaps with productive dialogue and the interchange of ideas and feelings. Knowing someone's mother tongue means that you are becoming a communicator of its philosophy of life and existence. The bridges could be more easily created automatically, and understanding can be more productively achieved. Language brings people together by making them feel closer to each other. This is what today's Greek-Turkish civil society needs. Therefore, language learning is a common ground for Greeks and Turks to know each other better to get rid of the prejudice and prejudgments between both communities.

Both in Turkey and in Greece linguistic programs are responsible for introducing Greek learner Turkish people and Turkish learner Greek people into the respective language's culture. These programs are in the service of intercultural approach from basic to advanced knowledge of grammar rules, vocabulary and right verbal and written expressions, as well as an introduction to each nation's history and ethics.

Both in Greece and in Turkey, there are great initiatives with the purpose to educate people to meet the different cultures and understand their foundations. Kim argues that there are two interrelated dimensions. One is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), which explains that learning languages integrates language and culture and contributes to the education process. The other one is that learning a language as an intercultural communication is a vision for rapprochement across differences catalyzed by language learning (Kim 2020).

It is a fact that from very young ages, the learning of English constitutes an important part of the Greek education system. Older children are also taught a second foreign language, having to choose between the most popular ones like French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The Turkish language, with reference to the education of the country's officially recognized minority, the Muslim minority in Thrace, is taught at all levels of education – pre-school, primary and secondary education. With regard to higher education, considering their cultural identity, measures such as special quotas are legislatively institutionalized. In this way linguistic identity is being saved for the next generations, under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. The co-existence of Christians and Muslims in specific regions in Greece like Thrace, Athens, Thessaloniki results in an intercultural approach, as both to a certain extent can speak the respective languages to communicate more easily (Kuijpers-Zandberg 2019).

The Greek education system does not include the Turkish language as a foreign language, but Greek school initiatives and cultural excursions to Turkey and more often to Istanbul, contribute to the intercultural approach in general, reflecting Greece's perspective towards Turkish-Greek approaches. Also, emphasis should be placed on cultural initiatives, such as music concerts and Greek poetry conferences, held by *Zografyon Lykeio* in Istanbul in cooperation with the *Mandoulides* schools in Thessaloniki under the aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, where apart from their educational aspect and impact, solidarity, cultural diversity, and interstate communication based on peaceful co-existence reflect some of the remarkable initiatives in the Greek-Turkish context (Mandoulides Schools n.d.).

Just as the learning of Turkish is not included in the Greek education system, the learning of Greek is not included in the Turkish education system. However, TÖMER, which provides language course services within Ankara University, offers 13 different language course services. One of these languages is Greek. According to information provided by TÖMER staff, while there was interest in the courses until 2010, the interest decreased after 2011. The courses were reopened as of 2020, because of the interest of the Turkish Armed Forces - General Staff (TÖMER 2021).

TÖMER was established in 1984 by Ankara University under the name of “Turkish Teaching Center (TÖMER)”, taking the world’s leading language and cultural centers as an example, in order to teach Turkish to foreigners. TÖMER’s name was changed to “Turkish and Foreign Language Application and Research Center” in 2011. TÖMER started as the first and only institution teaching Turkish as a foreign language in the 1980s.

There are three state universities which either have Contemporary Greek Language and Literature Departments, or as one of the offered foreign languages at their School of Foreign Languages. These universities are Ankara University, İstanbul University and Trakya (Thrace) University, as well as Boğaziçi University and Kadir Has University (Kadir Has University, n.d.). Higher education’s interest in teaching Greek Language reflects Turkey’s willingness to contribute to intercultural dialogue.

Besides the universities, there is one more institution to learn Greek which is called *Dilmer*. Like *Dilmer*’s other departments, the “communicative approach and method”, one of the modern language teaching approaches and methods, of which the validity and efficiency has been proven around the world, is applied in the language teaching activities of the Greek Department. The aim of this method is to provide the student with four basic language skills known as “listening comprehension”, “speaking”, “reading comprehension” and “writing”, without neglecting grammar and using it as a tool (Dilmer, n.d.). Cooperation between *Sismanogleio Megaro*, based on the promises of the Greek Consulate General in Istanbul and *Dilmer* Language School has also been initiated. Besides, *Sismanoglio Megaro* (n.d.) offers free Greek language courses to the Turkish public, supported by the *Stavros Niarchos Foundation* and the *Bodossaki Foundation*, both based in Athens. At the end of each academic year, students are able to take the language exam and receive a Greek Language Learning Certificate. *Sismanogleio Megaro* is the only officially recognized Greek Language Learning Center in Turkey.

The teaching of Turkish is included in Greek higher education curricula, either as a part of the offered foreign languages for students to choose as electives, especially those studying political science and international relations, or as core courses of the curricula of Turkish studies-oriented Faculties.

Faculty of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, School of Economics and Political Sciences: The first field of specialization (Turkish Studies) offers the chance to students to acquire deep knowledge of the Turkish language (both verbal and written -especially morphology, syntax, vocabulary- as well as Turkish literature), and Turkish history and culture in general. This Faculty focuses exclusively on the geopolitical role of Turkey. The aim is to broaden the level of understanding of researchers and students, of Turkey's economic, political, and social system as well as its cultural identity. The Faculty maintains strong relationships with educational organizations in Turkey so as to bring together both scientific communities especially through the participation in the Erasmus programs and bilateral agreements with Turkish universities. Around 60 students enroll in the program annually (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, n.d.).

Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies Department, University of Cyprus. It constitutes one of the few university programs in Europe focused on a Turkish studies-oriented education. It offers academic knowledge concerning an overview of Turkish language learning, Ottoman and Turkish History, language, and linguistics. It emphasizes the research and the promotion of Turkish language not only at the communicational level, but also as a means of approaching and evaluating Turkish bibliography and multiple sources (University of Cyprus, n.d.).

Department of Balkan, Slavic and oriental Studies, University of Macedonia: The study of the Turkish language is one of 5 foreign languages taught in this program. Apart from language learning, interstate relations between Balkan states as well as the Middle East and Greece are prioritized thereby offering a wide range of academic knowledge concerning history, economics, politics, culture of the region's states as well of their foreign policy and international context (University of Macedonia, n.d.).

Department of Language, Literature and Culture of the Black Sea Countries, Democritus University of Thrace: The program's main aim is to positively promote the language, history, culture, literature of the countries of the Black Sea region (Democritus University of Thrace, n.d.).

Department of Mediterranean, Faculty of Humanities, University of The Aegean: The Turkish language is one of the three Mediterranean languages (together with Arabic and Hebrew) offered to students. It aims to introduce students to the language rules, by emphasizing on everyday dialogues and useful expressions (University of the Aegean, n.d.).

Department of Foreign Languages, Translation and Interpreting, Ionian University: The Turkish language is offered as the third elective foreign language available to students interested in widening their language learning horizons as part of their field of study (Ionian University, n.d.).

IANAP, “is a vocational training center which was founded in 2007”, which in cooperation with the Lifelong Learning Programs of the University of the Aegean, offers online certificate Turkish courses based on the units below, under the framework of Education Center and Lifelong Learning (IANAP, n.d.).

- *Γνωριμία με την Τουρκική Γλώσσα: Türk dili ile ilk tanışma* – Introduction to the Turkish language.
- *Καθημερινότητα: Günlük hayat* - Everyday life.
- *Το κοντινό μας περιβάλλον: Yakın çevremiz* - Our environment.
- *Μια φορά και έναν καιρό: Bir varmış bir yokmuş* - Once upon a time.

The study of the Turkish language is certificated in Greece by Turkish universities and Institutions Diplomas, as well as by the Greek State:

Ankara University TÖMER: Founded in 1984, it aims to teach Turkish to foreigners by patterning leading language and culture centers of the world (TÖMER, n.d.).

Istanbul University: Istanbul University’s language center offers the chance for Turkish language learning through modern approaches and methods. Istanbul University Language Center is one of the oldest units of the university. The department, which was founded in 1933 under the name of the “School of Foreign Languages” in the Faculty of Letters, was renamed “Department of Foreign Languages” in 1983, before finally being renamed to Istanbul University Language Center (Istanbul University, n.d.).

Dilmer Language School: Dilmer Language School offers certified Turkish courses, also organizing online private group courses and private lessons online, with the aim to create multiple skills such as reading, oral, listening and writing comprehension and expression to a standard and competitive level (Dilmer, n.d.).

Greek National Foreign Language exams on Turkish: The Faculty of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, in conformity with the relevant decision of the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Culture and Sports, is responsible for the certified Turkish language exams since November 2009 (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, n.d.).

Institute for Balkan Studies: This Institute, well known as *IMXA*, is interested in Balkan Peninsula studies and in deep understanding of the interactions and relations with other parts of the world. It is an authorized examination center for internationally recognized language diplomas. In cooperation with Ankara University *TÖMER* (and other relevant university departments), it organizes a Turkish language examination procedure. At the same time, since 2019, it serves as the Official Language Certification Institution recognized by ASEP (the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection) (Institute for Balkan Studies, n.d.).

The extremely challenging work environment and the decreasing job opportunities highlight the need to create new potential work paths or deepen the existing ones. The fields of education that address the respective cultures in both countries could serve this aim. History, politics, sociology, economy, and management are fields of study that have gained important and increasing interest among students. By bringing people together new professional miracles can also be created and take place.

The various Erasmus programs hold an important place in the field of educational and cultural exchanges of students and professors. Bilateral agreements between universities are enablers and create the environment where people from different countries can meet each other, will be classmates, and debate on a wide variety of topics related to the economy, society, politics, and art. The interchange of ideas serves the deeper understanding of perspectives

and finally, by having brought people together, it can enlighten the potential areas of cooperation beyond the personal friendships that can develop. These programs built a common future for young and future generations by providing a fundamental basis for the positive promotion of cultural initiatives.

The Department of European Educational Programs of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (n.d.) monitors several agreements between Aristotle University and:

- Ankara University - Department of Theology,
- Gazi University - Department of Law,
- Istanbul University - Department of Law, Department. Of Medicine, Department of Theatre, Faculty of Biology,
- Özyeğin University - Department of Law,
- Yeni Yüzyıl University - Department of Law,
- Altınbaş University - Department of Law,
- Bahçeşehir University - Department of Preschool Education and Education Sciences,
- Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University - Department of Architecture,
- Istanbul Technical University - Faculty of Architecture, Faculty of Civil Engineering,
- TED University - Faculty of Architecture,
- Boğaziçi University - Faculty of Civil Engineering, Department of Political Sciences,
- Ege University - Faculty of Agriculture,
- Yeditepe University - School of Physical Education and Sports Science.

As we can see, under the framework of European programs, there is an extremely important opportunity that allows for the positive promotion of many cultural initiatives and interaction between higher education institutions of the two countries. In many of these universities' Turkish language learning and Greek language learning is included in the curriculum.

The National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (n.d.) also has relevant bilateral agreements with Turkish Universities. These include:

- Yeditepe University - English Language and Literature Department,
- Dokuz Eylül University - Department of Geology and Geo-environment,
- Hacettepe University - Department of Media and Communication,
- Izmir University of Economics - Department of Media and Communication,
- Middle East Technical University (METU) - Department of History and Archeology,
- Bogazici University - Department of History and Archeology,
- Ankara University - Political Sciences and Public Administration.

Keeping the previous in mind, reference to all the bilateral agreements between smaller respective Universities, as well as other European programs, such as Erasmus+ International, Erasmus+ Traineeship, Erasmus Mundus Studies, in both countries shouldn't lack mentioning.

THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A STORY TO TELL/NARRATE TO PEOPLE

Human relations are characterized by a variety of stories. Stories are attractive because they include powerful meanings. Language plays an important role in every aspect of human communication and interaction. Consciously or unconsciously, we communicate, we express ourselves through the use of words. In other words, it appears to be the means of communication and the exchange of ideas between people.

Almost two years ago, Chrysanthi and Hazel first met in Kavala as roommates, during the 5th Greek-Turkish Young Leaders Symposium (GTYLS), organized by the Center of International and European Studies at Kadir Has University, and kindly supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (Turkey Office), in December 2019. Here is how we planted the seeds of our friendship. Here is how educational initiatives and enhanced co-

operation between respective organizations can result in what we may call cultural bridging. Chrysanthi is very fluent in Turkish, and it is obvious that she had a gift for learning languages easily. Hazel also has an interest in learning languages. Recently, she is polishing her German. Especially since they met, Hazel tried to learn Greek when she returned to Ankara. Of course, it one should not ignore the songs they knew from both sides! Here they are after two of first getting together.

This brings them to their purpose, everything they plan which is to fight against prejudices, as well as their vision and perspectives for the future of Greek-Turkish relations. They believe that they will challenge the existing state of play between two countries. To make a long story short, we believe in thinking differently and our friendship will grow with our efforts to spread it to the bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey.

Although Greek for Turks and Turkish for Greeks may not always be the first choice of learning a new language, we would like to show how learning each other's language could lead to tremendous results of cooperation and productive cultural dialogue.

Words carry a huge importance in everyday life. That is why language could function as a way to establish trust between nations, strong bonds of friendship, economic cooperation, cultural interdependence, and, ultimately, peace.


Their friendship started in the framework of a Symposium on security held in Kavala, prioritizing developments in the region where Turkey and Greece co-exist. Bringing new young leaders together increases the possibilities of making people that come from different cultures understand the powerful influence of interaction in sharing common experiences and creating bridges. In a world full of challenging situations, pessimistic predictions, and individualism, what needs to be achieved is the creation of stories with powerful meanings of understanding and communication between people from different cultures. Survival can be achieved only in the framework of cooperation.

While Chrysanthi and Hazel were talking about learning each other's language, there had only one name on their mind, Herkül Millas. Herkül Millas was born in Ankara in 1940. He completed his higher education at Robert

College in 1965. He took part in the student movement in the 1960s. He settled in Athens in 1971. He translated from Greek to Turkish, the works of poets such as Ritsos, Seferis, Elitis, and others. During these years, he completed his doctorate in Political Science. His books and articles on Turkish-Greek relations and mutual perceptions were published in Turkish, Greek and English in various countries. He was one of the founders of Ankara University's Faculty of Language, History and Geography and a lecturer in the Department of Contemporary Greek Literature.

Besides his academic titles, Millas was also one of the producers of a documentary entitled "The Other Town" (Third World News Reel, n.d.). In the documentary there are two towns, one is Turkish and the other one is Greek. None of the residents of both villages have ever met residents from the other village. The point of the documentary was to understand the perceptions towards each other. Herkül Millas says that Turks and Greek have no idea about each other. They do not have any idea about their lives and even existence (Mülkiyeliler Birliği 2021). Therefore, it was impossible to make a comparison between these two villages. However, the villagers felt hostility because of the stories about each other. The only common link was their prejudice and not knowing about each other. Misperceptions can lead two nations not to properly understand each other. In the microcosm of the two towns, this was amply portrayed. Herkül Millas was asked if Turks and Greeks were like each other. He is not fond of the question as he suggests that the Turks themselves do not much about themselves and other Turks and the same applies to Greeks. Therefore, it is impossible for us to expect a concrete answer to this question, stated Millas (2021).

Herkül Millas (2021) provided an invaluable gift to the Turks and Greeks in a form of a book on common Greek and Turkish words, expressions, and proverbs. The book, which was first published in Greece in 1992, contains 4600 words in Turkish and Greek. There are also around 1300 common idioms and proverbs in the book. In 2012, the book was also published in Turkish.



Recently, the Orhan Kemal Novel Award, one of the most renowned Turkish literary awards, named after the great novelist Orhan Kemal, went to Herkül Millas with his novel “Family Tomb” published by *Doğan Kitap* in 2021.

We strongly believe that our friendship can work as a tangible example of how relations between the two countries can be built in the future.

FROM GLOBALIZATION TO A NEIGHBORING NATIONS APPROACH

A neighboring nations’ approach is a means of promoting peace in the space where Turkey and Greece exist. Security is not only geopolitical, and it not only addresses the political relations between governments; it also addresses the cultural dimension. Neighboring nations, especially Greece and Turkey, are characterized by multiple types of relations that include both tensions and conflicts as well as periods of strong cooperation and productive dialogue. Language learning is part of cultural diplomacy and constitutes a soft power. Bringing people together can challenge the fear of meeting someone different while simultaneously, it can lead people away from each other.

The key lies in creating opportunities. By giving people the opportunity to interact productively in a cultural framework can lead to enormous positive effects for civil society. Kim notices that, by being respectful to other voices, while interacting with them in the framework of a language learning procedure, and ultimately critically approaching them, intercultural communication can be more easily achieved (Kim 2020). What we achieve by offering opportunities is the active participation of both citizens and civil society entities. Why do we believe that creating opportunities is crucial? Increasing unemployment, daunting economic and pandemic crises, challenging work environments, and geopolitical uncertainty are some of the most important issues challenging both societies nowadays. Creating chances between nations may be one of the solutions that will keep the communication channels open even during difficult periods in their relationship. Language appears to be that fertile ground, where opportunities, especially for the young generation, can be widely created and positively promoted. Learning the language

of a different culture appears to be capable of destroying the prejudices that one might harbor about the other and creates the preconditions and the framework for people to act and react even as co-workers. Opportunities a future focused, hence creating an opportunity can lead to growing positive effects in the near future. Opportunities can be created even during periods where political instability, characterizing the geopolitical landscape, prevails. This is where civil society is still able to act as a balancer. This is possible because language creates communalities and emphasizes the importance of moving beyond international conflicts and rivalries.

PHRASES AND EXPRESSIONS OF WISDOM

“Learning a foreign language, and the culture that goes with it, is one of the most useful things we can do to broaden the empathy and imaginative sympathy and cultural outlook of children”, (Michael Gove)

Broadening empathy increases people’s ability to create strong relationships based on the deep understanding of another human being’s feelings and thoughts. Empathy constitutes an important element that exercises a human’s ability to be aware of and sensitive to other people’s way of thinking and feeling. In a world full of individualism, being able to look at someone else’s philosophies of life can be redemptive. Learning a language appears to be the means of lowering barriers between different cultures and finally bringing them together. Language creates intimacy and a surprising level of sympathy.

“Language is the road map of culture. It tells you where its people come from and where they are going” (Rita Mae Brown)

Language shows history by reflecting the past but also creates the future. By learning each nation’s language humans can be a part, not only of its history, by also of its future by communicating and cooperating widely.

“Without language one cannot talk to people and understand them. One cannot share their hopes and aspirations, grasp their history, appreciate their poetry, or savor their songs” (Nelson Mandela)

People learn widely spoken languages such as English because it of its *lingua franca* reach. There are many other regional languages that neighbors

can learn. By learning them and by learning them, they can create viable relationships with their neighbors and, ultimately, help in achieving regional security. Undoubtedly, security is not only political or military; it is also cultural. Without language it is impossible to create a healthy dialogue. Without language it is impossible to communicate and know each other better. It goes without saying that without desire to learn another's language, communication channels do not stay open for long.

“Cultural differences should not separate us from each other, but rather cultural diversity brings a collective strength that can benefit all of humanity. Intercultural dialogue is the best guarantee of a more peaceful, just and sustainable world” (Robert Alan)

At first glance, the complicated geopolitical context, as well as cultural diversity discourage intercultural understanding. Albeit the chaotic abyss of a variety of cultural characteristics, historical and political interaction, there is strength in bringing together people from different cultures. It is the respect to the difference, the solidarity, the common target that enables us to achieve peace and progress, finally resulting in a more just world.

“A nation's culture resides in the hearts and in the souls of its people” (Mahatma Gandhi)

Language is one of the key elements of a nation's culture. By being willing to know what a nation's culture reflects and represents means that people become more willing to know about what their heart and soul desire. This willingness opens new doors for opportunities.

“Difference is the essence of humanity. Difference is an accident of birth and it should therefore never be the source of hatred or conflict. The answer to the difference is to respect it. Therein lies a most fundamental principle of peace: respect for diversity” (John Hume)

The answer to difference is “located” in respect, trust and solidarity, the absence of which nations are having to cope with during this complicated crisis-laden period. Respect is about the first step to bridging people from different cultures. Learning foreign languages is the proof of believing in intercultural power.

“Keep your language. Love its sounds, its modulation, its rhythm. But try to match together with men of different languages, remote from your own, who wish like you for a more just and human world”
(Hélder Câmara)

Always refer to your origins, never forget where you come from because that is what makes you who you are. The past constitutes useful information helping people to define what kind of future they want. Showing respect to your cultural identity is essential for a healthy personal development and a balanced character. Never close the door to people that are, at first glance, different, holding a different national and cultural identity, because the need for a human-oriented world presupposes the presence of people who believe in the power of communication. Keeping your language but at the same time keeping your mind wide open to new linguistic experiences is a matter of choice, hence the relevance of being receptive to others.

Apart from the aforementioned phrases and expressions, two common proverbs in Turkish and Greek present great interest. In particular,

“Bir dil bir insan, iki dil iki insan.”
(in Turkish)

“Ο άνθρωπος που γνωρίζει μία ξένη γλώσσα αξίζει όσο δύο.”
(in Greek)

“A man who knows one foreign language is worth two men.”
(the English translation)

This linguistic communality expresses the common way of approaching the issue of existing cultural advantages, that are hidden in the foreign language learning procedure. There is great importance in widely evaluating and appreciating language learning skills and cultural bridging.

SHARED WORDS IN GREEK AND TURKISH

Although these two languages originate from different language families, they are bound by many similarities in the meaning and the use of their words, phrases, and vocabulary. Words become phrases, and phrases carry meaning and express ideas.

The existence of common words in two languages contributes to the increasing understanding between their people. Moreover, it prepares the ground for productive conversation and positive dialogue. Similar meanings help people understand what others think in a more exact and comprehensive way. As a result, undoubtedly, relations between the can be more easily built. This happens because common words break the ice and create a pleasant environment.

The two nations have shared historical interactions and, as a result, they have many things in common. One of them is shared words. These words are powerful because they can be considered as a potential field of interaction. Words deriving from Greek or Turkish constitute a part of each linguistic history and structure.

Greeks and Turks are being represented as enemies and historical rivalries have prevented two countries from building trust-based relationships. To one extent this corresponds to reality. This is because the challenging geographical context with increasing foci of war, political instability, climate change challenges, and multiple regional conflicts as well as the need to survive after an unprecedented pandemic crisis, lead relationships to a standstill.

This is where civil society appears and where cultural approaches takes using can create bridges between the two countries' people. One of its powerful elements is exactly the communalities that the two languages appear to share to this today. Common words can work as a realization of the fact that culture is a potential and significant area of understanding.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the need to realize that one of the healthiest ways to fight prejudices and differences, that derive from historical and political conflicts between two countries, is to highlight the communalities. Apart from the practical linguistic communalities and shared interactions throughout history, communalities can be easily built and constructed. We strongly believe that there is still hope and enough space for extensive communication. A common dialogue framework can be found in

the broader field of economic cooperation and tourism, as well as in culture and art. Also, it can be found in the process of creating opportunities in the wider geographical area. When people can communicate, they come to the realization that cultural interaction can lead to strong friendships and productive areas of dialogue.

Our aim is to reach the public's heart and mind. Our story reflects the wide variety of opportunities for peaceful development in the geography, where Greece and Turkey exist. We believe that "simplicity is the ultimate sophistication"; in other words, being simple helps us to achieve strong connections with others. It contributes to a deeper understanding of their needs, concerns, fears, and thoughts, in general. Being simple means to use your heart and mind, without thinking about the historical conflicts, while the willingness to meet people from different cultures is the starting point of the relationship.

The reason why we have invested in this short commentary in support of a cultural approach based on linguistic power is that we believe in a world that is "human-centered" with a strong essence of trust-based dialogue. For this to be achieved, people need to create stories with each other, something that can only be done in interaction with each other. This is how we understand the perspectives of the future Greek-Turkish relationship. Since social reality is constructed, let us construct our reality based on respect and solidarity. Language learning can construct our relations which are the only elements and key words to understand our differences and show respect for them, to create healthy societies.

Our world is rapidly changing, and the emergence of new dramatic and pressing challenges can only be addressed through increased cooperation. The Greek-Turkish rivalry influences bilateral relations. The recent tensions between the two countries, to a certain extent, make our vision a bit more difficult to realize. Our aim is to underline that if we do not meet each other, we will not be able to build a common future. We understand that political dialogue may not always be effective, but here is where contemporary civil society bears a heavier responsibility, because it has the opportunity through numerous educational and cultural activities to contribute to understanding and cooperation.

In the words of a Chinese proverb, “To learn a language is to have one more window from which to look at the world”.

Learning each other’s language constitutes a mandatory basis for the people of both countries to understand each other and to create a more promising future between neighbors.

“*Because with languages you are at home anywhere.*” (Flora Lewis)

REFERENCES

- Ankara University TÖMER. “About us” accessed May 31, 2021, <http://tomer.ankara.edu.tr/en/about-us-2/>.
- Department of European Educational Programmes (DEEP). “Διμερείς συμφωνίες στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος Erasmus+ κατά το ακαδ. έτος 2021-2022.” Accessed June 1, 2021, <https://eurep.auth.gr/en/agreementslist>.
- Democritus University of Thrace. “Department of Language, Literature and Culture of the Black Sea Countries.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://bscc.duth.gr/en/about-us/history/>.
- Dilmer. “Language Teaching in The Turkish Department.” Accessed May 31, 2021, <https://dilmer.com/turkish-course/>.
- Dilmer. “*Yunanca Kursu.*” Accessed June 7, 2021. <https://dilmer.com/yunanca-kursu/>.
- Hellenic Republic National Kapodistrian University of Athens. “Faculty Profile.” Accessed June 7, 2021. <http://en.turkmas.uoa.gr/the-faculty/faculty-profile.html>.
- IANAP. “Education Center and Lifelong Learning.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://ianap.gr/seminars/panepistimio-aigaiou/turkish/>.
- Institute for Balkan Studies. “About us.” Accessed June 1, 2021. https://www.imxa.gr/profile_en.htm.
- Ionian University. “Translation and Interpreting Programme.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://dfli.ionio.gr/en/undergraduate-studies/translation-interpreting/>.
- Istanbul University Language Center. “About us.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://dilm-erkezi.istanbul.edu.tr/en/content/about-us/mission---vision>.
- Kadir Has University. “Modern Languages Program.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://sfl.khas.edu.tr/en/academic-programs/modern-languages-program>.
- Kim, Deoksoon. 2020. “Learning Language, Learning Culture: Teaching Language to the Whole Student,” *ECNU Review of Education* 3(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2096531120936693>.
- Kuipers-Zandberg, Helga. 2019. *The Turkish Language in Education in Greece 2nd edition*. Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning. https://www.mercator-research.eu/fileadmin/mercator/documents/regional_dossiers/turkish_in_Greece_2nd.pdf.

- Mandoulides Schools. “Events in Collaboration with *Zografeio*.” Accessed June 7, 2021. <https://mandoulides.edu.gr/en/culture-2/#events-in-collaboration-with-zografia>.
- Millas, Herkül. 2012. *Yunanca ve Türkçe Ortak Kelimeler, Terimler ve Atasözleri Listesi* [Catalog of Common Turkish and Greek words, expressions and proverbs]. Istanbul: Istos Publisher. Accessed May 31, 2021, <http://www.herkulmillas.com/pdf/turkce-yunanca-ortak-kelimeler.pdf>.
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. “School of Economic and Political Sciences Faculty of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies.” Accessed June 1, 2021. <http://en.turkmas.uoa.gr/national-foreign-language-exam-system-kpg.html>.
- University of the Aegean. “Department of Mediterranean.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://dms.aegean.gr/en/studies-guide/>.
- University of Cyprus. “Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies.” Accessed June 7, 2021. <https://ucy.ac.cy/tms/en/>.
- University of Macedonia. “Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies.” Accessed May 31, 2021. <https://www.uom.gr/en/bso>.
- Yunanistan Cumhuriyeti Türkiye’deki Yunanistan. “Yunan Dersleri.” Accessed June 7, 2021. <https://www.mfa.gr/turkey/tr/sismanogliomegaro/yunanca-dersleri>.
- Mülkiyeliler Birliği. 2021. “Türkiye’nin Komşuları: Kıbrıs, Yunanistan, Bulgaristan.” YouTube. January 28, 2021. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=030snnfp6JY>.
- Sismanoglio Megaro - Yunanistan İstanbul Başkonsolosluğu. “All Videos.” Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/sismanogliomegaro/videos/?ref=page_internal.
- Third World News Reel. “The Other Town.” Accessed June 7, 2021. <https://twn.org/catalog/pages/responsive/cpage.aspx?rec=1328&card=price>.

About The Authors

Antonios Alexandridis is a PhD Researcher in Social Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam working on issues related to migration, civil society engagement and participation. He has international experience and has previously worked with refugees and asylum seekers as an academic, NGO, INGO and UN employee in Iceland, Denmark, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Greece. He is currently working as an Officer for UNICEF on issues related to education and integration of refugee and migrant children in Greece. He has authored articles in different journals including Oxford University's *Forced Migration Review* (2019) and the *Journal of Labor and Society* (2021).

Abdullah Arslan is a Research Fellow at Centre for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in International Relations at Middle East Technical University in 2019. He then started an MA degree in International Relations at Kadir Has University. He has been awarded with a Jean Monnet Scholarship for 2021-2022. As a Jean Monnet Scholar, he is currently pursuing an MSc degree in International Relations at University of Essex. He has participated in several research/civil society projects as a team-member, research assistant, project assistant, and volunteer. His research interests include EU Foreign, Defence and Security Policy, Border Security, Migration, and Greek-Turkish relations.

Chrysanthi Athanasiadou is an honors graduate student at the School of Political Sciences of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (2019). Her fields of interest include international relations, diplomatic history, and security, especially between Greece and Turkey. She took part in an Erasmus exchange program as a student of Political Sciences and Sociology at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul (Spring Semester 2016-2017). Also, she participated in an

Erasmus placement program as an intern at the Cultural Center, Sismanogleio Megaro, of the Consulate General of Greece in Istanbul (Fall Semester 2018). She is fluent in English, French and Turkish, also having attended advanced Erasmus courses on Turkish literature, during her Erasmus mobility. Chrysanthi is a columnist at Polls and Politics, managing issues related to Greece's foreign policy, war and its impact on society, environmental crisis, as well as interconnected human-society relations. She is currently attending the University of Piraeus to acquire a master's degree in International and European Studies.

Eirini (Irimi) Aikaterini Barianaki holds a bachelor's degree in Economic and Regional Development from the Panteion University of Athens. She is also a graduate of the Harokopio University of Athens with a master's degree in Sustainable Development. Since 2018 she has been working as a freelancer on monitoring and managing European Projects both for the Region of South Aegean and the Development Agency of South Aegean Region-READ SA. Irini also continues her education as a PhD Candidate on "Cultural Dimensions of Maritime Spatial Planning" at the Panteion University of Athens.

Effie Charalampaki is the founder and chair of The International Relations Theory Working Group at the Center for International Politics of the Institute of International Relations (IDIS) in Athens. She is also a research member of the East Asia Research Program, IDIS. Before that, she belonged to the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, IDIS with a focus on transatlantic relations. She has worked as a research assistant for Sara McLaughlin Mitchell in the ICOW Project and for James N. Rosenau who specialized her in complexity theory. She has conducted undergraduate and graduate studies in the United States, where she also worked for the Florida Department for Environmental Protection Press Office and the Greek Embassy in Washington D.C. Her research is focused on IR Theory, globalization processes, trans-nationalism, global governance, international institutions, world order processes and regionalism, with a special focus on the Eastern Mediterranean and Japan. She has presented papers in many international conferences. Also, she has published articles and book chapters and she is currently working on two book projects.

Bezen Balamir-Coşkun is an international relations scholar who specializes in foreign policy and security. She received her PhD degree from Loughborough University (UK). She has worked in several higher education institutions and research centers both in Turkey and abroad including the Center for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin. Since 2016, she has coordinated the Izmir Policy Center, which is a consultancy agency. She is also an Adjunct Professor at TED University in Ankara. Currently, her research focusses on Syrian refugees and refugee policies in Turkey and Europe. To conduct her research, she had received several international funds and grants including a British Council Fellowship and a GR:ENN FP7 Project Fellowship. She has presented in many international conferences and has given many talks about human security issues faced by Syrian refugees. She has published articles, book chapters, and policy briefs related to the subject.

Ioannis Choulis is a PhD candidate from the Department of Government at the University of Essex. His research focuses on issues of interstate conflict and aspects of civil-military relations, like conscription or coup d'état. You can find published samples of his work in journals such as *Defence and Peace Economics*, *International Interactions* and *Foreign Policy Analysis*.

Müge Dalkıran is currently a PhD candidate in Area Studies (Europe) at Middle East Technical University in Ankara. In conjunction with her Ph.D. studies, she works as an external lecturer at Istanbul Kültür University since October 2020. She has been a non-resident fellow at IWM Vienna (October-December 2020) and a researcher in the Europe-Asia Research Platform on Forced Migration. Within the context of her doctoral thesis on the Greek asylum regime, she has been doing her fieldwork in Greece since January 2020. She has published on forced migration, refugee rights, and human rights issues.

Mary Drosopulos is an intercultural trainer, youth worker and researcher, with experience in Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and the Western Balkans. Born in Thessaloniki and raised in Istanbul, Mary is bilingual in Greek and Turkish. She is also fluent in European and Balkan languages. She holds a PhD

from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in cross-cultural translation studies; during the last years she has been investigating the role of youth in state-building in post-conflict societies via arts-based participatory approaches within her role as a research assistant in the ‘CoLearnSEE-Changing the Story’ project, supported by the University of Leeds, UK. She is a member of the Trainers’ pool of the Council of Europe and a European Youth Researcher for the Youth Partnership between the EU and the Council of Europe. She is an external consultant for the Regional Cooperation Council, with a specialty on the implementation of the ‘South Eastern Europe 2030 Strategy’, aligned with the UN SDGs. Mary is also the founder and president of the Eurobalkan Youth Forum, an interregional advisory platform promoting cooperation and youth participation via track two diplomacy.

Yvonne Efstathiou currently serves as Political Officer at the EU Delegation to the United Arab Emirates. She has previously worked at the EU Delegation to Madagascar and as a Defense Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Research (IISS) in London. Her portfolio focused on naval military capabilities and security in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the MENA region. Yvonne specializes in the European defense cooperation package (PESCO, EDF, CARD), EU-NATO relations and the Turkish Defense Industry. She regularly comments on defense and military issues for international media outlets such as the BBC and Defense News. She has studied History and Political Science and holds a master’s degree in Security Studies from University College London (UCL).

Hazel Çağan Elbir graduated from Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University in 2008 and holds a MSc. in International Relations from Middle East Technical University (2012). Having completed her master’s thesis on Armenian Terrorism and the Turkish Press (1973-1984), Çağan Elbir interned in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (2006), the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) (2007), the Institute for Global Strategy (2007) and attended a Project on Model European Parliament in Graz, Austria. In 2012, Çağan Elbir joined AVİM as an analyst. She is currently a PhD candidate in the interdisciplinary Department of Political Economy at

Atılım University. Hazel's research areas are the European Union, Turkey-US Relations, Caucasus, propaganda studies, crimes against humanity, and terrorism.

Erman Ermihan is currently a PhD student at Kadir Has University in Istanbul. Erman has completed his undergraduate studies in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. He also holds an MA degree in Political Science from Sabancı University, focusing on the shifts in discourses of identity in EU-Turkey relations in his thesis. His areas of interest are EU-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, International Relations theory, emotion, and identity in foreign policy.

Ioanna M. Kostopoulou completed her second MA degree in European Journalism at the School of Journalism and Mass Communications of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. She holds a bachelor's in journalism and a Master of Arts in New Media Journalism from the same university. She has participated in many research projects such as the "Digital Bridges" (a platform for civil society dialogue and cultural journalism between Greece and Turkey) and the CSIS practicum in Modern Journalism: Reporting on International Affairs (Washington, D.C.). Kostopoulou has also worked as a media monitoring manager, journalist, and editor in various local media outlets in Thessaloniki and as a web editor at the European Parliament in Brussels.

Nur Sinem Kourou is a PhD candidate at The Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi University. Her current research focuses on the new rising phenomenon in global politics: populism. More particularly, she focuses on the gender into populism debate by analyzing the right-wing populist parties in the scope of their family-mainstreaming approach. She is currently a 2021-2022 Fox International Fellow at Yale University and research assistant at Istanbul Kültür University since February 2016.

Marius Mehrl received his PhD from the Department of Government at the University of Essex in 2020 and is a postdoctoral researcher at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, University of Munich. His research in-

terests include the dynamics of intrastate and interstate conflict, external intervention in armed conflict, and civil-military relations. Some of his work on these topics is published or forthcoming in journals including the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, and *International Interactions*.

Ronald Meinardus is a political analyst and commentator. Brought up in Egypt and Greece by globetrotting parents, he has followed their paradigm. He earned his Ph.D. from Hamburg University with a thesis on Greece's foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. Meinardus started his professional career in journalism at Germany's international broadcaster – first as economics' producer, later as Head of Deutsche Welle's legendary Greek radio program. A passion for liberal politics and advocacy took him to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) and assignments in Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Egypt, India and Turkey. Apart from managing political projects in various parts of the world, writing commentary and analytical papers, Meinardus is a qualified facilitator and consultant focusing on strategic planning and political communications. Meinardus joined the ranks of Greece's foremost foreign policy think tank ELIAMEP in 2021 as Senior Research Fellow. His current research interests center around Greek-Turkish issues, EU-Turkey relations, the role of Germany in the region and developments in the Arab world. More information and links to selected publications at www.meinardus.info.

Kleopatra Moditsi works at the Development Department of the Greek NGO ARSIS - Association for the Social Support of Youth. She is responsible for finding new sources of revenue for the organisation by writing project proposals and approaching potential donors. Kleopatra holds an MA degree in international peace and conflict resolution from the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC and a BA in political science and international studies from Old Dominion University in Virginia. Her previous experience includes positions in Europe and the United States in the fields of academia and research, as well as the non-profit and public sectors.

Alaaddin F. Paksoy holds BA degrees in 'Journalism' and 'Cinema and Television' from Anadolu University. He holds a master's degree from Stockholm University and a PhD in Journalism Studies from the University of Sheffield. His dissertation focused on the representation of Turkey's EU bid in the British media. Paksoy has published several research articles focusing on Turkey-EU relations and the Syrian refugees in Turkey. His most recent books *Türk Basınında Suriyeli Sığınmacılar* (Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Press) and *Ege'nin İki Yakası* (Two Sides of the Aegean) were published in Turkish/Paksoy works as a lecturer in the Department of Journalism of Anadolu University.

Selin Siviş defended her Doctoral thesis from the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex, in 2020. In her research, she focuses on how the boundary-making process takes place in multiple forms from perspectives of host population towards refugees and asylum-seekers in the informal market economy. She currently works as researcher for a British Academy funded project, titled "Wellbeing, Housing, and Infrastructure in Turkey," coordinated by the Institute of Development Studies. She also held visiting research fellow positions at the University of Konstanz, Germany, Yaşar University in İzmir and Çukurova University in Adana, Turkey. Her areas of interest include international migration, the informal labor market, local labor market integration policies, welfare deservingness, multiple forms of exclusion, and social and symbolic boundaries. She has published articles in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* and *International Migration*.

Jegar Delal Tayip is a cultural mediator and interpreter, currently working with refugees in an international organization. A native speaker of Turkish and Kurdish, with a strong command of English and Arabic, Jegar aspires to build bridges between people and societies through language and gastronomy. He is a youth worker at grassroots NGOs aiming at empowering young migrants and refugees, facilitating their transition to adulthood and autonomy by providing access to educational, vocational, and professional opportunities. Passionate about community cooking, he is a volunteer chef in intercultural events, where he prepares meals inspired by the cuisine of Anatolia,

where he was raised, but with a European twist. He was recently featured by the Intereuropean Human Aid (IHA) as a success story and a role model for young migrants. Despite his young age, thanks to his linguistic skills, cultural background and experience in Turkey, Greece, and the Middle East, he has contributed to the work of international researchers either as an expert or as a facilitator and mediator. His fields of interest include the social integration of young refugees and migrants, cultural mediation, refugees' access to education, arts and sports-based youthwork, intercultural and interfaith dialogue, prevention of youth extremism, and community cooking for good.

Deniz Halman Tomaka holds a BA in Sociology from Istanbul University and a master's degree in Sociology from Istanbul Bilgi University. Her thesis title is "Semiotic Analysis of Urban Transformation Promotional Films of Municipalities in Istanbul". She continues her education as a PhD candidate at the Communication Studies Program of Kadir Has University. She works as a Visiting Lecturer at Kadir Has University's Core Program. Her research interests are urbanization and urban regeneration processes.

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University, Istanbul. He holds a BA in Political Science and History from the University of California, Berkeley and an MA and PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has previously served in various capacities in several research and academic institutions such as the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens; the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris; the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of Economics; the University of the Aegean, Rhodes; and the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). Athens. He also served as an advisor at the Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He is Editor of *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* (SSCI indexed); a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum; co-convener of the Commission on the Black Sea; a member of the Advisory Boards of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, the International Institute for Peace, Vienna; and the Corporate Social Responsibility Asso-

ciation of Turkey. His more recent applied and research interests include Greek-Turkish Relations; Black Sea Security and Politics; EU foreign and neighborhood policies; Sustainable Development; and non-formal education activities focused on youth empowerment.

Polen Türkmén is currently a research associate at an independent think-tank, A Path for Europe, and a Blue Book trainee at the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Global and Transregional threats unit. She holds a Master of International Affairs with a specialization in 'security and sustainability' from the Hertie School and a bachelor's degree in Philosophy from the University of St Andrews. She has previously worked as a student/research assistant at the Hertie School's Jacques Delors Centre and All European Academies (ALLEA) and interned at the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi). Her interests include European foreign and security policy, EU - Turkey - NATO relations and disinformation.

About the Partners



**FRIEDRICH NAUMANN
FOUNDATION** For Freedom.

Turkey

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom is an independent, non-profit, and non-governmental organization from Germany working for adult civic education on an international scale. According to our mission, we are committed to promoting the values of liberalism: Individual freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and market economy. Tolerance, the full respect for human rights, and a secular state, which respects the religious beliefs of every citizen, are crucial for our understanding of liberalism.



The Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University

The Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University was established in 2004 as the Center for European Union Studies to study Turkey's European Union accession process. Since September 2010, the CIES has undergone a major transformation by widening its focus in order to pursue applied, policy-oriented research and to promote debate on the most pressing geostrategic issues of the region. The Center's areas of research and interaction include EU institutions and policies (such as enlargement, neighborhood policies and CFSP/CSDP), cross-cutting horizontal issues such as regional cooperation, global governance, and security, inter alia with a geographical focus on the Black Sea Region (including the Caucasus), the Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, Turkish-Greek relations, and transatlantic relations. The CIES has

organized numerous international conferences and outreach activities with selected speakers on a wide range of issues and has partnered with several like-minded organizations in Turkey and abroad. Its two flagship initiatives have been the annual International Neighbourhood Symposium which was held for 10 years in Istanbul and Odessa (2011-2020) and the Greek Turkish Young Leaders Symposium which has been held yearly since 2015 in Thessaloniki, Istanbul, Kavala, online and Athens. In 2021, the CIES launched the Dialogue Paper Series which includes papers that are co-written by Greek and Turkish young leaders. With the support of Kadir Has University, the CIES has laid the foundations for a sustainable research institution. It hopes to continue its mission of being a viable policy-oriented research center by promoting sustainable activities; promoting synergies among partners; cooperating with national and international institutions; and by continuing its outreach through policy-oriented publications, seminars, conferences, training symposia, and other activities.

DIALOGUE DIALOGUE DIALOGUE

Bridging the Gaps

An Almanac for Greek-Turkish Cooperation

Edited by Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

This book is a labor of love inspired by the continuous interaction and interaction between young Greek and Turkish participants in numerous forums that the two editors have nurtured for close to a decade. In an international order dominated by hostility, distrust and negative stereotypes, dialogues across borders are a positive response. The conflict between Greece and Turkey is considered one of the most complex conflicts in Europe, and possibly beyond. For decades, the bilateral strife has repeatedly led insecurity as well as periodic violence and war. Also, in this part of the world, the past weighs heavily on the present. What happened long ago determines what happens today and may stand in the way of a peaceful future, or even in imagining one. Conflicts bedevil the bilateral relationship on multiple fronts. As in other cross-border rivalries, we are witnesses to dynamic developments as new contentious issues have emerged to complicate the agenda.

With an eye on what the two sides can do together; this book presents original research co-written by at least one Greek and one Turkish scholar with the objective to provide policy recommendations that could help in bridging the gaps to enhance Greek-Turkish dialogue and cooperation.

 NOBEL BİLİMSEL ESERLER

www.nobelyayin.com   

nobelyayin | nobelkitap | nobelcocuk | nobelyasam | nobelcocukyayin

 **E-KİTAP**
kiralamak için

ISBN 978-625-433-135-0

9 786254 133135 0

 www.nobelkitap.com